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ABSTRACT
SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
FEBRUARY 1994
RICHARD CRANSTON PAULL, B.A., LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker
Supervenience is the impossibility of independent
variation. A crude statement of supervenience would be the
claim that things cannot differ in some respect without
differing in some other respect. For example, to say that
the mental supervenes on the physical is to say that there
cannot be mental differences without physical differences.
The basic idea behind supervenience can be developed
in a number of ways. My dissertation contains a detailed
study of the different supervenience relations found in the
literature. I consider their logical relations to one
another and their relative strengths and weaknesses. I
then develop new, more useful supervenience relations.
In general, supervenience is supposed to be a
nonreductive dependence relation. A primary goal of my
dissertation is to determine the nature and philosophical
significance of the dependence relation provided by
supervenience. So, for example, I attempt to determine
whether materialism is adequately formulated as a
supervenience thesis. Recently, many have claimed that it
V
is not. They claim that the mental could supervene on the
physical without being asymmetrically dependent on the
physical in the way that materialism requires. I respond
by agreeing that supervenience is not sufficient for the
relevant sort of dependence, but I contend that the
supervenience of the mental on the physical is a non-
trivial necessary condition on materialism. So the
question of the supervenience of the mental on the physical
is significant, for if it fails to hold, then materialism
is false. Thus, I defend the importance of supervenience
to philosophy while acknowledging that some of the recent
criticisms of supervenience are sound.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
ABSTRACT v
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. Supervenience and its Applications 1
B. Background Assumptions 11
1. Possible Worlds 11
2. Possible Individuals 16
3. Properties and Relations 17
4. Formal and Metaphysical Equivalence 24
5. Final Preliminaries 29
II. LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE 33
A. Strong and Weak Supervenience 3 3
1. Canonical Formulations 33
2. Logical Relations and Boolean Closure .... 36
3. Alternative Formulations 42
B. A Response to Bacon 49
1. Closure Under Resplicing 49
2. The Equivalence of Strong and Weak Under
Full Closure 51
3. Bacon on Coextension and Necessary
Coextension 54
4. The Case Against Diagonal Closure 60
5. Conclusion 64
III. STRONG SUPERVENIENCE AND NONREDUCTIVE DEPENDENCE 66
A. Strong Supervenience and Reducibility 66
1. Introduction 66
2 . Nagel on Intertheoretic Reduction 67
3 . Formulating the Issue : * : * :
4. Arguments in Support of Nonreducibility .. 75
5. Conclusion
vii
B. Strong Supervenience and Dependence 83
1. Introduction 83
2. Strong Supervenience and Functional
Dependence 86
3. Strong Supervenience and Ontic Priority .. 91
4. Conclusion 102
IV. GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AND PLENITUDE: A RESPONSE TO
KIM 105
A. Introduction 105
1. Formulating Global Supervenience 105
2 . Motivations for Global Supervenience 109
3. The Issue at Hand 116
B. Petrie on the Nonequivalence of Strong and
Global 118
1. Petrie's Counterexample 118
2. Plenitude Through Isolation 125
C. The Defense of Global Supervenience 132
1. Kim's First Argument 132
2. "Weird" Dependence 137
3. Kim's Second Argument 140
4. Intermediate Conclusion 142
D. Isolation and Contingent Supervenience 143
1. Objections to Isolation 143
2. Consequences for Contingent Global
Supervenience Theses 145
3. Conclusion 150
V. GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE: A CLOSER LOOK 152
A. Introduction ! * * * :
B. Heilman and Thompson's Determination
Principles 157
C. Reconciling (Gk) and (Gt) 104
1. A Suitable Definition of Global
A-Indiscernibility 104
2. The Reconciliation 108
D. Strong Global Supervenience 173
1. Inspiration from the Literature 173
2. The Need for (Gs)
viii
3. The Metaphysical Inequivalence of (Gs)
and (Gw) 184
E. The Importance of Relations 188
F. Petrie and Kim Reconsidered 193
1. Petrie's Counterexample 193
2. Kim on the Extra Atom 19 5
G. Conclusion 197
VI. GENERALIZED LOCAL AND GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE
RELATIONS 198
A. Introduction 198
B. Generalized Local Supervenience 200
1. Initial Formulations 200
2. Taking Account of the Part/Whole Relation . 203
3. The Local Supervenience of Relations 205
C. Generalized Global Supervenience: Final
Adjustments 2 07
D. Entailment Relations 211
1. The Basic Picture 211
2. Special Cases 214
E. Correlation and Functional Dependence 218
1. Introduction 218
2. (Gsm)
,
Correlation, and Functional
Dependence 220
3. (Lwm) , Correlation, and Functional
Dependence 226
4. (Gwm)
,
Correlation, and Functional
Dependence 229
F. Nonreductive Dependence Again 232
1. Reduction 232
2. Dependence 236
G. Conclusion 239
VII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUPERVENIENCE 241
A. The significance of Functional Dependence .... 241
1. The Objection 241
2. A Combinatorial Defense of Supervenience . 242
3. A Second Look at the Literature 248
ix
B. A Response to Grimes 251
C. Conclusion 253
BIBLIOGRAPHY 256
X
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. Supervenience and its Applications
A supervenience thesis is a denial of the possibility
of independent variation. For example, the claim that the
mental supervenes on the physical means (roughly) that
there can be no mental differences without physical
differences: anyone exactly like me in all intrinsic and
extrinsic physical respects must be like me in all mental
respects. Although supervenience has only become an object
of study in the latter half of this century, the history of
philosophy contains many supervenience theses: Leibniz
held that worlds cannot differ regarding the truths about
corporeal objects without differing regarding the truths
about monadic perceptions. Descartes, Locke, and others
held that objects cannot differ in their secondary
qualities without differing in the primary qualities of, or
relations between, their parts.
While the denial of the possibility of independent
variation is the core idea of supervenience, other ideas
are closely associated with it: specifically, (i)
dependence (or determination) and (ii) reducibility . Much
of the recent interest in supervenience derives from its
1
reputed capacity to capture the claim that one family of
properties depends on (or is determined by) another family
of properties without implying that scientific theories of
the dependent realm are reducible to those of independent
realm. We can understand this better by examining the
history of philosophical uses of supervenience
.
The leading expert on supervenience, Jaegwon Kim,
traces the current interest in supervenience to this
passage in G. E. Moore's "The Conception of Intrinsic
Value" :
if a given thing possesses any kind of
intrinsic value in a certain degree,
then. .. anything exactly like it, must under
all circumstances, possess it in exactly the
same degree. Or to put it in the
corresponding negative form: It is
impossible that of two exactly similar
things one should possess it and the other
not, or that one should possess it in one
degree, and the other in a different one. I
think this... is naturally conveyed by saying
that the kind of value in question depends
solely on the intrinsic nature of what
possesses it.^
Moore combined this view about the dependence of values on
facts with his rejection of the "naturalistic fallacy"
according to which normative predicates are definable in
terms of descriptive predicates. Thus, Moore provides a
precedent for viewing supervenience (the impossibility of
''Moore (1922) pp. 261-262.
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independent variation) as a dependence (or determination^)
relation free of certain kinds of reductive implications.
Others followed Moore in using the supervenience of
values on descriptive traits to capture the "primacy" of
descriptive characteristics of things while denying that
supervenience entails that values are reducible to (because
definable in terms of) descriptive properties. Consider,
for example, these comments of R. M. Hare which are
generally cited as the first use of "supervenience" in its
technical sense.
^
First, let us take that characteristic of
'good' which has been called its
supervenience. Suppose that we say 'St.
Francis was a good man. ' It is logically
impossible to say this and to maintain at
the same time that there might have been
another man placed exactly in the same
circumstances as St. Francis, and who
behaved in exactly the same way, but who
differed from St. Francis in this respect
only, that he was not a good man. Next, the
explanation of this logical impossibility
does not lie in any form of naturalism; it
is not the case that there is any
conjunction C of descriptive characteristics
such that to say that a man has C entails
that he is morally good. . .Nevertheless, the
judgment that a man is morally good is not
logically independent of the judgement that
he has certain good-making characteristics;
there is a relation between them, although
^The claim that A depends solely on B seems to be
equivalent to the claim that B determines A.
^Apparently, Leibniz sometimes used the Latin term
"supervenire" to express his doctrine of the dependence of
relations on the intrinsic properties of things. See Kim
(1990) p. 5.
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it is not one of entailment or identity of
meaning/
While supervenience still plays a large role in meta-
ethical discussions/ recently it has been most freguently
applied in the philosophy of mind as (part of) a solution
to the mind/body problem. In the late 1960 's, behaviorism
had run its course and Putnam's arguments for the multiple
realizability of mental states had put the reductive type-
type identity theory under siege. In this climate, it is
not surprising that those who still wanted to uphold the
primacy of the physical but had come to distrust
reductionist versions of materialism would appropriate the
notion of supervenience from ethics. With its credentials
as a nonreductive dependence relation, supervenience seemed
to be the perfect way to preserve the primacy of the
physical while denying the reducibility of the mental.
Donald Davidson was among the first to use the notion
of supervenience in the philosophy of mind.
Although the position I describe denies that
there are psychophysical laws, it is
consistent with the view that mental
characteristics are in some sense dependent,
or supervenient, on physical
characteristics. Such supervenience might
be taken to mean that there cannot be two
events alike in all physical respects but
^Hare (1952) p. 145.
^See Brink (1989), and DePaul (1987).
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differing in some mental respect, or that an
object cannot alter in some mental respect
without altering in some physical respect.
Dependence or supervenience of this kind
does not entail reducibility through law or
definition: if it did, we could reduce moral
properties to descriptive, and this there is
good reason to believe cannot be done.^
Jaegwon Kim, John Haugeland, Terence Horgan, Geoffrey
Heilman, Frank Thompson, Paul Teller, and David Lewis are
among the many philosophers who have subsequently used
supervenience to characterize materialism. Lewis speaks
for many when he claims that "the bare minimum that is
common to all materialist theories ... is a supervenience
thesis: no difference without a physical difference."^
Philosophers of mind have put supervenience to other
uses as well. It is often used to discuss the issue of
methodological solipsism and the related issue of whether
beliefs and other propositional attitudes have "wide" or
"narrow" content. Even dualists could make use of
supervenience in this context because it is a live issue
for dualists whether Putnam and Burge's thought experiments
refute the supervenience thesis according to which minds
cannot have different thoughts without differing
intrinsically in some way.
^Davidson (1970) p. 88.
^Lewis (1988) p. 507.
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Discussions of supervenience are not confined to
ethics and the philosophy of mind. It is used to
characterize the relationship between biological traits
like fitness and "the physical, behavioral and ecological
properties of organisms that are subjects of lower level
theories in the life sciences"®. It is also used to
characterize the relationship between the aesthetic and the
non-aesthetic^, the semantic and the non-semantic^°, and
the social and the individual . Most generally, it is
used to formulate the thesis that everything is dependent
on the microphysical^^
.
As supervenience came to play a role in so many areas
of philosophy, interest in the logic and philosophical
significance of the notion has increased dramatically. The
main issue at stake in discussions of its philosophical
significance is its adequacy as a nonreductive dependence
relation. This is a major focus of chapters III, IV, and
VI. As to its logic, a basic point of contention has been
the entailment relations among the various versions of
supervenience that have been proposed. To get some feel
®Rosenberg (1978) p. 368.
^See Currie (1991).
^®See Bonevac (1991).
^^See Currie (1984).
^^See Kim (1978), Horgan (1982), and Lewis (1983) and
(1986a)
.
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for the admissible alternatives, let us make the basic
supervenience schema explicit:
(Sch) There can be no difference of the supervenient
sort (e.g., the mental) without a difference of
the subvenient or base sort (e.g., the physical).
There are many dimensions along which this schema can
be made precise, thereby yielding different supervenience
relations. First, what sorts of entities are supposed to
be incapable of differing in the supervenient way without
differing in the subvenient way? In the literature the two
most common answers to this claim are (i) localized objects
or events and (ii) entire possible worlds or models. One
can categorize supervenience relations depending on their
answer to this guestion. Call relations that imply the
first answer "local" supervenience relations, and ones that
imply the second, "global" supervenience relations.
Another question is how should occurrences of 'the
mental', 'the physical', and 'the moral' be understood in
standard statements of supervenience? Usually, such
expressions are taken to denote sets of properties: when
one claims that the mental supervenes on the physical one
is saying that the set of all mental properties supervenes
on the set of all physical properties. There is also a
linguistic variant on this proposal according to which such
7
expressions are taken to denote sets of predicates. Yet
another possibility is that they denote sets of truths.
Once again, there is a linguistic version of this proposal
that essentially involves the notion of truths in a
language and analyzes the supervenience thesis in terms of
what holds in some set of models of the language (s) in
question, and a non-linguistic (or metaphysical) version of
this proposal which divorces truth from any particular
language and analyzes the supervenience thesis in terms of
what is true (simpliciter) in some class of possible
worlds
.
There is also the question of the proper
interpretation of the modality involved in supervenience
theses. Many options exist here, and some will be
discussed below.
To summarize: I have distinguished four dimensions
along which the supervenience schema can be made more
precise. First, there is the local/global distinction:
sometimes the denial of independent variation is intended
to apply to proper parts (or inhabitants) of possible
worlds; other times it is meant to apply to entire possible
worlds (or models) . Second, there is the question whether
it is sets of properties and relations (or predicates) on
the one hand or propositions (or sentences) that stand in
the supervenience relation. Third, supervenience relations
can be understood in a more or less linguistic fashion.
8
Both local and global supervenience can be (and have been)
understood as relations between sets of linguistic items,
either predicates or truths in a language . Fourth,
questions arise concerning the proper interpretation of the
modal expressions involved in supervenience claims.
In this dissertation I consider both local and global
supervenience relations. In chapters II, III, and IV, I
investigate the logical relations between, and
philosophical controversies concerning, local and global
supervenience relations as they are formulated in the
literature. In these chapters, following Kim (and others)
,
I formulate supervenience as a relation between sets if
properties. This way of understanding supervenience is
preferable to taking the relata to be sets of propositions
because it is plausible that propositions just are a
certain kind of property (properties instantiated only by
possible worlds) but properties are not readily subsumable
under propositions. It is also preferable to taking the
relata to be sets of linguistic objects because
supervenience is often used to characterize relations that
would hold even if there never were language users (e.g.,
the dependence of chemical features on microphysical
ones).^^ Finally, in chapters V and VI, I extend Kim's
treatment of supervenience by introducing new versions of
^^For details, see the beginning of chapter V.
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local and global supervenience that hold between sets of
properties and relations.
There are two main goals of this dissertation. First
I want to consider the status of supervenience as a
nonreductive dependence relation: particularly its
significance as a dependence relation. Jaegwon Kim has
often argued that any supervenience relation strong enough
to express the dependence of the mental on the physical
that is characteristic of materialism is too strong to be
nonreductive.^^ More recently, Kim has joined Thomas
Grimes and others in arguing that no version of
supervenience is strong enough to be a dependence relation
worthy of materialism after all. Some of the criticisms
illustrate limitations of supervenience we should be aware
of. But none of them, in my opinion, succeeds in
undermining the status of at least some varieties of
supervenience as philosophically significant nonreductive
dependence/determination relations
.
The other central task of my dissertation is to
investigate the logical relations between, and strengths
and weaknesses of, extant varieties of supervenience, and
then to introduce new supervenience relations that are
formulated more precisely and more widely applicable than
those prevalent in the literature. For example, while
supervenience is usually formulated as a relation between
^^Kim (1988). Also see Oddie (1991).
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sets of properties, it is more useful if the relate are
taken to be sets of properties and relations. After all,
the claim that the mental supervenes on the physical is
naturally interpreted as applicable to mental relations
such as belief and desire as well as mental properties.
Likewise, physicalists will surely want to include
spatiotemporal relations, the part/whole relation, and
perhaps causal relations in the base set. But standard
formulations of supervenience do not allow relations in
either the base set or the supervenient set. In chapters V
and VI, I introduce new versions of supervenience that
accommodate relations.
Since supervenience is a modal relation between sets
of properties (and relations)
,
in the course of the
discussion I make significant use of many metaphysical
notions. Consequently, I owe the reader some account of my
understanding of properties, relations, possible worlds and
possible objects. This is provided below.
B. Background Assumptions
1. Possible Worlds
I agree with David Lewis that
Supervenience means that there could be no
difference of one sort without difference of
the other sort. Clearly, this 'could'
11
indicates modality. Without the modality we
have nothing of interest.
Not surprisingly, supervenience theses are often formulated
in the language of modal logic, and discussed in the
possible worlds idiom. Lewis has criticized the former
portion of this practice. He believes that translating
supervenience theses into the language of boxes and
diamonds is an unnecessary intermediate step that actually
distorts the intended meaning of supervenience theses. He
advocates quantifying over possible objects and possible
worlds directly instead.
To see why Lewis's advice should be followed, consider
the folowing statement of local psycho-physical
supervenience: "no two objects can differ mentally without
differing physically". If one treats 'can' as a modal
operator, translates this into the language of modal logic,
and then applies modal negation, the resulting thesis reads
roughly as follows: "necessarily, any two things that are
physically indiscernible (instantiate the same members of
the class of physical properties) are mentally
indiscernible too". On the standard actualist semantics
for modal logic, this is the claim that any (accessible)
possible world is such that any physically indiscernible
inhabitants of it are mentally indiscernible. This version
^^Lewis (1986a) p. 15.
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of local supervenience is usually referred to as "weak
supervenience"
,
and for good reason: prima facia, it is
compatible with the possibility of there being someone
physically identical to the way I actually am who is vastly
mentally different from me. As long as all physically
indiscernible worldmates are mentally indiscernible, the
modal-operator rendition of our local supervenience thesis
is satisfied. The determination relation we tried to
capture in the original supervenience thesis appears to
have slipped away.
Lewis thinks that the translation into the language of
modal logic is to blame. He claims that by treating 'can'
and other modal expressions as modal operators, we distort
the meaning of the local supervenience thesis:
the thesis we want says that there could be
no mental difference between two people
without there being some physical
difference, whether intrinsic or extrinsic,
between them. Reading the 'could' as a
diamond, the thesis becomes this: there is
no world (or, none within a certain
restriction) wherein two people differ
mentally without there being some physical
difference, intrinsic or extrinsic, between
them. That is not quite right. We have
gratuitously limited our attention to
physical differences between two people in
the same world. . . .So what we have said is
not quite what we meant to say, but rather
this: there could be no differences without
some physical differences of the sort that
could arise between people in the same
world . The italicized part is a gratuitous
addition [I]nsistence on reading the
13
'could' as a diamond has distorted the
intended meaning.
Kim acknowledges that the original determination
thesis has been lost in the modal-operator translation
which results in weak supervenience . He tries to
capture the strength of the original idea with a new
version of local supervenience:
Let A and B be families of properties closed
under Boolean operations ... A strongly
supervenes on B just in case, necessarily,
for each x and each property F in A, if x
has F, then there exists a property G in B
^*^Lewis (1986a) p. 16.
^^As Kim says in "Concepts of Supervenience":
although the definition of "weak
supervenience" follows very closely the
bench-mark explanations of supervenience in
the literature, as witness the quotations
from Hare and Davidson, the relation it
defines is considerably weaker than one might
have expected - indeed, too weak for some of
its typical intended applications ... The
particular associations between [supervening]
properties and [base] properties in a given
world cannot be counted on to carry over into
other worlds.
Thus, weak supervenience falls short of
the following condition: fixing the base
properties of an object fixes its
supervenient properties. This condition
expresses a presumptive desideratum on the
explication of supervenience: base properties
must determine supervenient properties in the
sense that once the former are fixed for an
object, there is no freedom to vary the
latter for that very object (Kim (1984a) pp.
159-160)
.
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such that X has G. and necessarily if any y
has G, it has F.
Although this formulation has some virtues,
perspicuity is not among them. The local supervenience
schema states that there can be no supervenient differences
between individuals without subvenient differences between
them. The following is a more natural rendition of this
idea
:
Where A and B are any sets of properties, A strongly
supervenes on B iff any possible individuals that are
B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible as well.
The inclination to treat modal expressions as modal
operators (instead of possibilist quantifiers) apparently
contributed to both the misinterpretation of the basic idea
behind local supervenience (as weak supervenience) and to
the unnecessarily complicated formulation of strong
supervenience. In contrast, Lewis's modal realism provides
the requisite metaphysical background for quantifying
directly over possible individuals and their properties,
and making the trans-world comparisons that supervenience
requires. Consequently, modal realism (or some version of
’^Kim (1984a) pp. 164-165.
15
possibilism) is invaluable to the supervenience theorist,
and I will make use of it throughout
.
2 . Possible Individuals
I follow Lewis in assuming that possible individuals
are worldbound: they are literally parts of the
spatiotemporally isolated possible individuals that are
possible worlds. I also adopt an unrestricted principle of
mereological composition for possible individuals which are
worldmates. Thus, I accept the existence of temporally and
spatially discontinuous possible individuals.
Because I conceive of possible individuals as
worldbound, I need not qualify my attributions of
properties to possible individuals with the possible world
at which they have said attributes. Of course, when I say
a possible individual is part of a world, non-Lewisians can
understand me to be saying that it exists a^ or according
to the world. I will sometimes use this terminology (which
reguires reference to the world in which the individual
possesses the property) when I discuss the views of those
who accept Kripkean assumptions about trans-world identity.
would much prefer paradise on the cheap. I aro
sympathetic to Bigelow and Pargetter's (1990) view according
to which possible worlds are complex structural universals.
But this is a dissertation on supervenience not modal
realism, so I will avoid a detailed discussion of various
substitutes for Lewis's possibilia.
16
Finally, since I conceive of possible individuals as
having both temporal and spatial parts, I need not take
explicit account of existence at a time in my formulations.
Since non-instantaneous possible individuals are not
"wholly present" at each moment of time at which they
exist, I avoid the difficulty of temporary intrinsic
properties (I am not pushed to consider properties to be
relations between individuals and times)
.
3. Properties and Relations
Lewis diagnoses a number of "rifts" in the standard
accounts of properties and relations. One is between the
abundant conception and the sparse conception. According
to the abundant conception of properties, for any set of
possible individuals, there is at least one property
possessed by all and only the members of that set. On this
conception being grue is a property, and being grue or an
undetached rabbit part is another. There is no limit to
the gruesome disjunctiveness of such properties. Likewise,
on the abundant conception of relations, there is an n-
place relation for every set of n-tuples of possible
objects. On the sparse conception, however, only a select
minority of sets of possible individuals (or sets of n-
tuples) have the distinction of being the extension of some
property (or relation) . D. M. Armstrong has put forth such
a theory. He claims that only perfectly determinate
17
properties and relations that figure in the laws of nature
or account for the objective resemblances^^ of things
really exist. Armstrong calls such properties and
relations, "universals" . The set of universals is not
closed under either complementation or disjunction.
Lewis suggests that instead of choosing between the
two conceptions, we should accept both. More precisely, we
should accept an abundance of properties and relations
while admitting that there is a distinguished minority that
play the theoretical roles emphasized on the sparse
conception. I will take his advice. In Lewis's ontology,
sets of possible individuals and sets of n-tuples of
possible individuals are abundant properties and relations
respectively. So I commit myself to the existence of
entities suited to play (approximately) the role played in
Lewis's theory by sets of possible individuals and sets of
n-tuples of possible individuals. Since I have already
adopted other aspects of Lewis's modal realism, for the
sake of overall coherence I follow him in identifying
abundant properties (and relations) with sets of (n-tuples
^^The notion of objective resemblance is very hard to
specify precisely. But the intuition is that grueness, for
example, is not an objective respect of similarity, while
greenness (of some determinate shade) is. The difference,
according to Armstrong, is that entities that are both grue
need not share any universal (or certainly no color
universal)
,
while entities that are the same shade of green
do share a universal. Universals are postulated to accoun
for the intuitive distinction between real respects of
resemblance (or objective similarity) , and merely Cambridge
respects of resemblance.
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of) possible individuals.^^ I shall be assuming that
properties and relations are necessary existents, although
many are only contingently exemplified.
According to Lewis, a small minority of the abundant
properties and relations play the role that properties and
relations are supposed to play on the sparse conception.
Lewis calls them the natural properties and relations. If
we accept Armstrong's theory of universals we can analyze
the distinction between natural properties and the others
thus: a set of possible objects is a perfectly natural
property iff there exists some universal, U, such that all
and only possible objects which instantiate U are members
of the set. Lewis remains agnostic on the proper account
of the distinction because he is agnostic on the question
whether universals (of the sort Armstrong speaks) exist.
But he is committed to the existence of the distinction
even to the point of claiming that we should take it as
primitive if need be, and he makes extensive use of it.
The four essential features of naturalness are, first,
any natural property or relation is essentially natural;
second, natural properties and relations are supposed to be
respects of objective resemblance; third, the perfectly
^^Although I do not have a fully developed ontological
system, I would prefer taking properties and relations
(sparsely conceived) as my primitives and constructing
possible worlds and possible individuals in terms of them.
The goal would be to come up with an ersatz theory of
possibilia that is (more or less) isomorphic to Lewis's
modal realism.
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natural properties and relations are supposed to compose a
set of properties that is a minimal supervenience base for
all qualitative properties and relations, and, fourth,
naturalness comes in degrees. An example of a somewhat
natural property might be the conjunction of two perfectly
natural properties. It is somewhat natural in virtue of
being a respect in which things are objectively similar,
but, assuming that its conjuncts are perfectly natural , it
is not part of any minimal supervenience base for all
respects of qualitative difference that also contains its
conjuncts, and therefore it is not perfectly natural.
There is another important distinction between
properties: the one between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties. This distinction can be made in terms of the
intuitive notion of a perfect duplicate. Think of ping
pong balls from the same package. Ignoring their different
relational properties (e.g., one has the property of being
under a workbench, the other has the property of being on
the table)
,
they are qualitatively indistinguishable (to
the naked eye) . Of course, the balls are not really
duplicates, they are only approximate duplicates. For an
example of perfect duplicates, consider electrons. As I
understand it, they are supposed to be perfect duplicates
of one another. With this notion we can delineate the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. Intrinsic properties are
those that must be shared by duplicates. A property, P, is
20
intrinsic iff there is no pair of possible objects x and y
such that X and y are duplicates and x has P but y lacks P.
So a property is extrinsic iff it is not intrinsic - or is
it?
There is a difficulty. Extrinsic properties are
usually equated with relational properties, while intrinsic
properties are supposed to be entirely non-relational. But
now consider haecceities (or thisnesses) . They are non-
relational, but they do differ between duplicates. Thus,
if we assume that the intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy is
exhaustive, our characterization in terms of duplicates
implies that haecceities are extrinsic. One way to deal
with this problem is to claim that there are two different
kinds of properties, qualitative and non-qualitative
properties. If we could make independent sense of this
distinction, we could then make our conclusion that
haecceities are extrinsic more palatable by addinq that all
extrinsic qualitative properties are relational after all.
We need, therefore, to distinquish between qualitative
and non-qualitative properties. As a first approximation
we can say that non-qualitative properties are properties
whose extensions across loqical space can only be specified
in terms that make essential reference to particular
individuals or their haecceities. For example, compare the
extrinsic property of being less than a mile from my
computer with the extrinsic property of being less than a
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mile from anything that satisfies condition, C, where C
happens to be the conjunction of properties possessed by my
computer and all its (possible) duplicates. The latter
property is qualitative on my characterization, because
while it can be denoted by a description that makes
reference to my computer, it (the very same property) can
also be denoted by a description that makes reference to
any duplicate of my computer. The property of being less
than a mile from my computer, however, is a property that
my clock has, but a duplicate of my clock less than a mile
from a duplicate of my computer only possesses that
property if it is also less than a mile from mY computer,
the one I am composing this sentence on.
A complete account of the distinctions between natural
and nonnatural, intrinsic and extrinsic, qualitative and
non-qualitative properties, and their relations to the
notion of a duplicate are beyond the scope of this
dissertation. I hope I have said enough about these
distinctions to be able to make use of them.^^
^^Strictly speaking, either intrinsicality or
duplication can be defined in terms of the other. Lewis
attempts to define duplication in terms of naturalness, and
intrinsicality in terms of duplication. Since I find the
notion of a duplicate clearer than the notion of a natural
property, I refrain from defining it in terms of naturalness
and take it as a second basic notion. So for me,
duplication (like naturalness) is primitive, intrinsic
properties are those that cannot differ between duplicates,
and the rest are extrinsic.
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amongFinally, I need to introduce some distinctions
relations. Intrinsic relations are relations such that any
duplicate of the composite of the relata of the relation
must also have parts which stand in that relation to one
another. For example, distance relations are intrinsic: if
I am ten feet from my stereo, the duplicate of the
composite of me and my stereo (in our present positions)
must also have parts (namely duplicates of me and of my
stereo) that are ten feet apart. On the other hand, the
relation of having the same owner is extrinsic.
Lewis divides intrinsic relations into internal
relations and external relations. As he says, "an internal
relation is one that supervenes on the intrinsic natures of
its relata"^^, while an external relation is one that
"does not supervene on the natures of the relata taken
separately, but it does supervene on the nature of the
relata taken together. For example, similarity is an
internal (intrinsic) relation and distance relations are
external (intrinsic) relations. The difference is that if
X is similar to y then x is similar to any duplicate of y,
but it is not the case that if x is ten feet from y then x
is ten feet from any duplicate of y. Instead, if x is ten
^^I have heard David Lewis make this distinction
between relations. He makes it in a preliminary way in
Lewis (1983) footnote 16.
^^Lewis (1986a) p. 62.
^^Lewis (1986a) p. 62.
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feet from y then any duplicate of the composite of x and y
(x and y "taken together") will contain duplicates of x and
y which are ten feet from one another.
In conclusion, there are internal relations
(similarity)
,
external relations (distance)
,
and extrinsic
relations (having the same owner)
. All of them are to be
conceived of as sets of n-tuples of possible individuals,
and, like properties, they come in degrees of naturalness.
4. Formal and Metaphysical Equivalence
There is a lot of discussion of the equivalence
relations and entailment relations between different
formulations of supervenience . Unfortunately, however,
there is little mention of the different sorts of
equivalence (and entailment) that might be at issue.
Clarity demands that we consider the issue of equivalence
before we go any further. My remarks will generalize to
entailment in an obvious way.
According to one standard definition, where P and Q
are propositions,
(El) P is equivalent to Q D(P Q) is true.^^
^^Hughes and Cresswell (1968) p. 28. They call the
relation so defined, ' strict equivalence’ .
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This is a foriniilation of th© old. idoa that two piropositions
are equivalent iff it is impossible for them to differ in
truth value. (El) is best thought of as a schema, where
is replaced by specific necessity operators as
appropriate. The interpretation of relevant to our
purposes is the one where it is taken to express
metaphysical necessity (i.e., truth at all possible
worlds) . We will call the kind of equivalence defined in
(El), thus interpreted, "metaphysical equivalence". So,
given our appropriation of Lewis's metaphysical framework,
to say that two propositions are metaphysically equivalent
is to say that there is no possible world (simpliciter) at
which one is true and the other is false.
There is a different sort of definition that one is
likely to find in mathematical logic texts. For example,
according to Boolos and Jeffrey, where L is a logic (or
formal language) and S and T are sentences in L,
(E2) S is equivalent to T [in L] for all
[interpretations] I [satisfying the axioms of L] , if I
is an interpretation of S and of T, then I(S) =
I (T)
I will call this sort of equivalence, "formal equivalence".
Note that two formulas (e.g., OA and DOA) can be formally
equivalent in one logic (e.g., S5)
,
but fail to be formally
2^Boo1os and Jeffrey (1989) p. 107. They call the
relation so defined, ' logical equivalence’ .
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equivalent in another (e.g.
,
T) . That is why formal
equivalence must be relativised to particular formal
systems
.
These two kinds of equivalence are clearly distinct.
Two formulas can express metaphysically equivalent
propositions even though they fail to be formally
equivalent in any appropriate logic. Consider, for
example, the following sentences and their natural
translations into predicate logic:
(B) All Bachelors are male; Vx(Bx ^ Mx)
.
(M) All unmarried males are male; Vx((Ux & Mx) -> Mx) .
These sentences express metaphysically equivalent
propositions: both are true at all possible worlds. But
there are perfectly legitimate models of the predicate
calculus which assign a different set to 'B' than to the
intersection of 'U' and 'M' . If there were no such models,
'Vx(Bx ^ Mx) ' would be a theorem of the predicate calculus,
which it is not. 'Vx((Ux & Mx) Mx) ' , on the other hand,
is a theorem of the predicate calculus. But the sentences
they translate do, in fact, express metaphysically
equivalent propositions.
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For another example of this difference, consider the
following sentences and their translations into modal
predicate logic:
(1) Necessarily, all objects are spatiotemporally
related to one another; DVxVySxy.
(2) Necessarily, all tigers are cats; C]Vx(Tx ^ Cx) .
Assuming that Lewis's modal realism affords the correct
interpretation of the modal operators (as guantifiers over
"buzzing, blooming" possible worlds) and that possible
individuals are worldmates iff they are related by some
spatiotemporal relation, it follows that (1) is true. In
fact, it follows that (1) is necessarily true. Likewise,
suppose, for the sake of argument, that Kripke's views on
natural kind terms are correct and that (2) is also
necessarily true. More precisely, suppose that the
proposition we would express if we uttered (2) is true at
all possible worlds. It follows, then, that (1) and (2)
are metaphysically equivalent. But they are not formally
equivalent in any standard modal logic. After all, the
axioms of (even) the correct modal logic are validated by
models which clearly do not afford a literal interpretation
of modal discourse. We can take the domain of "world-
indices" to be pieces of paper, doughnuts or whatever. As
27
long as all the doughnuts are appropriately related to one
another (e.g. for S5, being made by the same baker would
do ) , and the valuation function follows the standard
rules, the axioms of the logic will be true in the model.
But clearly, many such interpretations of modal logic are
misinterpretations.^^ Formulas, and the propositions they
are used to express, are not true or false at doughnuts,
pieces of paper, or other entities that can serve as
members of the domain for metalogical purposes. Many
incorrect interpretations validate the axioms of the
correct modal logic. But on some of these incorrect
interpretations, (1) and (2) may well have different truth
values at some indices in the domain. There is nothing
about their "form" which rules this out, and that is all
that is required for them to fail to be formally equivalent
even on the correct modal logic.
On the other hand, only the correct interpretation of
the correct modal logic (for metaphysical necessity and
possibility)
,
the model that accurately models what Lewis
^®This assumes that every doughnut has a unique baker.
^^As Lewis says.
If modal operators were quantifiers over
towns restricted by the relation of being
connected by rail, that would validate some
system or other of modal logic. - So what,
since modal operators are nothing of the
sort? What good is it to know which
misinterpretations would validate a system?
(Lewis (1986a) p. 19)
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calls, 'logical space', is relevant to questions of
rnetaphysical equivalence. I follow Lewis in adopting
possible worlds as the indices and in assuming that all
worlds are (metaphysically) accessible to all other worlds.
Given our assumptions, it follows, then, that (1) and (2)
are metaphysically equivalent. Generally, two formulas can
fail to be formally equivalent in a particular modal logic
despite expressing necessarily equivalent propositions if
the formulas have divergent truth values at some index in
one of the incorrect models of that logic. It is plausible
that (1) and (2) are examples of this.
To sum up: two modal claims are metaphysically
equivalent iff they have the same truth value at every
world-index on the correct model of the correct modal
logic. But they are formally equivalent (in a logic) iff
they have the same truth value at every world-index on all
models of that logic, including the necessarily inaccurate
ones. Clearly, then, metaphysical and formal equivelence
are fundamentally different notions of equivalence. I will
do my best to distinguish them throughout the dissertation,
particularly in the next chapter.
5. Final Preliminaries
I will keep the discussion as nontechnical as
possible. In general, the argument will proceed in English
with informal use of variables ranging over possible
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worlds, possible individuals, properties, sets of
properties and even propositions. Most of the discussion
be carried on at a inetaphysical level, as it were.
For instance, even issues regarding the formal eguivalence
or lack thereof of two supervenience theses in a particular
modal logic (e.g., S4) will usually be considered by
investigating the respective truth values of these theses
at accessible possible worlds while making appropriate
assumptions about the accessibility relation (e.g., that it
is transitive, reflexive, but not symmetric)
.
Also, although I formulate supervenience as a relation
between sets (of properties or relations)
,
this use of sets
is to be treated as an expository convenience, not as a
substantive philosophical position. When the
convenience vanishes, as is the case when the relata of
supervenience relations are unit sets, so will the
practice. For example, if the unit set of being in pain
supervenes on some set of physical properties, I will
abbreviate this by saying simply that the property being in
pain supervenes on that set of physical properties.
^°For example, there might be advantages to formulating
supervenience as a relation between the properties and
relations themselves using the resources of plural
quantification. And since I do not discuss this issue, I do
not want to be interpreted as having any philosophical
objections to it. Rather, this is one place where I have
chosen to follow the path of least resistance because it is
familiar and I don't think the choice has much impact on the
issues I want to discuss.
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Once again, the main goals of this dissertation are
(i) to investigate the promise of supervenience as a
nonreductive dependence relation, and (ii) to develop more
useful versions of supervenience in light of a detailed
study of the strengths and weaknesses of extant versions.
In chapters II, III, and IV, I am solely concerned
with supervenience relations formulated in the literature
and the controversies involving them, while in chapters V,
VI, and VII, I introduce and explore new local and global
supervenience relations. In chapter II, I consider the
logical relations between the two main varieties of local
supervenience, weak and strong supervenience, in their many
different (often nonequivalent) formulations. In chapter
III, I consider the status of strong supervenience as a
nonreductive dependence relation. In chapter IV, I begin
my discussion of global supervenience by defending it from
some influential criticisms according to which it is too
weak a functional determination relation to be a
significant necessary condition on materialism. In chapter
V, I develop two new, more precise, global supervenience
relations that allow for the supervenience of relations,
and I investigate their relative strengths and weaknesses.
In chapter VI, I formulate new local supervenience
relations that are analogous to the new global relations.
I then consider the status of my new supervenience
relations as nonreductive dependence relations. I conclude
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in chapter VII with a defense of the significance of
supervenience, including an illustration of why global
psychophysical supervenience is a necessary condition
physicalism.
on
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CHAPTER II
LOCAL SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS FROM THE LITERATURE
A. Strong and Weak Supervenience
1. Canonical Formulations
According to our supervenience schema, there can be no
difference of the supervenient sort without a difference of
the base (or subvenient) sort. There are local and global
versions of this idea. In this chapter I will investigate
controversies concerning alternative formulations of, and
logical relations between, the two local supervenience
theses commonly discussed in the literature: "weak" and
"strong" supervenience.
I begin with the following definition:
(IS) For any set of properties. A, and any possible
objects, X and y, x and y are (individually) A-
indiscernible for any P in A, Px iff Py.
Now, where S (supervenient) and B (base) are sets of
properties and possible individuals are worldbound, our two
local supervenience relations can be defined thus:
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(W) S weakly supervenes on B for any possible
objects, X and y, (within sphere of
accessibility, A) if x and y are worldmates and x
and y are B-indiscernible
,
then x and y are S-
indiscernible
.
(S) S strongly supervenes on B for any possible
objects, X and y, (within sphere of
accessibility. A) if x any y are B-indiscernible
then X and y are S-indiscernible
.
One need not fix on a single accessibility relation as
the accessibility relation relevant for interpreting
supervenience claims J Thus, there is really no unique
relation defined by either of these formulations: each is
really a schema characterizing a family of relations with
members that differ depending on how the modal parameter is
fixed. In general, however, I will treat the accessibility
relation as an unrestricted equivalence relation on the
assumption that metaphysical possibility or necessity is in
question. Consequently, I will drop the parenthetical
reference to the accessibility relation in future
statements of (S) and (W) as well as in my forthcoming
formulations of other supervenience relations.
^See Kim (1984a) pp. 165-166; Kim (1990) p. 10.
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In this chapter I am primarily concerned with the
formal equivalence and formal entailment relations between
variants of strong and weak supervenience
. Thus, for the
time being, I shall use 'equivalent' to abbreviate
'formally equivalent' (as opposed to metaphysically
equivalent)
. The following question arises: "equivalent in
what logic or world theory?". When I claim that two theses
are equivalent (simpliciter)
,
I mean that they are T-
equivalent. I do this because the T-axioms provide a
relatively weak modal logic, and equivalence in a weaker
system implies equivalence in all stronger systems. When a
specific thesis fails to be T-equivalent but is equivalent
on some stronger system (e.g., S4)
,
I indicate this
explicitly.
In section A I consider the logical relations between
strong and weak supervenience on both their canonical
formulations and on other formulations. I pay particular
attention to the significance of the common requirement
that the base and supervenient sets be closed under Boolean
operations. Then, in section B, I present, explain and
evaluate John Bacon's controversial argument for the
equivalence of (S) and (W)
.
I hasten to add that in much of this chapter I focus
on clarifying some relatively arcane issues, and responding
to some misleading arguments that have caused confusion and
debate among supervenience theorists. But quite frankly.
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they are of limited philosophical significance. The reader
who is primarily interested in the philosophical issues
raised by supervenience (such as its status as a
nonreductive dependence relation) can safely skip all but
the next section of this chapter (section A. 2).
2 Logical Relations and Boolean Closure
Kim once reguired that both the supervening set S and
the subvening set B be closed under the Boolean property
forming operations of negation, (infinite) conjunction, and
(infinite) disjunction.^ Some supervenience theorists
have added new closure conditions;^ others have found
fault with closure under negation.^ Consequently, it is
important to note that I am justified in not requiring
either set to be Boolean closed:
(Rl) (W)/(S) with the requirement that S and B are
closed under Boolean operations is equivalent to
(W)/(S) without the closure requirement on either
S or B.^
^See Kim (1987), pp. 315-316, and Kim (1984a), pp.
157-165 for detailed discussions of weak and strong
supervenience with the closure condition.
^Bacon ( 1986)
.
^Post (1984), and Van Cleve (1990).
^This has been noted by Oddie and Tichy, (1990), p.
261, and hinted at by Van Cleve (1990), p. 231. For a
proof, see appendix I of Pauli and Sider (1992).
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Despite (Rl)
,
Boolean closure still plays a role in
many of the issues discussed in this chapter. I will
always distinguish the base set, B, from its Boolean
closure, ^(B)
.
Of course, this in no way implies that any
particular set B /3(B).
We are now prepared to examine the essential
difference between strong and weak supervenience
. Weak
only requires that no two worldmates are S-discernible and
B-indiscernible. Strong requires that no two possible
individuals from the same or different worlds are S-
discernible and B-indiscernible. Clearly, whatever holds
for any two possible individuals holds for any two
worldmates, so strong entails weak.
To prove that weak does not entail strong consider C,
the property of coexisting with a sentient being. It
weakly supervenes on any set of properties because, for any
world, W, all objects in W are indiscernible with respect
to coexisting with a sentient being. If there (actually)
is a sentient being, everything has C; if there is no
sentient being, nothing has C.^ Thus, it is impossible
for worldmates to be C-discernible . Hence, they cannot be
both C-discernible and indiscernible in some other way,
from which it follows that C weakly supervenes on any set
of properties. On the other hand, C fails to strongly
supervene on many sets of properties. For example, C does
^Obviously, I am using restricted quantifiers here.
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not strongly supervene on E, the property of being an
electron. Plenty of pairs of electrons from different
worlds will fail to be C-indiscernible
. Specifically, take
any electron from the actual world and a duplicate from a
world without any sentient beings. They are E-
indiscernible but C-discernible
. Thus weak supervenience
does not entail strong supervenience.^
More insight on the relative strength of weak and
strong supervenience is afforded by the following
considerations. Where '=»' stands for formal implication,
Kim has established the following results
(WE) S weakly supervenes on B =» Necessarily, for each
property in S, P, there is a coextensive property
in the Boolean closure of B.
(SE) S strongly supervenes on B =» for every property
in S, there is a necessarily coextensive property
in the Boolean closure of B.
These results can be stated more concisely: Let ' s’ be
a variable ranging over members of S and ' b’ range over
members of the Boolean closure of B, then we have
^This is based on the proof presented by Oddie
and Tichy (1990) p. 260.
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(WE) S weakly supervenes on B nVs3bVx(sx bx) .
(SE) S strongly supervenes on B => Vs3bnVx(sx « bx) .®
Kim argues that (SE) establishes that strong supervenience
fails to be nonreductive
. The significance of (SE) is a
hotly debated topic which I will take up in the next
chapter. First, however, we need to establish the truth of
(WE) and (SE)
.
We begin with the observation that for any set of
properties, B, because )S(B) is closed under infinitary
Boolean operations, it will contain a special subset of
properties, the B-maximal properties. B-maximal properties
are (metaphysically) consistent conjunctions of properties
in B and their complements (and no other properties) . They
are maximal in that for any B-maximal property, M, and for
any member of /3(B), P, either having M entails having P, or
having M entails having --P (but not both) . For example,
if B = {C, H, L), the following are the B-maximal
properties in jS(B): C&H&L, -’C&H&L, C&-’H&L, C&H&--L, ->C&-'H&L,
^C&H&-L, C&--H&--L, and -’C&--H&-L. B-maximal properties form
a partition of logical space: specifically, (i) every
possible object has one and only one of the B-maximal
properties from any set B. The proofs of (WE) and (SE)
®There is no need for a in front of the first
universal quantifier because of the assumption that all
properties are necessary existents.
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rely on (i) and the fact that for every property, p, and
any possible object x, x has P or x has -P.
In order to establish (WE) we note that for any sets
P^opsi^ties, S and B such that S weakly supervenes on B,
and any property P in S, the B-maximal properties in )8(B)
will divide into two exclusive classes: one class contains
all and only the B-maximal properties had by (actual)
objects that have P; the second class contains all and only
the B-maximal properties had by actual objects that have
-P.’ Call the disjunction of all the members of the first
class, ' B1
' ,
and the disjunction of the members of the
second class, ' B2 '
.
Since every object has P or -P and
some B-maximal property, every object has either B1 or B2
.
In fact, precisely those actual objects that have P have
Bl, and precisely those actual objects that have -P have
B2 : Vx[(Px -H- Blx) & (-’Px B2x) ] . And clearly both Bl and
B2 are members of (3 (B) . The argument is perfectly general.
It shows that for any sets of properties, S and B, the weak
supervenience of S on B ensures that within each world
every member of S is coextensive with at least one member
of )0(B). (WE) is established.
^To prove that these classes are disjoint suppose, for
reductio, that S weakly supervenes on B yet there is a B-
maximal property, E, which is a member of both classes.
Thus, there is an (actual) object which has E and P, and
there is an (actual) object which has E and --P. But then
B-indiscernibility among worldmates does not imply S-
indiscernibility among worldmates, contradicting our
supposition that S weakly supervenes on B.
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The parallel result for strong supervenience is
obtained in a similar fashion. Where S strongly supervenes
on B, and P is in S, the B-maximal properties will divide
into two exclusive classes. The first class is composed of
B-maximal properties possessed by possible objects that
have P. Members of the second class are B-maximal
properties had by possible objects that have -P.”'° Let B1
be the disjunction of the members of the first class, and
let B2 be the disjunction of the members of the second
class. In this case, all and only possible objects that
have P will have B1 and all and only possible objects that
have --P will have B2 . Thus, assuming, as I am, that an
individual is a possible individual (in some context) iff
it inhabits an accessible world, the following necessary
coextensions will hold: []Vx(Px Blx)
,
and nVx(-Px B2x) .
Since the argument was perfectly general it shows that the
strong supervenience of S on B ensures that every member of
S is necessarily coextensive with a member of P (B)
.
Thus,
(SE) is established.
Clearly, the necessary coextension of any two
properties entails their coextension, while the converse is
not true. This supports the conclusion that strong
^°To show that these classes are disjoint, suppose
that there is a B-maximal property, E, which is a member of
both classes. Thus, there is a possible object which has E
and P, and there is a possible object which has E and -P.
But then B-indiscernibility does not imply S-
indiscernibility, so, contrary to our supposition, S does
not strongly supervene on B.
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supervenience entails weak, but weak does not entail
strong
.
3. Alternative Formulations
Kim's original formulations of weak and strong
supervenience still have some currency. And their precise
relationship to (W) and (S) is far from obvious.
(WK) S weakly supervenes on B necessarily, for any
property F in S, if an object x has F, then there
exists a property G in B such that x has G, and
for any y, if y has G then y has F.
(SK) S strongly supervenes on B necessarily, for
any property F in S, if an object x has F, then
there exists a property G in B such that x has G,
and necessarily for all y, if y has G then y has
F.
In contrast to (W) and (S)
,
with (WK) and (SK) the
customary requirement that the base set be closed under
Boolean operations is crucial. Otherwise, these
formulations define relations that have little to do with
supervenience (the impossibility of independent variation)
.
For example, suppose that, as strong is defined in (S)
,
being a morally good person, M, strongly supervenes on the
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set containing the properties of being courageous, c, being
honest, H, and being loving, L. Specifically, suppose that
a ll and only possible good people have at least two of
these three properties. Let S = (M}, B = {C, H, L} (so B
is not ^-closed)
,
and let's see if S strongly supervenes on
B according to (SK)
. According to (SK)
,
if S strongly
supervenes on B then, necessarily, for any property F in S
and any object, x, if Fx then there is some G in B such
that Gx, and, necessarily, for any y, if Gy then Fy. But
there is no such G in B. Consider H, the property of being
honest. It is not the case that anyone who is honest is
good because some bad people are honest: namely those who
are neither courageous nor loving. The situation is
similar for C and L. Therefore, without the closure
condition, (SK) fails to be equivalent to (S)
.
The
analogous result for weak supervenience can be proved in a
parallel fashion. So,
(R2) (WK)/(SK) without the requirement that the base
set is closed under Boolean operations is not
equivalent to (W)/(S).
With the closure condition on the base set, however,
(SK) gives the desired result. Specifically, for any
(possible) good person, there is some property in the
Boolean closure of B, such that, necessarily, anyone who
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has that property is good. An example of such a property
is the property of being both honest and courageous, H&C.
Of course, one instance of agreement between (S) and (SK)-
with-^-closure does not constitute a proof of their
equivalence. It does, however, suffice to establish
(R3) (WK)/ (SK) with the Boolean closure requirement on
the base set is not equivalent to (WK)/(SK)
without the Boolean closure requirement on the
base set.
Given the importance of Boolean closure to Kim's
formulations, I suggest that we reformulate his theses to
capture its effect without requiring that 'B' (and 'S')
only range over sets which are closed under Boolean
operations. That way, it will be easier to compare Kim's
supervenience relations to (S) and (W) which also do not
restrict the range of 'B' (or 'S') in that way.
Specifically, where S and B are any sets of properties,
(WK') S weakly supervenes on B necessarily, for
any property F in S, if an object x has F, then
there exists a property G in /3(B) such that x has
G, and for any y, if y has G then y has F.
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(SK ) S strongly supervenes on B necessarily, for
any property F in S, if an object x has F, then
there exists a property G in /3(B) such that x has
G, and necessarily for all y, if y has G then y
has F.
For any sets S and B, S strongly supervenes on )0(B)
according to (SK) iff S strongly supervenes on B according
to (SK'). Our reformulations provide the effect of Boolean
closure on the base set without requiring it explicitly.
(WK') and (W) are equivalent.''^ On the other hand,
contrary to received opinion, (S) is not equivalent to
(SK') in any system where the characteristic S4 axiom, DA
a, is not a theorem (or where the associated requirement
that accessibility be transitive is rejected)
.
Their
nonequivalence is apparent if we translate the respective
theses into world theory. Letting x and y range over a
fixed domain of all possible objects,
(SKwt) S strongly supervenes on B For any
accessible world, w, and any property F in S, if
X has F in w, then there exists a property G in
j0(B) such that X has G in w, and any world z
which is accessible to w is such that for all y
in z if y has G then y has F.
^^See Kim (1984) pp. 163-164.
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(Swt) S strongly supervenes on B For any
accessible worlds , w and z, if x in w is B-
indiscernible to y in z then x in w is s-
indiscernible to y in z.
(SKwt) quantifies over worlds accessible to worlds
accessible to the actual world, while (Swt) only quantifies
over worlds accessible to the actual world. It makes
sense, then, that in loqics with non-transitive
accessibility relations, (SK') and (S) are not equivalent.
Also, it is not surprising that Kim's reputed proof of
their equivalence relies on the transitivity of
accessibility.
To show, first, that [strong supervenience
as defined by (S)
]
entails [strong
supervenience as defined in (SK')]: Assume,
for any property F in [S], x has F at w.
.
Let B. be the B-maximal property of x at
w^ . . . . Let B. be the G in the definition of
strong supervenience [namely, (SK')]; we
need to show that necessarily if any y has
it, it has F. Suppose otherwise - that is,
at some w
^
there is a v such that y has B -
but not F . Thus, x has B. at w. and y has B.
at Wj ; that is, x and y have the same B-
properties in these worlds respectively, and
by [(S)1, they must have the same [S1-
properties in the respective worlds. Since
X has F in w .
, y must have F in w .
,
contradicting the supposition. Hence, [S]
strongly supervenes on B [according to
(SK) ] .^2
^^Kim (1987) p. 317.
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Consider the underlined portion of the passage. Since
Kim has already considered an arbitrary possible world, w.,
in order for the proof to be perfectly general he should
say that "at some w. accessible to w.
,
there is a y such
that y has B. but not F” . When he goes on to claim that
(S) ensures that since x has F in w. y must have F in w
' j
'
he assumes the transitivity of accessibility. After all,
(S) only guarantees that y must have F in Wj if w. is
accessible to the actual world. But all we know from the
reductio assumption is that w^. is accessible to w^ . So the
proof only succeeds on the assumption that the
accessibility relation is transitive
.
For a countermodel to the equivalence, consider three
worlds Wl, W2
,
and W3 . Each world is accessible to itself,
W2 is accessible to Wl and vice-versa, W3 is accessible to
W2 and vice-versa, but there are no other accessibility
relations. Most importantly, W3 is not accessible to Wl
(the rejection of transitivity). This is a B-model:
accessibility is symmetric and reflexive. Each world has a
single inhabitant: the lone inhabitants of Wl and W2
instantiate both P and Q, while the lone inhabitant of W3
^^Of course, assuming that S5 is the correct logic for
metaphysical possibility, Kim's argument does succeed in
establishing an important equivalence. Nevertheless, since
Kim is careful not to commit himself to any particular
interpretation of the modal operators in (SK) or the
possibilist quantifiers in (S)
,
I think it is fair to
criticize the argument for failing to establish the more
general equivalence.
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instantiates Q but not P. According to (S)
,
p strongly
supervenes on Q at W1 because the only worlds accessible to
W1 are W1 and W2
,
and there are no Q-indiscernible P-
discernible individuals in the union of the domains of W1
and W2. According to (SK>), on the other hand, it does
not. This is especially clear from the world-theory
formulation, (SKwt)
:
although there exists a world
accessible to Wl, namely W2
,
and an individual in W2 which
has P and Q, not every individual existing at any world
accessible to W2 which has Q has P. For example, W3 is
accessible to W2 and the lone inhabitant of W3 has Q but
not P. This countermodel shows that in B and weaker
systems, (S) and (SK') are (formally) non-equivalent.
Consequently, the choice between (S) and (SK') (or (SK)
with the requirement that the base set has the Boolean
closure property) is more than a choice between alternative
formulations of the same notion. I will continue to use
(S) as my "official" formulation of strong supervenience
.
By way of summary, our catalogue of results now
contains the following:
(Rl) (W)/(S) with the requirement that S and B are
closed under Boolean operations is equivalent to
(W)/(S) without the closure requirement on either
S or B.
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(R2) (WK)/(SK) without the requirement that the base
set is closed under Boolean operations is not
equivalent to (W)/(S).
(R3) (WK)/(SK) with the Boolean closure requirement on
the base set is not equivalent to (WK)/(SK)
without the Boolean closure requirement on the
base set.
(R4) (WK') is equivalent to (W)
.
(R5) (SK') (or (SK) with the base set Boolean closed)
is equivalent to (S) in S4 and S5.
(R6) (SK') (or (SK) with the base set Boolean closed)
is not equivalent to (S) in B, T, etc.
With these results established, we are prepared to evaluate
John Bacon's controversial argument that weak and strong
supervenience are, despite all appearances, equivalent.
B. A Response to Bacon
1. Closure Under Resplicinq
In a rather technical paper, John Bacon offered a
proof of the equivalence of strong and weak supervenience.
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His proof relies on the novel requirement that base sets
are closed under Boolean operations and an operation called
"resplicing" or "diagonalization"
. B is closed under
resplicing (or B is diagonally closed) iff
Where 0
^
is the extension of [property] 0 at
world w, and B^ = { 0^; 0eB}, B is also to
contain any property Y such that ¥ e B for
each world wJ^ w w
To see how this works, consider the Boolean closure of
the unit set of being an electron, /3{E}, which contains E,
^E, E&--E, and Ev-E. The diagonal closure of (3{E), D,
contains any property whose extension in each world, w, is
the extension in w of some member of /3{E}. D contains
properties whose extension across logical space is "spliced
together" out of the world-relative extensions of members
of For example, suppose there are only three
possible worlds, Wl, W2
,
and W3 . And suppose there are
twelve possible (world bound) objects denoted by the
numerals, '1', through '12'. The extension of each member
of ^{E) is represented in the following table.
Wl W2 W3
E 1 6,7,8 10
,
-E 2,3,4, 5, 9,11,12
E&-E
Ev-E 1
,
2 , 3, 4, 5, 6 ,
7
,
8
9,10,11,12
^^Bacon (1986) p. 165.
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D, the diagonal closure of ^(E), includes the property that
has the same extension as E in Wl, the same extension as
-^E
in W2 and the same extension as E&-E in W3 : the property
with the extension {1,5). Likewise, it includes the
property that has the same extension as -E in Wl, the same
extension as E in W2 and the same extension as E in W3 : the
property with the (trans-world) extension,
(2,3,4,6,7,8,10). In fact, D includes any property whose
complete possible extension is the union of the world-
relative extensions obtained by zigzagging through the
above table taking the world-relative extension of one
property per world.
2. The Equivalence of Strong and Weak under Full Closure
According to Bacon, base sets must be closed under the
Boolean operations and resplicing. Following Oddie and
Tichy, I call any set closed under these operations 'fully
closed'. Full closure invalidates the proof that weak is
weaker than strong in the following way. I argued that C,
^^Bacon believes that properties are functions from
possible worlds to sets of individuals, so he cannot
distinguish between necessarily coextensive properties.
This is compatible with my working assumption that
properties are sets of possible individuals. On the other
hand. Bacon does not accept my assumption that all
individuals are worldbound, so, even if he were to grant
that the domains of Wl, W2 and W3 are non-overlapping, he
would describe the example differently. The preceding mode
of expression, however, affects neither the content nor the
plausibility of Bacon's basic theses.
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the property of coexisting with a sentient being, is weakly
supervenient on any set of properties. Hence it is weakly
supervenient on E, the property of being an electron. But
it is not strongly supervenient on E because many pairs of
electrons from different worlds will fail to be C-
indiscernible
. Full closure defeats the argument by
ensuring the existence of a property, P, in D (the full
closure of {E}) that is necessarily coextensive with C. P
is the property that is co-extensive with E&-E in worlds
where there is no sentient being, and coextensive with Ev--E
in worlds where there is a sentient being. In terms of our
table above, if W1 and W3 are the only worlds with sentient
beings, the extension of P would be {1,2,3,4,9,10,11,12},
which would also be the extension of C. Hence, in our
simplified model, C is necessarily coextensive with P.
Thus, C strongly supervenes on D because, if two possible
individuals differ with regard to the supervening property
C, then they differ with regard to the subvening property P
(and the subvening set D) : C-discernibility entails D-
discernibility
.
The proof that weak and strong are equivalent under
full closure is simple. Clearly, strong entails weak. To
show that weak entails strong, assume that S weakly
supervenes on B. From (WE) we know that the weak
supervenience of S on B entails that for every property, P,
in S, and every world, w, there is some member of the
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Boolean closure of B, Q^ that is coextensive with P in w.
By full closure, however, B is )0-closed, so each Q“ is a
member of B, and, by resplicing, there is another member of
B, C, which, at every world w, is coextensive with in
other words, C is coextensive with at world z,
coextensive with at world u, and likewise for every
possible world. Thus C is necessarily coextensive with P.
The preceding considerations are perfectly general.
They apply to any property P in S, and they show that if S
weakly supervenes on B and B is fully closed, then every
member of S is necessarily coextensive with some member of
B, which entails (by the following Lemma) that S is
strongly supervenient on B.
Lemma 1: if every member of S is necessarily
coextensive with some member (or other) of B then
S strongly supervenes on B.^*^
The reader familiar with Bacon's article may protest
that all Bacon proved was that weak supervenience and
strong supervenience are equivalent under full closure in
^^Suppose, for reductio, that although every member of
S is necessarily coextensive with some member of B, S does
not strongly supervene on B. So there are possible
individuals, x and y, such that x and y are B-indiscernible
and S-discernible . There must be some property P in S such
that Px and ->Py. Since there exists a property Q in B such
that Vx(Px ^ Qx)
,
it follows that Qx and -Qy. Thus, x and
y are not B-indiscernible, after all: contradiction.
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S4 and S5. On the other hand, my proof appears to be
general for it makes no essential use of any S4 or S5
axioms (or assumptions about accessibility relations)
.
This disparity is readily explicable. Bacon worked with
Kim's original formulation of strong supervenience
,
(SK)
,
which, as I noted before, is stronger than (S) except in S4
and S5 where the two are equivalent. So the proof I just
gave establishes exactly what Bacon argues in his paper:
namely that under the full closure requirement, strong
supervenience as defined in (SK) is equivalent to weak
supervenience in S4 and S5. Of course, it also establishes
a more general equivalence between strong (as defined in
(S)
)
and weak under full closure.
3. Bacon on Coextension and Necessary Coextension
One of Bacon's results is inconsistent with some of
the claims I have made above. Before considering reasons
for accepting or rejecting full closure, I should probably
attempt to discover the source of the inconsistency.
Bacon distinguishes nine different "variants of
supervenience", four of which are relevant to our concerns.
He "make[s] some informal use of second-order modal
logic"^^ to formulate the theses and examine their logical
relations, and consequently, so will I. He assumes a
"single common domain (of existent or nonexistent
^^Bacon (1986) p. 163.
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individuals) for all possible worlds"^® and treats
properties as necessary existents, so he accepts a second-
order version of the Barcan equivalence:
Barcan(P). VpDA hh DVPA
The notation I use below was introduced by Van Cleve
(1990) in his discussion of Bacon: 's' and 'b' are
variables ranging over supervenient properties and members
of the Boolean closure of the base set, respectively, and
'X =B y' is an abbreviation for 'x is B-indiscernible to
y'. Here, then, are four of Bacon's nine supervenience
relations
.
Weak = []VxVy(x =B y -* x =S y) .
Strong
2
= [I]VsVx(sx 3b [bx & nVy(by sy) .
Coextension (C) = []Vs3bVx[sx bx] .
Necessary coextension (NC) = Vs3b!3Vx[sx H’ bx]
Weak is a precise formulation of (W)
,
and Strong
2
is
precise formulation of (SK)
.
What is less obvious is that
NC is formally equivalent to, and therefore a legitimate
formulation of, (S)
.
Remember,
(SE) S strongly supervenes on B => Vs3bl3Vx(sx ++ bx) .
^®Bacon (1986) p. 164.
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To show that NC is an adequate formulation of (S) we need
to establish the converse of (SE)
. of course, we have
already established Lemma 1. But Lemma 1 is not quite the
converse of (SE) because in (SE)
,
'b' ranges over members
of /3(B), but in Lemma 1, there is no mention of the Boolean
closure of B. This is easily surmountable, however, for
since Lemma 1 applies to all sets of properties S and B, it
certainly holds for sets which are )0-closed. Thus, it
implies
(i) Vs3bDVx(sx ++ bx) => S strongly supervenes on (3 (B) .
From (Rl) we know that S strongly supervenes on B iff S
strongly supervenes on j0(B), so (i) and (Rl) imply the
converse of (SE)
:
(ii) Vs3bDVx(sx bx) =* S strongly supervenes on B.
Finally, (ii) and (SE) entail the desired equivalence:
(E) S strongly supervenes on B Vs3bDVx(sx bx) .
Therefore, NC is equivalent to strong (as defined in (S) )
.
Now consider Bacon's results concerning the entailment
relations in (second-order) T, S4 and S5 between our four
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theses with the full closure requirement on the base
set
:
T
Strong2
C Weak
NC (or (S)
)
Bacon's claim that C entails but is not entailed by NC in T
or S4 amounts to the claim that weak is stronger than
strong in T and S4. It contradicts either my earlier proof
of the (formal) equivalence of strong and weak under full
closure or my argument that (S) and NC are equivalent, so
some response is required. Bacon's paper isn't directly
helpful, however, for while he proves that C entails NC
(given resplicing)
,
he offers no direct proof of their
nonequivalence (in T or S4)
.
To see why I am skeptical of Bacon's conclusion that
NC does not entail C in T or S4, consider the two theses
and Barcan ( P)
.
Coextension (C) : nVs3bVx(sx bx) .
Necessary Coextension (NC) : Vs3b[I]Vx(sx ++ bx) .
Barcan (P): VPDA hi- DVPA
S4
C Weak ^ Strong,
S5
All equivalent
NC (or (S))
^’Bacon (1986) p. 167.
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By Barcan(P), which Bacon accepts, Coextension is
equivalent to
Coextension' (C): VsD3bVx(sx bx) .
If NC fails to entail C, it must also fail to entail C.
That, however, would mean that the following is false:
(*) 3pDa h D3PA.
Even with resplicing, which does guarantee the converse
(3pa h 3 pC3A),^° I am unable to conceive of how (*) could
be false given Bacon's (reasonable) assumption that
properties, while perhaps contingently exemplified, exist
of necessity. Moreover, I think I can prove that necessary
coextension entails coextension' (and, by Barcan(P)
,
coextension) in a second-order version of T.
1. Show Vs3bDVx(sx bx) VsD3bVx(sx bx)
2 . Vs3bDVx(sx -H- bx) Assumption
3 . Show VsD3bVx(sx bx) Indirect Proof
4 . --Vsn3bVx(sx bx) Assumption
5. 3s--n3bVx(sx bx) Modal Negation, 4
6. --3bVx(Px bx) Existential Inst.
,
7 . Vs3bDVx(sx bx) Reiteration, 2
^°See (2) from Bacon (1986) p. 165.
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8 . 3b[3Vx(Px bx) Universal Inst.
,
7
9. Vx(Px Qx) Existential Inst.,
10. Show 3bVx(Px bx) Proof (T-strict)
11. Vx(Px -H- Qx) K reiteration, 9
12 . 3bVx(Px bx) Existential Gen.
,
13 . P & -P 6,10
Given Bacon's assumptions, and given that the only line
(namely line 9) reiterated across a show line in a modal
subproof is a regular formula of first order quantified
modal logic, the proof appears conclusive
. So Bacon's
results, even granting full closure, have to be amended
thus
:
T
Strong2
NC (or (S) ) + Weak C
S4 and S5
All Equivalent
^^The only questionable line is 12. How do I know
that Q, from 11 by way of 9, is a base property, thereby
justifying my claim on line 12 to the effect that there is
a base property such that..., as opposed to the claim that
there is a supervening property such that...? First, Q is
an arbitrary base property as can be seen from lines 8 and
9. And even though the existential generalization from
'
. . .Q. . . ' to '3b... b...' on line 12 occurs within a modal
subproof. Bacon assures us that if Q is in the range of 'b'
at the actual world, it is in the range of 'b' at any
accessible world: see (1) in Bacon (1986) p. 165. Also, it
makes sense that if properties are necessary existents,
sets of properties will have the same members at every
world. So, once the base set has been indicated, the range
of 'b' will be constant across logica], space.
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Finally, without diagonal closure, the relations are
as follows:
T S4 and S5
Strong^ Strong2 (^) )
i
Weak CNC (or (S))
Weak ++ C
These results are born out by my previous proofs (i) that
(S) (formally) entails but is not entailed by (W) and (ii)
that (SK')
,
which is equivalent to Strong
2 ,
is stronger
than (S) in T but equivalent to (S) in S4 and S5. With
these points clarified, we can consider the merits of
diagonal closure directly.
4. The Case Acainst Diagonal Closure
The only reason Bacon gives in support of diagonal
closure, and the only reason given anywhere in the
literature, is that "it seems natural" to apply the
requirement. In a recent response to Van Cleve's
criticisms. Bacon explains that this feeling of naturalness
was derived from his working assumption that properties are
functions from worlds to individuals.^^ His argument
seems to be that the functions from worlds to possible
individuals that result from resplicing are equally good
^^Bacon (1990) p. 239.
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properties as the functions one begins with. But surely we
should not include any and every property in the base set
even though all of them are also functions from possible
worlds to possible individuals. I fail to see why the
functional conception of properties gives us any positive
reason to require that all subvenient sets be closed under
resplicing. Many reasons for rejecting diagonal closure
are given in the literature. A common objection is that,
in some important sense, resplicing does not preserve
propertyhood.^^ The objection is most sympathetically
represented as follows. For most (if not all) uses of
supervenience
,
there is a desire to consider base sets
containing nothing but (somewhat) natural properties. And
properties respliced from the world-relative extensions of
various natural properties will often be extremely
unnatural. Thus, base sets should not be diagonally
closed
.
^^Van Cleve (1990) p. 235; Currie (1990) p. 246.
^^Gregory Currie argues as follows:
The things I have in mind as the bases for
aesthetic properties are ' natural’
properties; you can't expect to take bits of
properties (their extensions in particular
possible worlds) and knock them together to
produce a new, natural property. Call such
gerrymandered constructions ' properties’ if
you like, but they are not the sort of thing
that I or anyone else have in mind when we
wonder whether aesthetic properties
supervene on some other kind of property
( (1990) p. 246)
.
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preserveOf course, Boolean closure does not
naturalness either, so this argument also applies against
that requirement. The argument does not appear conclusive,
however. As I illustrated with (SK*), only slight changes
in the formulation of (SK) are required to get the effect
of Boolean closure without placing any closure requirement
on the base set itself. The same sort of thing could be
done with full closure. For example. Bacon's Strong
2
could
be redefined thus:
S strongly
2
supervenes on B nVsVx(sx -> 3b [bx &
Vy(by sy)
,
where 's' ranges over members of S and
'b' ranges over members of the full closure of B.
This way there are no closure conditions on B (so it may
contain only perfectly natural properties, for example).
Yet for any sets S and B, S strongly
2
supervenes on B
according to our new definition iff S strongly
2
supervenes
on the full closure of B on the old definition.
One of the better reasons to reject full closure
derives from the fact that it has the consequence that
every global property strongly supervenes on any base
set.^^ Global properties are properties such that if they
are instantiated at a possible world, then every object in
that world has that property. Coexisting with a sentient
^^See Oddie and Tichy (1990) pp. 262-267.
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being, being such that Stalin was a dictator, and being
such that some roses are red are all global properties.
Because worldmates are always indiscernible regarding
global properties, global properties weakly supervene on
any set of properties. And, given the fact that weak
entails strong under full closure, it follows that any
global property will strongly supervene on any fully closed
set. But this is a very problematic result. Unlike
necessary properties, which are trivially supervenient
because no two objects can differ with regard to then,
things can differ with regard to global properties: I have
certain global properties I could very well have lacked,
and other possible objects have different global
properties. It is a real issue whether coexisting with a
sentient being strongly supervenes on various sets of
intrinsic and extrinsic biochemical properties, but full
closure makes all such questions as trivial as questions
regarding the supervenience of being self identical. Full
closure ensures that global properties will strongly
supervene on anything.
^“^Whether more interesting examples of this sort can
be found depends on some metaphysical issues I do not
consider until chapter four. Essentially, any sets of
properties that supervene weakly but not strongly on one
another can be used to illustrate the deleterious effects
of diagonal closure. The problem is, only examples
involving the supervenience of global properties are
provably immune to responses based on combinatorial
principles of the sort introduced in chapter IV.
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The essential defect of full closure is that instead
of making weak supervenience as strong as strong
supervenience is without full closure, it makes strong
supervenience as weak as weak supervenience is without full
closure. But as we saw in chapter I, weak supervenience is
really too weak to capture the fundamental idea of local
supervenience: the determination of supervenient properties
by base properties. That, after all, was one reason Kim
felt he couldn't rest with weak supervenience, and
subsequently introduced strong supervenience. Thus, even
if we found full closure intuitively compelling, we would
have sound theoretical reasons to introduce a local
supervenience relation that is free of the full closure
requirement. But the fact is, full closure is not
intuitively compelling. Nor is any discernible theoretical
purpose served by reducing the more useful supervenience
relation to its weak cousin. I conclude, then, that
Bacon's requirement that the base set be fully closed
should not be accepted.
5. Conclusion
We can allow some flexibility in the formulation of
alternative supervenience claims, but the core idea of no
supervening differences without subvening differences must
be respected. Since possible objects can differ in their
global properties, we need some supervenience relation
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strong enough to distinguish the global properties that do
from the global properties that do not supervene on other
sets of properties. Strong supervenience can do so. But
full closure makes this impossible. While Boolean closure
is harmless on its own, full closure is not. Supervenience
is not well served by full closure.
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CHAPTER III
STRONG SUPERVENIENCE AND NONREDUCTIVE DEPENDENCE
A. Strong Supervenience and Reducibilitv
1. Introduction
As noted in Chapter I (p. i)
,
much of the interest in
supervenience can be traced to its promise as a
nonreductive dependence relation. Jaegwon Kim questions
whether any one supervenience relation can play both of
these roles.
The central problem. .. has been that of
defining a supervenience relation that will
fill the twin requirements [Davidson] set
forth: first, the relation must be
nonreductive ; that is a given domain can be
supervenient on another without being
reducible to it. Second, the relation must
be one of dependence : if a domain supervenes
on another, there must be a sturdy sense in
which the first is dependent on the second,
or the second determines the first.... The
main difficulty has been this: if a relation
is weak enough to be nonreductive, it tends
to be too weak to serve as a dependence
relation: conversely, when a relation is
strong enough to give us dependence, it
tends to be too strong - strong enough to
imply reducibility .
^
^Kim (1989) p. 40.
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Kiln's standard example of the latter sort of relation is
strong supervenience
. He claims it is too strong to be
nonreductive.2 Many disagree. The nonreduct ive status of
strong supervenience is important because no supervenience
relation is stronger than strong. So if it is
nonreductive
,
it is plausible that supervenience, in
general, is nonreductive. In order to adjudicate the
debate, we have to determine what sort of reducibility is
in question.
2-1 Nagel on Intertheoretic Reduction
Most discussions of the reductive implications of
supervenience have focussed on the reduction of scientific
theories. Although there are many models of intertheoretic
reduction, supervenience is usually discussed in connection
with Ernest Nagel's.^
Nagel construes intertheoretic reduction as a matter
of logical derivation. In a successful reduction, the laws
of the secondary theory are derivable from the laws of the
primary theory (often with the aid of certain supplementary
principles whose nature is outlined below) . Nagel calls
^As we shall see in the second part of this chapter,
he now questions its adequacy as a dependence relation as
well
.
^For alternative models of intertheoretic reduction
see Sarkar (1992) pp. 172-175, and, especially, Sklar
(1967). For evidence that Nagel's model is assumed in
discussions of supervenience see Kim (1989), (1990), Horgan
(1982), and Petrie (1987).
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this the condition of derivability
. The other formal
condition on an adequate reduction is the condition of
connectibility: the theoretical concepts of the primary
theory (the concepts expressed by terms occurrinq in
statements of the more qeneral laws of the theory) have to
be "connected" to the concepts appealed to in the laws of
the secondary theory. For example, without some principle
(at least indirectly) linkinq the concept of absolute
temperature from thermodynamics to the concept of mean
kinetic enerqy from statistical mechanics, the laws of
thermodynamics could not be derived from the laws of
statistical mechanics. Such connectinq principles have
come to be called 'bridge laws' or 'bridge principles'.
Bridge laws are identity statements, conditionals, or
biconditionals. The conditions of connectibility and
derivability are Nagel's two formal conditions on an
adequate intertheoretic reduction.^
There are also informal conditions on intertheoretic
reduction. Roughly, the primary theory must somehow
explain the success of the secondary theory. Preferably,
after the theories are "connected", the laws of the
secondary theory are shown to be instances of previously
accepted laws of the primary theory. Alternatively,
translated laws of the secondary theory may sometimes be
^See Nagel (1961) pp. 352-354.
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added to the list of laws of the primary theory.^ But
such augmentations of the primary theory are justified only
if these new laws somehow contribute to the overall
coherence and explanatory power of the primary theory.
They must not be ad hoc additions to the primary theory
that serve only to allow the derivation of the secondary
theory. As Nagel says:
The two formal conditions for reduction
discussed in the previous section do not
suffice to distinguish trivial from
noteworthy scientific achievements. If the
sole requirem^ent for reduction were that the
secondary science is logically deducible
from arbitrarily chosen premises, the
requirement could be satisfied with
relatively little difficulty. In the
history of significant reductions, however,
the premises of the primary science are not
ad hoc assumptions ....[ I ] t is not enough
that previously established laws of the
secondary science be represented within the
theory of the primary discipline. The
theory must also be fertile in usable
suggestions for developing the secondary
science, and must yield theorems referring
to the latter's subject matter which augment
or correct its currently accepted bodies of laws.*^
^Nagel (1961) p. 355.
^Nagel (1961) pp. 358, 360. Nagel uses the reduction
of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics to illustrate
these informal conditions:
the axioms of mechanics, constituting the
most general parts of the premises in the
primary science to which thermodynamics is
reduced, are supported by evidence from many
fields quite distinct from the study of
gases. The assumption that these axioms
also hold for the hypothetical molecular
(continued. .
.
)
69
3. Formulating the Isrup
In a recent paper Kim claims that connectibility by
means of (at least nomologically) necessary biconditionals
is all that is required for one theory to be in principle
reducible to a second.
Reduction is standardly understood to be a
relation between theories, where a theory is
understood to consist of a distinctive
theoretical vocabulary and a set of laws
formulated in this vocabulary. The
reduction of one theory to another is
thought to be accomplished when the laws of
the reduced theory are shown to be derivable
from the laws of the reducer .... The only
requirement on the bridge laws that can be
explicitly stated, independently of the
particular theories involved, is the
following, which I will call "the condition
*^
( . . . continued)
components of gases thus involved the
extrapolation of a theory from domains in
which it was already well confirmed into
another domain postulated to be homogeneous
in important respects with the former ones.
But the point having the greatest weight in
this connection is that the combined
assumptions of the primary science to which
the science of heat was reduced have made it
possible to incorporate into a unified
system many apparently unrelated laws of the
sciences of heat as well as other parts of
physics. (Nagel (1961) pp. 358-359.
These informal conditions (i.e., explanatory power and
theoretical unification) are more important when the theory
to be reduced is not a "mature" science with a clear body
of laws available for derivation from some reducing
science. In such cases, about all that remains of the
notion of intertheoretic reduction are the informal
conditions. See Sarkar (1992). Kitcher (1984) essentially
argues that the reduction of genetics to molecular biology,
to the extent that it has occurred, is of this less formal
variety
.
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of strong connectibility"
: Each primitivepredicate P of the theory being reduced is
connected with a coextensive predicate Q ofthe reducer in a biconditional law of theform: "For all x, Px iff Qx"
,
and similarlyfor all relational predicates. if this
condition is met, then no matter what the
content of the two theories may be,
derivational reduction is guaranteed; for
these biconditional laws would allow the
rewriting of the laws of the theory being
reduced as laws of the reducer, and if any
cf these rewrites is not derivable from pre-
existing laws of the reducer, it can be
added as an additional law (assuming both
theories to be true)
. In discussing
reduction and [supervenience]
,
therefore, we
will focus on this condition of strong
connectibility .
^
There are two things to note about this passage. First,
Kim appears to be simply ignoring Nagel's informal
conditions on intertheoretic reducibility
. Second, on the
standard view that a theory is a language and a set of
statements (laws) closed under logical consequence, Kim's
claim is false. For if the laws of the secondary theory,
T2
,
when translated into the vocabulary of the primary
theory, Tl, are not derivable from the laws of Tl, then, T2
is not reducible to Tl because the condition of
derivability is not satisfied. By allowing any translated
T2-laws into the set of Tl-theorems, Kim appears to risk
^Kim (1990) p. 19. In a note that occurs in the
middle of this quote, Kim cites Nagel as the originator of
the model of reduction he is working with.
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trivializing the notion of intertheoretic reduction.® At
best, T2 is derivable from some augmented theory of the
same sort as the primary theory, Tl. The significance of
such a derivation is hardly apparent.
Strong connectibility is primarily a relation between
sets of terms. One set of terms is strongly connected to
the other iff every predicate of the first set is
necessarily coextensive with some predicate of the second
set. Since Kim's point revolves around the notion of
strong connectibility, I suggest that we understand
theories to be of the same sort iff they share the same set
of theoretical terms. Now, in light of the independence of
strong connectibility and the derivability of theories, and
because theoretical terms are closely identified with
scientific disciplines (e.g., "molecule" in chemistry,
"mass" and "energy" in physics, "action potential" and
"synapse" in neurobiology)
,
it seems that if the strong
connectibility of theoretical terms has reductive
implications, they would be primarily for disciplines (or
domains of study)
,
and only secondarily for theories.
^Apparently, in most real cases of intertheoretic
reduction, only approximations of the laws of the secondary
theory are derivable from the laws of the primary (or
reducing theory). I don't think this empirical fact
justifies Kim's claim that strong connectibility of
predicates of the two theories is sufficient for
intertheoretic reducibility
,
however, for there is no
indication that Kim is restricting his claim to cases where
approximations of the translated T2-laws are derivable from
the Tl-laws.
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Perhaps, then, strong connectibility of the theoretical
terms of discipline X to those of discipline Y is
the in principle reducibility of the X-
discipline (and its idealized complete theory) to the Y-
discipline (and its idealized complete theory)
.
Nagel's discussion of connectibility indicates that he
also thought it was significant because it had implications
for the reducibility of entire disciplines (or sciences)
.
Connectibility would indeed assure
derivability if... for every term 'A' in the
secondary science but not in the primary one
there is a theoretical term 'B' in the
primary science such that A and B are linked
by a biconditional: A if and only if B. If
the linkage has this form, 'A' can be
replaced by 'B' in any law in which 'A'
occurs, and so yield a warranted theoretical
postulate L'. If L' is not itself derivable
from the available theory of the primary
science, the theory need only be augmented
by L' to become a modified theory
, but
nonetheless a theory of the primary science
[from which] L will be deducible.’ (my
emphasis)
In any case, I think Kim's claim that strong
connectibility is sufficient for in principle reducibility
is most charitably interpreted as the claim that the strong
connectibility of the terms of one discipline (or science)
^Nagel (1961) p. 355. Note that Nagel only says that
connectibility would imply derivability, not reducibility.
This is because a successful reduction must satisfy both
the formal and the informal conditions. For other comments
on this issue see Kincaid (1987) p. 344.
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to those of another discipline is sufficient for the
intertheoretic reducibility of the entire first discipline
(or its complete idealized theory) to the second. The idea
would be that if strong connectibility obtains between the
terms of some psychological theory, Tl, and those of some
physical theory, T2
,
then if the translated Tl-laws cannot
all be derived from the T2-laws, they can be accepted as
new theoretical postulates of physical theory (broadly
construed)
. This is somewhat plausible, and in what
follows, for the sake of argument, I will grant that strong
connectibility of sets of theoretical terms does have
reductive implications for the respective disciplines.
The key issue, then, is "does the strong supervenience
of S on B imply the strong connectibility of the terms of
one discipline to those of another?". Quite clearly, since
neither S nor B will always correspond in any natural way
to any identifiable discipline, this won't generally be the
case. But let's agree to limit our attention to cases
where all and only the members of S are expressed by the
theoretical terms of a single scientific discipline, and
where all the members of B are expressed by terms from some
other scientific discipline. I believe there is good
reason to doubt whether in even these cases, the strong
supervenience of S on B implies the strong connectibility
of the terms of the S-discipline to those of the B-
discipline. If this is right, the nonreductive status of
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strong supervenience (at least with respect to
i^t^^theoretic reduction) should be assured.
Kim's reason for rejecting the claim that strong
supervenience is nonreductive is based on (SE) : the fact
that every strongly supervenient property is necessarily
coextensive with some member of the Boolean closure of the
base set (see p. 37)
.
(SE) implies that terms expressing
supervenient properties are strongly connectible to terms
expressing (infinitary) Boolean combinations of base
properties, which in turn suggests that the condition of
strong connectibility could be met between the theoretical
terms of the S—discipline and those of the B—discipline.
The key question, then, is "even when S and B are
restricted as I indicated above, does strong supervenience
entail strong connectibility as Kim claims?".
4. Arguments in Support of Nonreducibilitv
One of the original objections to Kim's contention
that strong supervenience threatened to entail
intertheoretic reducibility was presented by John Post.^^
For a version of Kim's argument that strong
supervenience implies strong connectibility see Kim (1990)
pp. 19-22.
^^Post (1984) pp. 165-166. Post argued that Kim's
formulation of strong supervenience, (SK)
,
was defective
because it required the base set to be closed under
negation. I will ignore this aspect of the argument
because (S) does not have any such requirement. See Van
Cleve (1990) for a sympathetic development of Post's
objection.
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Consider some paradigmatic example of a physical property
such as having mass (Post's example is being an electron).
Clearly, its complement, not having mass, cannot be
considered a physical property unless we are willing to say
that everything, including disembodied spirits and Gods (if
such there be) must have some physical properties.
The relevance of Post's point can be seen as follows.
Suppose we have two sets of properties, s and B, such that
all would agree that the members of S are psychological (or
mental) properties and the members of B are neurological
properties; suppose, furthermore, that S strongly
supervenes on B. It follows by (SE) that every
psychological property in S is necessarily coextensive with
some property in the Boolean closure of B. If that
property were truly a neurological property, then every
mental property is necessarily coextensive with a
neurological property. And this would suggest that
psychology is in principle reducible to neuroscience. But
the Boolean closure of B contains any property
constructible from the properties in B with the aid of
conjunction, disjunction and negation. Thus, if we agree
with Post that the set of neurological properties is not
closed under negation, then (SE) does not justify the
conclusion that the mental properties in S are necessarily
coextensive with neurological properties. The threat of
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reducibility seems to be avoided. Post sums up his
diagnosis thus.
Fuirtheirmoire
,
if we allow every property
constructible frcpm physical properties to bephysical, there is no reason why we should
not allow the same for any other class of
P^op^i^ties. . . .Then we would have to say that
electrons have moral properties simply
because they are not morally good (and not
morally bad)
. Here the absurdity is even
more striking. ... it follows that a set of P-
properties is not generally closed under
constructibil ity
,
since complementation is a
property-forming construction. Moreover,
maximally consistent conjunctions of given
P-properties and their complements are not
themselves all P-properties ... Yet it is
precisely to properties constructible out of
the others via this operation that Kim
reduces the supervenient ones. We cannot
say of such a property thus reduced that it
is "nothing but" a P-property
.
Suppose, once again, that B is a set of neurological
properties. If there is reason to doubt whether some B-
maximal properties (e.g. the property of not having a brain
of such and such a structure, nor of so and so structure
nor of...) really qualify as neurological properties, then
there is reason to doubt whether the translations of the
laws and terms of some S-theory (e.g., some psychological
theory) into the theoretical vocabulary of some B-theory
(e.g. some theory in neuroscience) really qualify as laws
(and terms) of an augmented neurological theory. Because
^^Post (1984) p. 166.
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the translations of the laws of the S-theory into the terms
of the B-theory will often involve complementation, Post's
argument gives us reason to be skeptical of the claim that
they gualify as laws of any B—theory.
In a similar vein, Paul Teller argues that
disjunctions of physical properties need not be physical
properties. He emphasizes one of the leading ideas of
functionalism; that the same mental property can be
"realized" in (or instantiated by) an indefinite multitude
of diverse physical systems which differ greatly in their
intrinsic physical features. Teller essentially argues
that in light of the multiple realizability of mental
properties, the strong supervenience of the mental on the
physical fails to entail the reducibility of psychological
theories. Although each mental property will be
necessarily equivalent to some potentially infinite
disjunction of all of its possible realizations, there is
no reason to consider such disjunctions of broadly physical
properties to be physical properties themselves (or to be
expressible by the theoretical terms of physics) . While
discussing the multiple realizability of the property of
being currency (which has been realized by animal,
vegetable, and mineral)
,
Teller expresses his doubts thus:
Now what, I want to ask, makes it
appropriate to call a property 'physical'
when it is such a disparate and infinitely
long disjunction [? ] ...What is it that
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determines whether a description gets thrownin as one of the disjuncts? Not physicalfacts of the sort that physicists study.
While being a Boolean combination does not
automatically exclude a property from
occurring in physical laws, Boolean
combinations like the ones we are
considering will never figure in physical
laws in any science remotely like the
physics we know today. What determined
whether or not a case gets into the
disjunction is going to be the economic
/ the fact as to whether or not the
economic characteristics of a situation make
something function as money or not.^^
Teller's objection can be reformulated as a rejection
of the claim that for every predicate expressing a
supervenient property from the S-discipline (e.g.
economics)
,
there is a predicate of the B-discipline (e.g.
physics)
,
which is necessarily coextensive with it. So,
like Post, Teller grants that for each predicate expressing
a supervenient property there is a necessarily coextensive
predicate constructible from predicates of the reducing
discipline and (infinitary) Boolean operations. Evidently
they both reject the thesis that the set of theoretical
terms of a discipline is closed under Boolean operations.
^^Teller (1984b) p. 59. One might object to Teller's
example because the property of being currency is an
extrinsic property and therefore does not strongly
supervene on any set of intrinsic physical properties (e.g.
duplicate pieces of clam shell have the property in some
social settings and not in others) . But this is not
relevant because being currency may nevertheless strongly
supervene on a set including extrinsic physical properties
in which case we are still faced with Kim's claim that
strong supervenience implies reducibility
.
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is not
and Teller apparently believes that the class of
theoretical terms of a discipline (e.g., physics)
even closed under disjunction. Not surprisingly, Kim
disagrees
.
When reduction is the issue, we are talking
about theories, theories couched in their
distinctive theoretical vocabularies. And
it seems that we allow, and ought to allow,
freedom to combine and recombine, the basic
theoretical predicates and functors by the
usual logical and mathematical operations
available in the underlying language,
without checking each step with something
like the resemblance criterion; that would
work havoc with free and creative scientific
theorizing ....[I]t may well be that when an
srtificial-looking predicate proves useful,
or essential, in a fecund and well
corroborated theory and gets entrenched, we
will come to think of it as expressing a
robust property, an important respect in
which objects and events can resemble each
other
.
If the artificial looking predicate was artificial in
virtue of disjoining a few (e.g., four) apparently
heterogeneous predicates of the B-discipline
,
but proved to
be particularly useful, then it does seem plausible that,
as Kim suggests, eventually, translations of laws from
theories in the S-discipline might be added to the
theoretical postulates of theories in the B-discipline. In
this case, the predicates appearing in the translated
statements of these laws might well be accepted as
^^Kim (1990) p, 21.
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theoretical terms of the B-discipline
. if the number of
disjuncts is large (say over 1000, let alone infinite),
however, as would be the case for the property of being
currency
,
and the translated laws are not derivable from
the previously accepted laws of any theory in the B-
discipline, then I am inclined to agree with Teller that
the complexity of such laws and their apparently ad hoc
nature would be a decisive objection to their being
included as independent theoretical postulates of the B-
discipline. In such cases, the translated laws of the S-
discipline and the predicates used to express them would be
too difficult (if not impossible) to comprehend and to work
with, so considerations of theoretical simplicity would
suggest that these predicates would not be afforded the
status of theoretical terms of the B-discipline.
5. Conclusion
Let's say that one term is Boolean definable in terms
of a set of other terms iff the former is necessarily
coextensive with some Boolean combination of the members of
the set. The following thesis is necessary for the claim
that strong supervenience entails Kim-style reducibility of
disciplines (i.e., the strong connectibility of terms of
the S-discipline with terms of the B-discipline) and
appears to be the central point of disagreement between Kim
and Teller. Kim apparently believes the set of terms of a
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theory (or a discipline) is closed under Boolean
definability, and Teller does not. i think Post and Teller
have given us good reason to doubt whether the closure
condition is satisfied.
I hasten to add that there are many different notions
of reduction. Some, such as mathematical reduction, are
relatively free of epistemological considerations; others,
such as intertheoretic reduction, are not. Certainly, it
is easier to argue that strong supervenience is
nonreductive by appealing to the more epistemologically
sensitive types of reduction. It is somewhat surprising,
then, to find that Kim is as explicit as anyone that the
sort of reducibility in guestion is intertheoretic
reducibil ity . And these informal, epistemic considerations
involved in intertheoretic reducibility are not somehow
eliminated from the discussion when we move to the issue of
strong connectibility
,
even among disciplines. They
reappear as guestions about which terms are theoretical
terms of the B-discipline and which are merely (infinitely)
definable in terms of them. I think Teller and Post have
given us every reason to accept the claim that when this
sort of reducibility is at issue, strong supervenience is a
legitimately nonreductive relation.
On the other hand, Kim is correct to emphasize (SE)
.
(SE) makes it apparent that the strong supervenience of S
on B would be welcome news to anyone attempting to reduce
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some S theory to a B-theory - welcome news, but not a
guarantee of its possibility.
Having clarified and defended the nonreductive status
of strong supervenience
,
next I turn to the other side of
the eguation: its status as a dependence relation.
B_;—Strong Supervenience and Dependence
1. Introduction
We think of the world as layered. At the bottom (at
least as far as we know), are the entities, properties and
relations, presently studied by guantum physicists. If we
contrast the quantum realm with even the properties studied
by cell-biologists, it is natural to say that the
properties studied by biochemists are intermediate.
Moreover, the objects and properties of the "upper" levels
seem to be dependent on the objects and properties of the
"lower" levels. For example, we are inclined to think that
the properties of social institutions are dependent on the
properties of individuals, and that the mental properties
of individuals are dependent on the neurophysiological
properties of their brains, which, in turn, are ultimately
dependent on the properties of the atomic and subatomic
entities composing the brain.
Supervenience is often taken to be an analysis of (or
a substitute for) this sort of inter-level dependence
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between properties (events or facts). For example,
consider these passages from Jaegwon Kim:
Acceptance or rejection of the supervenience
of the mental on the physical leads to the
most basic division between theories of the
mind-body relation: theories that accept
psychophysical supervenience are
fundamentally materialist, and those that
reject it are fundamentally anti-
materialist. This difference is
philosophically more basic and more
significant than the usual classification of
mind-body theories as "monist" or
"dualist"
.
I am taking mereological supervenience ... as
a thesis concerning the objective features
of the world - a metaphysical doctrine -
roughly, as I said, to the effect that the
macroworld is the way it is because the
microworld is the way it is.'"^
Other influential philosophers have treated supervenience
as a philosophically significant dependence or
determination relation (witness the quotations from G.E.
Moore and Donald Davidson in chapter I. A.). In fact, it is
the promise of supervenience to be of use in characterizing
such inter-level dependence relations, more than anything
else, that makes it attractive to philosophers.
Recently, however, this sort of reliance on
supervenience has come under attack. Opening salvos were
launched by Lombard (1986), DePaul (1987), and Grimes
^^Kim (1984a) p. 156.
^^Kim (1984b) pp. 264-265.
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(1988). For example, Thomas Grimes concludes his paper
"The Myth of Supervenience"
,
with the following claim:
Instead of being a savior of contemporary
philosophy, the concept of supervenience
turns out to be rather uninteresting, or atleast ill-suited for the applications it is
supposed to have. For even in its strongest
form [i.e., strong supervenience], this
concept fails to serve as a general form of
dependency.
. . .Thus, supervenience is not an
all-purpose device for explaining how the
moral, the mental, or the macrophysical
depends in some special way on a more basic
reality. It is just not the right sort of
concept in this regard.''^
Grimes is claiming that since supervenience is not a
general (or an appropriate?) kind of dependence relation,
it is not strong enough to play the roles that Moore,
Davidson, Kim and others appear to have envisioned for it.
David Charles has recently argued that materialism cannot
be expressed as a supervenience thesis because
supervenience fails to "capture the priority of the
physical in either an explanatory or ontological mode"^®.
Even Kim has come to believe that supervenience is not the
dependence or determination relation it was once thought to
be
.
Since strong supervenience is the strongest
supervenience relation discussed in the literature, by
’^Grimes (1988) p. 159.
^®Charles (1992) p. 276.
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questioning its adequacy as a dependence relation the
critics threaten to expose all supervenience relations as
metaphysically insignificant correlation relations. One of
the primary tasks of this dissertation is to identify and
separate the truth that underlies these criticisms from the
exaggerated implications some have drawn from them. l
undertake the relevant identification in the remainder of
this chapter.
—
—Strong Supervenience and Functional Dependence
The word 'dependence' has a myriad of different
senses: causal dependence, functional dependence,
ontological dependence, and explanatory dependence all come
to mind.''^ Yet critics of supervenience often fail to
distinguish the kind of dependence at issue. Let's see if
we can do better.
We begin by noting that supervenience relations really
just are functional dependence (or determination)
relations. To see this recall that for any set of
properties. A, an A-maximal property. A*, is any consistent
conjunction of members of A and their complements such that
for every individual, x, and every member of A, P, D(A*x ^
Px) V D(A*x --Px) . Now, the strong supervenience of S on
B requires that any two things that have the same B-maximal
^^Peter Simmons (1987) begins his study of ontological
dependence by distinguishing ten different types of
dependence
.
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property (i.e., instantiate precisely the same subset of B-
properties) must have the same S-maximal property (although
the converse need not hold)
. More precisely, s strongly
supervenes on B iff there is a (potentially many-one)
function, f, from B-maximal properties to S-maximal
properties such that, necessarily, if an individual has B-
maximal property, b, then it has S-maximal property, F(b) .
In essence, strong supervenience is a functional dependence
relation where the independent variable ranges over B-
maximal properties and the dependent variable ranges over
S-maximal properties: the S-maximal property of any
individual is functionally dependent on/determined by its
B-maximal property.
Grimes appears to be aware of the fact that
supervenience relations are functional dependence (or
determination) relations. He distinguishes
^^Jaegwon Kim and others have treated dependence as
the converse of determination: "Supervenient properties are
dependent on, or are determined by, their base properties"
(Kim (1990) p. 9). Despite what Grimes (1991) claims,
there is a perfectly good sense of "dependence" on which
this claim is true. Consider the common practice of
distinguishing independent from dependent variables. Where
f(x) = y, 'x' is the independent variable, and 'y' is the
dependent variable: the idea being that the values of 'y'
are functionally dependent on (because functionally
determined by) the values of 'x*. The variable ranging
over B-maximal properties (or subsets of B) is the
independent variable, the variable ranging over S-maximal
properties (or subsets of S) is the dependent variable.
The S-maximal property of any individual is functionally
determined by, and thereby functionally dependent on, its
B-maximal property.
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(CD) One thing correlationally determines
another if and only if given the way the first
only one way the second can
from
"(D) One thing determines another if and only if
given the way the first is there is one and only
one way the second can be because of the wav i-ho
first is.»^^ ^
And he claims that
Strong supervenience.
. . implies the
correlational sense of determination (CD) . .
.
However, [strong supervenience] does not
imply (D)
,
the more interesting or
dependency sense of determination. If these
two senses are not adequately distinguished,
strong supervenience might easily be
mistaken as a form of dependency and it
falsely concluded that supervenient
properties are dependent upon their
corresponding subvenient properties
.
Despite the different terminology, I think Grimes agrees
that strong supervenience is what I am calling a
"functional dependence" relation. He just prefers to call
its converse a "correlational determination" relation.
^^Grimes (1988) p.l56.
^^Grimes (1988) p.l56.
^^Grimes (1988)_ p. 156.
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The idea that supervenience provides only the
correlational (or functional) component of some stronger
dependence relation has recently been echoed by Kim:
when nonreductive physicalists appeal to
supervenience as a way of expressing the
dependence of the mental on the physical,
they pretty clearly have in mind an
asymmetric relation.
. .
.
"Functional
dependence", in the sense that two state
variables of a system are related by a
mathematical function, may be neither
symmetric nor asymmetric; however, what we
want is metaphysical or ontic dependence or
determination, not merely the fact that
values of one variable are determined as a
mathematical function of those of another
variable
.
Finally, David Charles also offers a similar criticism of
supervenience. Charles focusses on the inadequacy of
supervenience as a means of formulating materialism:
There seem to be at least two physicalist
claims at work here. The first is that
physical properties are explanatorily prior
or primary, and that mental properties are
explanatorily dependent or secondary....
The second physicalist intuition is
expressed by a certain ontological thesis:
the physical is what the mental is composed
of . The physical constitutes the basic
building blocks of the universe, and
everything else is made up from these....
Both of these intuitions need
refinement. . . . However,
supervenience ... fails to capture either of
them. The relations of being explanatory
prior and being the ontological basis of are
^^Kim (1990) p. 13.
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stronger than the one expressed by any
member of the supervenience family.
Grimes, Kim and Charles seem to be making essentially the
same point: namely, that ontologically significant inter-
level dependence relations such as materialism involve (at
least) two components: a functional dependence or
correlation relation, and a non-functional priority
relation. They also agree that supervenience provides only
the former. They are correct. Even without knowing
exactly what this sought for ontic priority relation is, on
the mere assumption that it is asymmetric (which comes from
Kim)
,
we will be able to show that strong supervenience
(qualified any number of ways)
,
is not sufficient for the
ontic priority of the base-properties.
Before I do so, however, I want to make two points.
First, it is worth noting that although I am not offering
any official analysis of this ontic priority relation, a
Lewisian would probably understand ontic priority between
properties in terms of greater naturalness. I am neutral
on this proposed analysis, but those who have some grasp on
greater naturalness may find it helpful to think of ontic
priority in this manner.
Second, I want to comment on Kim's suggestion that
supervenience is supposed to be an ontic dependence (or
^^Charles (1992) p. 274 .
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determination) relation. l propose the following
provisional analysis of the relation of ontic dependence
among sets of properties: S ontologically depends on B iff
S functionally depends on B and there is an appropriate
sense in which the members of B are ontically prior to (or
more natural than) the mebers of s. Note, first of all,
that since functional dependence is necessary for ontic
dependence, if supervenience relations really amount to
types of functional dependence relations (as
strong supervenience does)
,
this sort of analysis respects
Kim s opinion that (at least some kind of) supervenience is
a necessary condition of ontic dependence between sets of
properties
. Moreover, since strong supervenience, at
least, is equivalent to a variety of functional dependence,
the question of whether strong supervenience entails ontic
dependence reduces to the question "does strong
supervenience yield the ontic priority of the members of
the base set?". The critics say "no". It is time to see
why they are correct (about this)
.
3. Strong Supervenience and Ontic Prior ity
We begin by noting that ontic priority, whatever else
it might be, is clearly an asymmetric relation, while
strong supervenience is not. For example, any property, P,
strongly supervenes on itself: no objects can differ with
^^See Kim (1990) p. 16; Kim (1991) p. 10.
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regard to P without differing with regard to P. But no
is ontically prior to (or more natural than)
itself. This establishes that the strong supervenience of
S on B is not sufficient for the ontic priority of the B-
properties. (For now I am assuming that B—properties are
ontically prior to the S-properties iff every member of B
is ontically prior to every member of S. Later, this
simplifying assumption will be modified.)
Although strong supervenience is not sufficient for
the ontic priority of the base properties, perhaps
asymmetric strong supervenience will be:
(SAS) If S strongly supervenes on B and B fails to
strongly supervene on S (for short, S strongly a-
supervenes on B)
,
then all the members of B are
ontologically prior to any member of S.
After all, when materialists claim that the mental is
supervenient on the physical, they are implicitly assuming
that the physical is not supervenient on the mental.
As it stands, however, (SAS) is false. To see this
^^The only detailed counterexample to (SAS) in the
literature was first suggested by Grimes, and it has been
fleshed out by Kim. It is unsuccessful, however. Kim and
Grimes claim it is possible that three sets of properties,
A, B, and C, stand in the following relations. A strongly
asymmetrically supervenes on B (for short, A strongly a-
supervenes on B)
,
but B-properties are not ontologically
prior to A-properties . Rather, A and B both strongly a-
( continued. .
.
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. continued)
supervene on C, and it is the C-properties which are
ontological ly prior to the others. The asymmetric
supervenience of A on B is a result of the fact that both
supervene on C (Grimes (1988) p. 157; Kim (1990) pp. 14 -15) . Kim goes on to support these general considerations
with an example:
As a possible example consider this: I've
heard that there is a correlation between
intelligence as measured by the IQ test and
manual dexterity. It is possible that both
manual dexterity and intelligence depend on
certain genetic and developmental factors,
and that intelligence strongly [supervenes]
on manual dexterity but not conversely. If
such were the case, we would not consider
intelligence to be dependent on, or
determined by, manual dexterity (Kim, (1988)
p. 157; Kim (1990) pp. 14-15).
The idea is that intelligence strongly supervenes on, but
is not ontologically determined by, manual dexterity.
Rather, both intelligence and manual dexterity are onticly
determined by "certain genetic and developmental factors".
Thus asymmetric strong supervenience is not sufficient for
ontic determination (nor, therefore, the ontic priority of
the base properties)
.
This may seem compelling. The connection between
manual dexterity and intelligence is very tenuous. Surely,
there are possible worlds in which beings without hands (or
dispositions to use them) are very intelligent and there
are worlds in which beings without hands (or dispositions
to use them) are not intelligent. Such considerations lead
us to accept the premise that intelligence is not
ontologically determined by manual dexterity.
Unfortunately, the very same considerations show that
intelligence does not strongly supervene on manual
dexterity thereby defeating the example. What has gone
wrong?
Perhaps Kim merely meant to claim that it is
metaphysically possible that, as a matter of nomological
necessity , intelligence strongly a-supervenes on manual
dexterity. If we grant that this is metaphysically
possible and we also grant that if such a situation were
possible, intelligence would still not be ontologically
determined by manual dexterity, Kim's counterexample
stands. It is a counterexample to an implausible thesis,
however. Specifically, on this interpretation Kim's
(continued. .
.
)
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let S {blueness) and let B - {blueness, redness). s
strongly supervenes on B because no two things can differ
with regard to blueness without differing with regard to
either blueness or redness. But the converse is not true.
Thus the antecedent of (SAS) is satisfied. On the other
hand, blueness is not ontically prior to itself:
ontological priority is not reflexive. Thus the consequent
of (SAS) is not satisfied.
There are various ways to amend (SAS) so that it is no
longer susceptible to such examples.^® But more general
difficulties will remain. Many result from the following
fact
:
^^(
. . . continued)
example establishes the falsehood of
(SAS') If, as a matter of nomological (but not
metaphysical) necessity, S strongly a-supervenes on B,
then all members of B are ontologically prior to all
members of S.
It is not surprising that (SAS') is false. Relations
of ontological priority, unlike causation, are not
contingent on the laws of nature. They hold of
metaphysical necessity or not at all. Thus, we should not
expect that merely nomologically necessary supervenience
relations are sufficient for ontic priority. Kim's example
reinforces this impression: or motivates it for those who
didn't have it in the first place. I conclude, then, that
this example does not refute (SAS)
.
^®Here ' s one of them.
(SASl) If S strongly a-supervenes on B then all
members of B-S are ontically prior to all members of
S-B.
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(1) For any property, P, if s strongly a-supervenes on
B, then S strongly a-supervenes on B u {P}.
(1) can be used to argue that any property is ontically
prior to any property, even itself. For example, suppose
that (A) strongly a-supervenes on (C, D}, and {C, D)
strongly a-supervenes on {E, F, G, H}. Such a situation
might occur with a biological property, its chemical
realizations, and their physical realizations in turn. (1)
implies that {C,D} also asymmetrically strongly supervenes
on {E,F,G,H,A). Thus, we have the result that A (as well
as E, F, G, and H) is ontologically prior to C, while C in
turn is ontologically prior to A. Assuming that
ontological priority is an asymmetric relation, this is an
unacceptable result.
In order to neutralize (1) , we need some way of
limiting the membership of the base set. We begin by
introducing the notion of a minimal supervenience base.
(MSB) For any sets of properties, S and B, B is a
minimal (strong) supervenience base for S S
strongly supervenes on B and S does not strongly
supervene on any proper subset of B.
Our new sufficient condition for ontic priority follows.
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(SAS2) If s Strongly a-supervenes on B and B is a
minimal strong supervenience base for S, then all
the members of B are ontically prior to all the
members of S.
(SAS2) avoids the problem caused by (1) because given that
{C, D} strongly supervenes on {E,F,G,H}, {E,F,G,H,A} is not
a minimal strong supervenience base for {C,D}. Thus, we do
not get the conseguence that A is ontically prior to C and
D. It also avoids our first objection to (SAS)
.
Unfortunately, (SAS2) is also defective. One problem
arises from our oversimplified treatment of the
relationship between strong supervenience and ontic
priority. Since the notion of a minimal supervenience base
can be of service here, it is worth considering this
problem first. Although we have been assuming that all the
members of the base set have to be ontically prior to all
members of the supervenient set, the requirement is too
strong. For example, suppose {A} strongly supervenes on
{C,D}, both members of which are ontically prior to A, and
suppose that {E} strongly supervenes on {F,G}, both members
of which are ontically prior to E. Suppose, furthermore,
that neither C, D, nor E is ontically prior to either of
the two others. This is a problem because it follows from
the two supervenience theses, that (A,E) strongly
supervenes on {C,D,F,G}, although C and D are not
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ontically prior to E. Suppose, finally, that {C,D,F,G) is
a minimal supervenience base for {A,E). it follows, then,
that (SAS2) is false, although, in some sense, the spirit
of (SAS2) is not clearly violated because the properties
which A supervenes on (minimally) are ontically prior to A
and likewise with E.
To correct the oversimplified treatment of the
relationship between ontic priority and strong
supervenience, we need the notion of minimal strong a—
supervenience base which is defined in terms of a minimal
strong supervenience base.
(MSBa) For any sets of properties, S and B, B is a
minimal strong a-supervenience base for S Bdf
is a minimal strong supervenience base for S and
B does not strongly supervene on S.
With this notion, we can capture the spirit of the claim
that strong supervenience entails ontic priority:
(SAS3) If S strongly a-supervenes on B then every
member of S, P, is ontologically posterior
relative to each member of some subset of B which
is a minimal strong a-supervenience base for P.
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Basically, (SAS3) has the effect of breaking up a single
supervenience thesis into n supervenience theses, one for
all n members of the supervenient set. Then we ask of each
of these properties whether the properties which it really
supervenes on are ontologically prior to it. This approach
avoids the problem raised above because the members of the
minimal supervenience bases for both A and E are ontically
prior to A and E respectively. it also could be
generalized to other kinds of supervenience if the need
arose
.
Despite the usefulness of the notion of a minimal
supervenience base, there are problems with (SAS) and its
successors the notion of a minimal supervenience base
cannot solve. For one thing, supervenience relations
are insensitive to the difference between a property and
its complement, but it is plausible that the relation of
once objected to (SAS3) as follows: suppose P
strongly a-supervenes on the set of its two possible
"realizations" {C, D}, which is a minimal supervenience
base for P, and suppose that C and D are onticly prior to
P. Since we are assuming that possession of either C or D
is sufficient for possession of P (they are realizations of
P) it follows that P also strongly a-supervenes on {C&P, D}
(since C is equivalent to C&P)
,
which is also a minimal
strong a-supervenience base for P. Then it follows from
(SAS3)
,
as well as its predecessors, that the property,
C&P, is ontologically prior to P. But this, I argued, was
not an acceptable result. I was wrong. It is perfectly
acceptable to anyone who holds that necessarily equivalent
properties are identical, as I am inclined to. For on this
assumption, C&P just is C. Replacing C&P with CvP in the
above example is equally harmless, for CvP is equivalent to
P and {P,D) is not a minimal strong a-supervenience base
for P.
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ontological priority is not. For example, if c strongly a-
supervenes on {D, E), then it also strongly a-supervenes on
{-D, -E}. This is because two individuals are
indiscernible with respect to a property iff they are
indiscernible with respect to its complement. On the other
hand, there is reason to doubt that a property and its
complement are at equal levels on the ontic priority
hierarchy
.
^ objection to the adequacy of supervenience
as a formulation of metaphysically significant dependence
relations is provided by the fact that things can be
indiscernible with respect to a set of properties in virtue
of instantiating the complements of all of them. Van Cleve
(1990) and Grimes (1991) have pointed out that even the
strong supervenience of the mental on the physical is
compatible with the possibility of there being disembodied
spirits with mental states as long as they all have the
same mental properties. For example, if all possible
disembodied beings experience eternal bliss, we would not
thereby have a case of physically indiscernible, mentally
discernible objects, and, therefore, we would not have a
counterexample to the strong supervenience of the mental on
the physical. Individuals which fail to instantiate any
physical properties would be physically indiscernible
nevertheless. Some find this a rather compelling objection
^°See Armstrong (1989) p. 83.
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to the claim that supervenience
,
itself, is an adequate
formulation of materialism: it does seem incompatible with
the claim that the physical is ontically prior to the
mental
.
A truly decisive objection to (SAS) and amended
versions involves the supervenience of a property on a set
of mutually exclusive properties. Examples of this are
provided by the supervenience of a determinable property on
an appropriately selected set of its determinates. For
example, suppose, to keep things simple, that there are
only two determinate shades of green, say light green, L,
and dark green, D. Since L and D are the only determinates
of some determinable, they are contraries. Thus every
green part of a thing is either light green or dark green,
but not both. In this case, greenness, or G, strongly
supervenes on the set (L, D}, and it does so
asymmetrically. Clearly, no two things can differ with
respect to greenness (one is green and one isn't) unless
they instantiate different members of the set {L, D);
although the converse is not the case. It is plausible
that determinates are more basic (or natural) than
determinables
,
so I am willing to grant that our example
accords with (SAS3) . So far so good.
But since L and D are mutually exclusive properties
(contraries)
,
and they are the only possible "realizations"
of greenness, it is also true that light-greenness strongly
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supervenes on greenness and dark-greenness. That is, L
strongly supervenes on {G, D} . No two things can differ
with respect to L (one is light green the other is not)
without differing with respect to (G, D). The thing that
is light green will have G but not D, and anything that
fails to be light green will either instantiate D and G or
to instantiate either. So if our earlier claim that
determinates are more natural than their determinables is
correct we now have a counterexample to (SAS3)
. Of course,
if the earlier claim is false, then since all determinables
strongly supervene on the set of all their determinates, we
already have a counterexample to (SAS3).
Note the generality of the point. Anytime a
contingently exemplified determinable property P strongly
a-supervenes on a minimal base set of its determinates, B,
any member of B, M, will strongly a-supervene on the set
that includes P and all members of B other than In
^^Assume a contingent property P (a property that is
not instantiated by every possible object) strongly a-
supervenes on a minimal base set of mutually exclusive
determinates of P, B. Since the supervenience is
asymmetric, B must have at least two members. Now, for
reductio, suppose that some member of B, M, fails to
strongly a-supervene on {P}uB-{M} (call this set "C")
.
Clearly, C does not strongly supervene on M (because
otherwise P, which is a member of C, would strongly
supervene on M and therefore B would not be a minimal
supervenience base for P) . Thus, the reason M fails to
strongly a-supervene on C is because it fails to strongly
supervene on C. But if M fails to strongly supervene on C
then things can be M-discernible and C-indiscernible
.
Consider two such possible objects a and b such that Ma and
-•Mb. Since M is a determinate of P, if Ma then Pa. Thus,
(continued. .
.
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such as situation, either all the members of B are
ontologically prior to P or they are not. if not, we
already have a counterexample to (SAS3) (and its
predecessors). On the other hand, if all the members of B
are ontologically prior to P we use an argument of the
above form to falsify (SAS3) by taking any member of B, M,
out of the base set, replacing it with P and then showing
that (SAS3) entails the falsehood: P is ontologically prior
to M. This is a fundamental difficulty with (SAS3) and the
entire project that motivates it.
4. Conclusion
It seems that the task of analyzing ontic priority (or
even finding an informative sufficient condition) in terms
of supervenience is impossible. Does this mean that
supervenience, in general, is metaphysically insignificant
as Grimes has claimed? I aim to show that it does not. In
the final chapter I will argue that supervenience relations
are necessary conditions on materialism and other
metaphysically significant theses supervenience has
^^
( . . . continued)
from the C-indiscernibility of a and b we have Pb. Since B
is a set of mutually exclusive determinates of P on which P
supervenes, anything that instantiates P must instantiate
some member of B. Since ^Mb, b must instantiate some other
member of B, N (so Nb) . Because the members of B are
mutually exclusive determinates of P, if Ma then a has no
other member of B, so -Na. But since N is in C, a and b
are not C-indiscernible after all. Contradiction.
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customarily been associated with. Thus if they are false,
so are the relevant theses. That should suffice to make
them philosophically significant (assuming they are not
trivially true)
.
The claim that supervenience relations are necessary
conditions on such metaphysical dependence theses should
not be surprising. We have already seen that strong
supervenience is essentially a functional dependence (or
determination) relation, and in subsequent chapters we
shall see that the same holds for other supervenience
relations. Thus, if ontic dependence between sets of
properties just is the functional dependence of less
natural on more natural properties, as I have suggested,
then whatever supervenience relation provided the
appropriate sort of functional dependence would be one part
of a two part analysis of ontological dependence between
properties. Such a relation, and any weaker
^^The idea that supervenience is one part of a two
part analysis of the ontologically significant dependence
relations is implicit in this passage from Graham Oddie:
Supervenience theses hold out a double
promise. The first is that of ontological
economy . The guiding idea is that... the
supervenient attributes of an item or state
of affairs are determined by its base
attributes. Thus if the supervenience base
is ontologically privileged , what supervenes
on it is ontologically derivative (Oddies
(1991) p. 20: my emphasis)
Oddie (conversationally) implies that a supervenience
claim, on its own, does not justify claims of ontological
( continued . .
.
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supervenience relations, would, of course, be a necessary
condition on ontological dependence. Even if this was the
only role supervenience theses could play in philosophy
(and it is not)
,
it would suffice to make supervenience
philosophically significant. In the subseguent chapters I
that a version of global supervenience is
ideally suited to play this role.
^^
( . . . continued)
dependence. Otherwise, the emphasized antecedent would be
redundant. But he also implies that supervenience plus the
priority of the base set implies some sort of ontologically
significant dependence relation.
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CHAPTER IV
GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE AND PLENITUDE: A RESPONSE TO KIM
A. Introduction
1-i—Forinulat
i
ncf Global Supervenience
According to our supervenience schema, there can be no
difference of the supervenient sort without a difference of
the base sort. The schema invites the question: "no
among what?". According to local supervenience
relations such as strong and weak, individuals cannot
differ in one respect without differing in others.
According to global supervenience relations, on the other
hand, entire possible worlds or models cannot differ in one
way without differing in another. Roughly, the mental is
locally supervenient on the physical iff no two organisms
(or objects of any sort) can differ psychologically without
differing physically in some way. Whereas the mental is
globally supervenient on the physical iff no two possible
worlds have different distributions of thoughts and
feelings (over their inhabitants, or over space and time)
without having different distributions of physical
properties
.
The standard formulation of global supervenience has a
superficial similarity to our formulation of strong
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supervenience, (S)
.
Where S (supervenient) and B (base)
are sets of properties:
(S) S strongly supervenes on B for any possible
objects, X and y, if x and y are B-indiscernible
then X and y are S-indiscernible
.
(G) S globally supervenes on B for any possible
worlds, w and z, if w and z are B-indiscernible
then w and z are S-indiscernible as well.^
The relevant difference can be brought out by focussing on
the definition of A-indiscernibility used to explicate the
meaning of (S)
.
(II) For any set of properties. A, x and y are A-
indiscernible for any P in A, Px iff Py.
If (II) is accepted as the definition of A-
indiscernible worlds (i.e., global A-indiscernibility),
then S globally supervenes on B iff no possible worlds have
the same B-properties and different S-properties . Since
the properties instantiated only by possible worlds (the
ways only worlds can be) are propositions, on this
^Contingent supervenience theses are accommodated by
treating the locutions 'any possible objects' and 'any
possible worlds' as restricted quantifiers.
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interpretation global supervenience is primarily a relation
between sets of propositions. Some writers, such as LePore
and Loewer, seem to understand global supervenience this
way
:
Global supervenience: If two nomologically
possible worlds are exactly alike with
respect to fundamental physical facts (the
facts expressible in terms of the
vocabularies of fundamental physical
theories) then they are exactly alike with
respect to all other facts.^
Their thesis is an instance of (G) supplemented by (II)
,
where S is taken to be the class of all non-physical
propositions, B the class of all physical propositions, and
the quantifier is restricted to nomologically possible
worlds
.
Thomas Grimes, Bradford Petrie, and Jaegwon Kim, who
first offered (G) as the definition of global
supervenience, are among those who interpret (G)
differently.^ They allow S and B to contain properties of
any sort (as opposed to just propositions) as is the case
with weak and strong supervenience. This facilitates
discussion of the logical relations between global, strong,
and weak supervenience. But it also creates a need for a
^LePore and Loewer (1989) pp. 177-178. For another
example see Lewis (1983) p. 362.
^See Grimes (1988), Petrie (1987), MacDonald (1989) p.
209, and Pauli and Sider (1992).
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different definition of global A-indiscernibility
. After
all, when Kim, Grimes or Petrie claim that the mental is
globally supervenient on the physical, they do not mean
that possible worlds with the same physical properties have
the same mental properties. That is trivial.^ They mean,
roughly, that any worlds with the same distribution of
physical properties (over space and time) have the same
distribution of mental properties as well. m general,
then, they would say that two worlds are A-indiscernible
iff the two worlds have the same distribution of A-
properties over space and time.
Since this chapter focusses on Kim and Petrie's
arguments concerning global supervenience
,
I will follow
them in distinguishing global A-indiscernibility from
individual A-indiscernibility, and in not limiting the sets
of properties related by global supervenience to sets of
propositions. Throughout this chapter, then, our working
definition of global supervenience will be:
(G') For any sets of properties S and B, S
globally supervenes on B any two worlds
which have the same distribution of B-
properties (are globally B-indiscernible)
^Why? Because possible worlds are not the sorts of
things that have beliefs or sensations.
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have the same distribution of S-properties
(are globally S-indiscernible)
.
There are alternative explications of precisely what
it is for two worlds to have the same distribution of some
class of properties (to be globally A-indiscernible)
. And
the issues involved get very complex. While these
alternatives are discussed in chapter V, in this chapter we
can rest on the unexplicated notion. The central arguments
presented in this chapter are sound on any of the plausible
analyses of precisely what having the same distribution of
some class of properties amounts to. They are also sound
even if global supervenience is understood as a relation
between sets of propositions. Both of these assertions
will be confirmed in chapter V.
2 . Motivations for Global Supervenience
There are three main reasons that have motivated
philosophers to take global supervenience seriously. The
first is the existence of multiple-domain supervenience
relations, and the need to express such relations. A
supervenience relation, R, is a multiple-domain relation
iff R is compatible with the existence of possible
individuals (even worldmates) with different supervenient
properties and no base properties. More precisely, where R
is a supervenience relation between sets of properties and
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require B-
relations, s and B (i.e., S-differences
differences)
,
R is a multiple-domain supervenience relation
Iff there are possible objects which differ in their s-
properties (are S-discernible)
,
and lack any B-properties
at all. 5 otherwise R is a single-domain relation. Note
that I will also refer to types of supervenience, such as
global supervenience, that are capable of capturing
multiple-domain supervenience relations as multiple-domain
supervenience relations. This sort of supervenience
relation is required to adequately formulate the
supervenience of the properties of wholes (one domain) on
the properties of (and relations between) their proper
parts (a distinct domain)
. For example, a tiger and a
mouse differ in that one has the property of being a tiger
while the other has the property of being a mouse, but
neither organism has any of the microphysical properties of
their microphysical parts such as negative unit charge on
which these complex structural properties ultimately
depend. Thus, two organisms can instantiate different
members of the set of all species-properties without
themselves instantiating any members of the set of
microphysical properties (such as negative unit charge)
.
am indebted to Mark Aronszajn for helpful discussion
of the characterization of a multiple-domain supervenience
relation. For more on multiple domain supervenience, see
Kim (1988) .
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Of course, there is a property of being composed of
such and such particles with such and such microphysical
properties in such and such an arrangement which the mouse
has and the tiger has not, but a complex structural
property such as this is instantiated by one of the
organisms, not by any of its microphysical parts. Weak and
strong supervenience are capable of formulating the
supervenience of properties, like being a mouse, on complex
structural properties of organisms
, but they are not able
to capture directly the supervenience of the property of
being a mouse on the microphysical properties of (and
relations between?^) the microphysical constituents of the
mouse. The advocate of strong or weak supervenience is
unable to capture the intuitive determination of the
properties of wholes by the properties of their parts .
(S) and (W) are what we might call single—domain
relations: they are falsified by any case where two objects
instantiate different S-properties but no B-properties
.
Clearly then, if the B-properties are of a sort that cannot
be instantiated by the objects which instantiate the S-
properties (as in the example above where the B-properties
are microphysical properties and the S-properties are
*^1 start discussing the benefits of including relations
in the base set (and the supervenient set) in chapter V.
But for now we will follow the general practice of ignoring
this complication. By including relational properties in
the base set, we can get some, but not all, of the
advantages of including relations themselves.
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properties of whole organisms) neither (W) nor (S) will
hold. In many such cases, however, we have the
characteristic feature of supervenience: the impossibility
of independent variation. Since no two objects can be
members of different species unless there is some
difference in the properties (including relational
properties) of their microphysical constituents, there
should be some version of supervenience capable of
expressing such claims directly.
Although in chapter VI I formulate new versions of
local supervenience which are suited for this purpose, the
only multiple-domain supervenience relations available in
the literature are global supervenience relations. To see
that global is a multiple-domain relation, note that
species properties (almost certainly) globally supervene on
microphysical properties: fix the distribution of these
microphysical properties over time and space and the
distribution of mice and tigers is determined. The lack of
any worlds with the same distribution of microphysical
properties and different distributions of mice or tigers is
perfectly compatible with the fact that no organisms (at
least no tigers or mice) instantiate any of the members of
the set of truly microphysical properties.
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are both motivatedJohn Haugeland and Gregory Currie
by this consideration to make use of global
supervenience.^ Currie, in his paper on the global
supervenience of the properties of (he says facts about)
social institutions on the behavior and attitudes of
individuals, lodges the following complaint against Kim's
formulation of weak supervenience. Using 'M' for the set
of supervenient properties and 'N' for the set of
subvenient properties in his definition of (W)
,
he says
this definition is deficient from my point
of view. The right side involves the idea
that the N- and M-properties belong to the
same objects: if two objects agree in their
N-properties they will agree on their M-
properties. So Kim's formulation confines
us to talking about individual and social
properties which we attribute to the same
objects. This is too restrictive. Social
institutions [the wholes] can be treated as
objects with social properties, but they
cannot be said to have individual properties
(e.g., they do not have mental states). We
want the idea that the N-properties of one
set of objects determines the M-properties
of another set of objects (though of course
the two sets may overlap) .®
^Haugeland seems to be motivated to present a multiple-
domain supervenience relation because he is concerned with
the reductive implications of single-domain supervenience.
See Haugeland (1982) pp. 96-97. For a discussion of
Haugeland 's criticism of single-domain supervenience see Kim
(1988) pp. 131-132.
®Currie (1984) pp. 348-349.
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A second motivation for using global supervenience is
provided by the intuitively holistic nature of many
determination relations. Many would claim that the content
of my thoughts is determined by more than just the
intrinsic state of my brain, it also depends on my physical
surroundings (past and present)
. Currie cites this as a
second advantage of global over local supervenience:
Putnam has argued that a person's
psychological state is not a matter simply
of what is going on 'in his head' but also
of what external objects he is causally
related to. The same difficulty arises when
we consider facts about the social. There
is an undeniable sense in which such facts
holistically constituted. My becoming
Prime Minister is not just a matter of what
I think or do; it depends upon what others
think and do as well. So my social
characteristics are clearly not determined
by my individual characteristics alone. If
individual facts determine the social facts
they do so in a global rather than a local
way . ’
David Lewis is one of many philosophers who have made
essentially the same point.
At this point it ought to seem advisable to
formulate materialism as a supervenience
thesis: no difference without a physical
difference. .. .The thesis might best be taken
to apply to whole possible worlds, in order
to bypass such questions as whether mental
^Currie (1984) p. 349.
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life is to some extent extrinsic to the
subject.
The third and final motivation for global
supervenience is provided by the fear of the reductive
implications of individual supervenience. Specifically,
some fear the reductive implications of the strong
connectibility of predicates expressing supervenient
properties with Boolean constructions out of predicates
expressing base properties which is entailed by strong
1
0
•Lewis (1983) p. 362. Also see Petrie (1987) pp. 121-
122, and Horgan (1982) pp. 32-33.
Before considering the third motivation, it is worth
noting the following disanalogy between the first and second
motivations. The critics are right that neither weak nor
strong supervenience is a multiple-domain relation, but are
they correct that strong supervenience cannot formulate
holistic determination theses? Mightn't we express the
holistic determination of the mental in terms of strong
supervenience by saying that mental properties strongly (or
weakly) supervene on intrinsic and extrinsic physical
properties of individuals? Yes we can. There are
difficulties, however. For example, "Precisely which
extrinsic physical properties have to be included in the
base set for the mental to supervene on the physical?". If
one has nothing informative to say at this point or simply
allows all extrinsic physical properties in the set, then
one might as well formulate the thesis in terms of global
supervenience. For if all extrinsic physical properties are
included, then two possible individuals would have to be in
physically indiscernible positions in physically
indiscernible worlds in order to falsify the individual
supervenience thesis at issue. By making the truth or
falsehood of a supervenience thesis depend on the
distribution of physical properties over entire possible
worlds, the distinctive idea of local supervenience has been
abandoned in favor of the leading idea of global
supervenience. Perhaps, then, formulating holistic
determination relations in terms of global supervenience is
the safe thing to do so long as we remain ignorant of the
precise intrinsic and extrinsic base properties on which the
supervenient properties depend.
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supervenience (see chapter III) Global supervenience
does not imply the strong connectibility of predicates
expressing supervenient properties and predicates
expressing members of the Boolean closure of the base set.
This motivation, although rarely given explicitly, is quite
powerful, for, although many do not find Kim's attack on
the nonreducibility of strong supervenience conclusive, l
suspect that many would rather sidestep this difficult
issue altogether.
To the best of my knowledge, these are the three
primary motivations for global. They are, once again, the
desire for a multiple-domain supervenience relation, the
desire to capture "holistic" determination theses,
particularly the determination of mental by intrinsic and
physical properties, and a desire to avoid any
reductive implications of strong supervenience.
3. The Issue at Hand
Until recently, many found global psychophysical
supervenience to be an ideal formulation of materialism.
It was considered weak enough to be nonreductive yet strong
enough to ensure that mental properties are wholly
determined by physical properties . But, since 1987
^^Petrie (1987) .
^^For an explicit statement to this effect, see Petrie
(1987) pp. 129-130. Also see Heilman and Thompson (1975);
Horgan (1982); Lewis (1983); Currie (1984), and Post (1987).
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Jaegwon Kim has consistently argued that global
supervenience, unlike strong supervenience
,
is too weak to
be a determination (or dependence) relation worthy of
materialism.''^ It is important to realize that this
argument is independent of his doubts about whether strong
supervenience entails the ontic priority of the base
properties. Essentially he argues that, unlike strong,
global fails to provide for even the sort of functional
dependence relation required for ontological dependence
relations such as materialism.''^ If he is correct, global
psychophysical supervenience would not even be a
significant necessary condition on materialism.
Kim's arguments have been very influential. Most
recent discussions of supervenience either ignore global
entirely or quickly dismiss it on the basis of his
criticisms.''^ The arguments are unsound, however, and a
very promising concept is being ignored without good
reason. Kim's criticism of global supervenience is based
on Bradford Petrie's inconclusive counterexample to the
equivalence of strong and global supervenience. Petrie's
counterexample is subtly flawed, and since the defect is
^^See Kim (1987), (1989), and (1990).
^^See Kim (1990) p. 23.
^^Among those who do the latter are Crane (1991) p.
237; Macdonald (1989) p. 209, and Grimes (1988) p. 154. An
exception to this rule is provided by LePore and Loewer
(1989) .
117
inherited by Kim's arguments l take great pains to identify
It in section B. m that section I also introduce a
metaphysical principle concerning the plenitude of
possibilities which I use, in section C, to defend global
supervenience from Kim's criticisms. Finally, in section
D, I reexamine my arguments that rely on the plenitude
principle for their relevance to contingent supervenience
theses
.
—
—
Petrie on the Nonequivalence of Strong and Global
1-:^
—
Petrie's Counterexample
Kim once argued that strong and global supervenience
are equivalent. If true, this would mean that global is
not a multiple-domain supervenience relation (or that
strong is)
. It would also mean that global has the same
reductive implications that strong does and is no better
suited for formulating holistic determination theses.
Later, Kim retracted his "proof" in light of a
counterexample offered by Bradford Petrie.'''^ Petrie's
conclusion that strong and global supervenience are not
equivalent is correct . His reasoning , however, is
^^See Kim (1984) p. 168 for the "proof" and Kim (1987)
p. 318 for the retraction. See Petrie (1987) and Kim op.
cit., for the counterexample and extensive discussions of
its significance.
^^For Sider's proof see Pauli and Sider (1992), section
3 .
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subtly flawed
. i take the time to diagnose the flaw
because Kim's arguments for the weakness of global
supervenience are explicitly fashioned on this argument of
Petrie
' s
.
Petrie's counterexample to the equivalence of strong
and global supervenience involves a supervening set, A,
which contains only the property Q, and a base set, B,
which contains only the property P. We are supposed to
consider two worlds, w and w'. in w there are two objects,
X and y, such that Px, Qx, Py, but
-Qy. m w' there are
two objects x' and y', such that Px',
--Qx',
--Py', and
-Qy ' :
Qx
-Qy
-Qx' -Qy'
Px py Px'
-Py
'
After presenting the example, Petrie argues as
follows
:
[The] strong supervenience [of A on B]
requires that objects which do not differ
with regard to B-properties cannot differ
with regard to A-properties . In w and w',
however, x [and x'] differ with regard to
^®Since Petrie hasn't specified which properties 'P'
and 'Q' denote, strictly speaking w and w' are world-types,
not specific possible worlds. Nevertheless, it is simpler
to follow Petrie in thinking of them as particular possible
worlds
.
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the A-property [Q] without differing with
regard to the B-property P. Thus we cannot
consistently suppose that A strongly
supervenes on B in this case. We can
consistently suppose that A globally
supervenes on B, however. The worlds w and
w| are not B-indiscernible since they differ
with regard to what B—properties are
possessed by y [and y']. Thus global
supervenience does not require that w and w'be A-indiscernible and thus there is no
conflict with global supervenience in the
supposition that x possesses [Q] in w but[x' does not possess Q in w']. Since global
gupervenience i s, and strong supervenience
is
—
not
,
—consistent with this example, the
two concepts of supervenience are noh
equivalent
.
^ (my emphasis
)
Essentially, Petrie has provided us with a model-schema for
languages capable of expressing supervenience theses. On
some models constructed according to this schema (e.g.
,
models where w and w' are the only indices)
,
the global
supervenience of A on B is true and the strong
supervenience of A on B is false. Thus, he has proven that
the two notions are not formally equivalent
. So far, so
good.
The problem is Petrie, Kim, and others^^ have
interpreted the example as proof that global is
metaphysically weaker than strong supervenience. According
^’Petrie (1987) p. 121.
^®The distinction between formal and metaphysical
equivalence (see chapter I) is absolutely crucial to an
accurate appreciation of my criticism of Petrie's argument.
^^See Grimes (1988) p. 154; Macdonald (1989) p. 209,
and Crane (1991) p. 237.
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any
to Petrie the example shows that global does not share
of the reductive implications of strong supervenience
;
according to Kim it shows that, unlike strong, global is
too weak to serve as an adequate determination relation.
But what is the metaphys ical significance ofthe failure of global supervenience to
entail strong supervenience? To see
Petrie's example as showing this failure isto see, I think, the limitation of global
supervenience as a relation of determination
or dependence. (my emphasis)
Evidently, many think the example establishes
(CE) There are sets of properties S and B such that S
supervenes globally but not strongly on B.
If true, (CE) would falsify an important equivalence:
(EQ) S globally supervenes on B iff S strongly
supervenes on B.
I will show that Petrie's example fails to establish (CE)
and therefore fails to falsify (EQ)
^^Kim (1987) p. 319.
complication: I have suggested that Kim and others
have taken Petrie's example as establishing (CE) and thereby
(continued. .
.
)
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present us with
In order to establish (CE) Petrie must
sets of properties that supervene globally, but not
strongly, upon one another. He uses w and w' in his
attempt to prove that A and B are such sets, w and W are
23
( . . . continued)
^ counterexample to (EQ)
. But one might objectthat (EQ) IS a material equivalence, and material
equivalence is not the primary issue in discussions of the
^
strength of supervenience relations. Even if l amright that Petrie, Kim and others have interpreted Petrie'sexample as proof of more than the formal nonequivalence ofstrong and global, it does not follow that they interpretedIt as proof of (CE)
. Perhaps they only think that Petrie'sexample establishes that (CE) could be true which wouldfalsify
(NEQ) Necessarily, S globally supervenes on B iff s
strongly supervenes on B.
After all, with the proper interpretation of 'necessarily'(NEQ) is the thesis that strong and global are
metaphysically equivalent. If Petrie's example establishes
the falsehood of (NEQ) it would be a metaphysically
significant example.
Note, however, that as long as we are assuming that the
accessibility relation is an equivalence relation (as I am
until and unless I indicate otherwise)
,
(EQ) and (NEQ) are
metaphysically equivalent because strong and global are both
necessarily true (false) if true (false)
. So if strong and
global have the same truth value at one world, they have the
same truth value at all worlds. Thus, by considering
whether Petrie's counterexample disproves (EQ)
,
I am
simultaneously considering whether it disproves (NEQ)
,
and,
consequently, I can avoid discussion of these complications
in the text.
On the other hand, if the relevant accessibility
relation is not an equivalence relation (because, for
example, strong and global supervenience are interpreted as
involving quantification over only nomologically possible
worlds and objects)
,
the possibility that (CE) is true does
not entail that (CE) is true, and thus (EQ) and (NEQ) are no
longer metaphysically equivalent. Nevertheless, once we see
why Petrie's example fails to establish (CE)
,
it will be
clear that it also fails to establish that (CE) could be
true. And at that point, in note 33, I will explicitly lay
out why this is so. We will find that Petrie's example
still fails to falsify (NEQ)
.
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clearly inconsistent with the strong supervenience of A on
B. But do Petrie's worlds succeed in establishing that A
globally supervenes on B? Well, Petrie claims that their
existence is consistent with the hypothesis that global is
true. If he means that w and w' are not B-indiscernible
,
A-discernible worlds, he is correct. But note that the
existence of w and w' is egually "consistent" with the
hypothesis that global is false
,
because, for all Petrie
has told us, there may be other B-indiscernible, A-
discernible worlds that falsify the global supervenience of
A on B. The existence of w and w' fails to establish that
A globally supervenes on B, and therefore fails to
establish (CE)
The claim that A globally supervenes on B is a
universally quantified thesis. So while it can be
falsified by a single case of B-indiscernible A-discernible
worlds, it can only be established by arguments which show
that of all the possible worlds, nq two have the same
distribution of B-properties and different distributions of
A-properties
. Recall, if Petrie is going to establish (CE)
with the sets A and B, he needs to establish that A
globally supervenes on B. To do so, Petrie needs to show
^^Petrie's inclusion of w' is especially mysterious.
W, with its two B-indiscernible A-discernible objects,
falsifies the strong supervenience of A on B all by itself.
And the supposition that global is true, if consistent with
the existence of w and w', is surely consistent with the
existence of w.
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either (i) that there are no B-indiscernible worlds or (ii)
that every pair of B-indiscernible worlds are A-
indiscernible as well. it is quite clear, however, that
Petrie is considering such an incomplete model of logical
space that there is no hope of establishing the truth of
(CE) or of any global supervenience claim.
One might object to my criticism of Petrie's example
by pointing out that we often consider blatantly false
models of reality in order to present vivid
counterexamples. Consider the standard counterexample to
the identity of indiscernibles
. We are asked to suppose
that only two perfectly spherical, homogeneous balls exist.
If that is a legitimate form for a counterexample to take,
then why can't we understand Petrie to be asking us to
suppose that the only possible worlds are w and w'?
Clearly, if w and w' were the only possible worlds, then A
would supervene globally on B. The short answer to this
objection is that while it is possible that only two
spheres exist, it is not possible that w and w' are the
only possible worlds. Since the actual world is not
identical to w or w'
,
and the actual world is (necessarily)
a possible world, it follows that w and w' do not (and
could not) exhaust logical space.
While there are coherent models of modal logic where w
and w' are the only possible worlds (and that is why his
example does establish the formal inequivalence of strong
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and global )
,
we know that no such model could be accurate
because we know that the actual world is not identical to w
or w'. So when metaphysical possibility and necessity are
at issue (as they are now)
,
while we can grant Petrie that
w and w' are possible worlds, we can be assured that there
are some other possible worlds as well. And Petrie's
example gives us no reason to believe that the other worlds
do not falsify the global supervenience of A on B.
Therefore, as a counterexample to (EQ)
,
Petrie's example is
incomplete. Its incompleteness is highlighted in the next
section where I introduce and defend a metaphysical
principle that supports the inference from the existence of
w and w' to the existence of worlds inconsistent with the
global supervenience of A on B.
2. Plenitude Through Isolation
Whatever one thinks of unactualized possibilities, I
contend that one should accept the following principle: if
there are any unactualized possibilities, there is a
plenitude of such possibilities. The claim that all truths
are necessary is compatible with this principle. But once
one admits that some false propositions are possibly true,
good reasons are required for saying that one false
proposition is possibly true while another is not. Unless
one is willing, with Spinoza, to forego the whole idea of
125
alternative possibilities, one must be willing to accept a
plenitude of such possibilities.^^
This principle suggests that if some unactualized
combination of objects and properties is a possible
combination, then there is a plenitude of such merely
possible combinations. And we certainly are inclined to
believe that at least some things could have been arranged
differently or absent altogether. For example, it seems
possible that your refrigerator be where your kitchen sink
actually is and that your sink be where your refrigerator
is. Also, it seems that your sink could have been a
color or could have failed to exist at all.
Thus, we appear to be committed to a plenitude of possible
arrangements of objects and properties.
But precisely which arrangements are possible?
Surely, there cannot be a colorless blue frog, and many
have doubted whether there can be more than one physical
object occupying exactly the same spatiotemporal location.
We need to supplement our original principle with some
specific theses about the content of logical space.
According to David Lewis,
^^The idea that there is a plenitude of possibilities
is often captured in the motto "there are no gaps in logical
space" (Lewis (1986a) p. 86). See Bricker (1991) for an
example of how to develop the idea behind this motto into a
genuine theory of plenitude.
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anything can coexist with anything else, atleast provided they occupy distinct
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise,
anything can fail to coexist with anythinq
e se. Thus, if there could be a dragon, andthere could be a unicorn, but there couldn'tbe a dragon and a unicorn side by side that
would be an unacceptable gap in logical
space, a failure of plenitude.
(By "logical space" Lewis means, roughly, the mereological
sum of all possible worlds. Also, Lewis is speaking of
metaphysical possibility - not some weaker kind of formal
possibility.
)
Lewis expresses two principles of plenitude in the
passage. One says that if it is possible for x to exist
and it is possible for another object, y, to exist, then it
is possible for x and y to exist together. The other says
that if it is possible for x to exist together with y, then
it is possible for x to exist without y.^^ I will use a
version of Lewis's second principle of plenitude in my
defense of global supervenience : for any possible object
(including any mereological fusion of objects), it is
possible for a duplicate of that object to exist in
isolation. I call this "the principle of isolation".
^"^Lewis (1986a) p. 88.
^^Since Lewis restricts these theses to possible
obi ects (as opposed to allowing any combination of objects
and properties)
,
he is not committed to the possibility of
colorless blue frogs.
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(I) For any possible individual, x, there is a
possible world containing only* a duplicate of x
Where
,
^ contains only* a duplicate of x w contains a
duplicate of x, its parts, and no other possible
individuals.
Where
Y is a possible individual y could fail to
(actually) exist, y is not a space-time point, and y
has no members.^®
(I) is the principle that for any possible object, it is
metaphysically possible for an object with the same
intrinsic properties to exist without worldmates
.
(I) is compatible with different views on the nature
of logical space. For example, it is consistent with both
Lewis's modal realism and D.M. Armstrong's "naturalistic"
^®My intention is to allow the existence of contingent
entities such as sets whose only members are parts of x in w
and to stay neutral on the spatiotemporal structure of the
worlds resulting from isolation.
^^Note that (I) does not state that it is nomologically
possible for any object to exist in isolation.
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combinatorial theory of possibility People with
disparate modal ontologies can use (I) as a way of
partially specifying the extent of the plenitude of
possibilities (as a way of "filling in" some of the gaps in
incomplete and potentially misleading models of logical
space)
.
To see how (I) can help us "fill in the gaps",
reconsider Petrie's counterexample to (EQ)
:
w
“’Qy
--Qx ' ->Qy
'
PX Py px «
_py I
In section B, I argued that while the example falsifies the
strong supervenience of A (= {Q}) on B (= {P}), it fails to
establish their global supervenience. Now I shall
demonstrate this by using (I) to show that on a natural
interpretation of the example, there must be worlds which
falsify the global supervenience of A on B.
Petrie's presentation of his example leaves certain
issues unresolved. Are x and x' atomic individuals or do
they have proper parts? Are P and Q intrinsic or extrinsic
properties? Petrie does not say. Suppose that P and Q are
^°See Armstrong (1989) pp. 61-65.
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are atomicintrinsic properties and x and x'
individuals. (I) implies that there is a world, t, with
only* a duplicate of x (v)
,
and a world, f, containing
only* a duplicate of x' (v'). Since P and Q are intrinsic
properties, they cannot differ between duplicates so z and
z' will be as they are represented below.
Because x and x' are atomic, their duplicates, v and v' are
also atomic. So neither v nor v' has any parts which might
disrupt the apparent B-indiscernibility and A-
discernibility of z and z'. Clearly, then, z and z' are B-
i^*^iscernible but A—discernible t A fails to globally
supervene on B!
I have just used the principle of isolation to
demonstrate that if P and Q are intrinsic properties and x
and X' are atomic, then the existence of w and w' is
inconsistent with the global supervenience of A on B.^^
^^In fact, Petrie appears to implicitly assume that x,
x', y and y' are atomic. For if any of these objects have
proper parts, the global B-indiscernibility of w and w'
would not be established because he has not told us which of
the parts have P and which of them have Q.
^^Even if P or Q is extrinsic (or x and x' are not
atomic), Petrie's example is still incomplete (and therefore
(continued. .
.
)
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This illustrates both the essential defect in Petrie's
example and the usefulness of (l)
. continued)
inadequate)
. Although in this case (I) cannot be used toB^ove that there must be worlds which falsify global, thefact remains that Petrie has not established that there are
no other possible worlds which falsify global.
this point I can make good on my promise in note
23 to show why Petrie's example fails to establish that (CE)
true, and therefore fails to falsify (NEQ) even on
the assumption that the supervenience theses are
metaphysically contingent. The thesis that (CE) could be
true is restated thus:
(PCE) Possibly, there are sets of properties S and B
such that S globally but not strongly supervenes on B.
One establishes (PCE) thereby refuting (NEQ) by showing that
there is a possible world, v, at which (CE) is true. In
other words, one needs to show that there is a possible
world, V, and sets of properties, S and B, such that v is
accessible to the actual world and there are B-indiscernible
S-discernible possible individuals in worlds accessible to
V, but there are no B-indiscernible S-discernible worlds
accessible to v.
Petrie's example failed to establish (CE) because it
failed to show that while w and w' are accessible, no other
(accessible) worlds are B-indiscernible and A-discernible
.
Likewise, the example fails to establish (PCE) because it
fails to show that there is any possible world, v, from
which both w and w' are accessible but from which no B-
indiscernible A-discernible worlds such as z and z' are
accessible as well. In both cases, the (possible) global
supervenience of A on B is not established.
Finally, as I mentioned before, although Petrie's
example failed to be conclusive, (EQ) is indeed false; for
Sider's proof, see Pauli and Sider (1992), section 3.
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c_
,
The Defense of Global Superv^ni
-i-:
—
Kim's First Araumerrh
Kim claims that the "metaphysical significance” of
Petrie's example is that it shows "the limitation of global
supervenience as a relation of determination or
dependence
. He has repeatedly presented two Petrie-
style examples to establish the weakness of global
supervenience. Here is one of them.
But before we accept global psychophysical
supervenience as a significant form of
materialism we should consider this: it is
consistent with this version of materialism
for there to be a world which differs
physically from this world in some most
ti^ifling respect (say, Saturn's rings in
that world contain one more ammonia
molecule) but which is entirely devoid of
consciousness. .. .As long as that world
differs from this one in some physical
respect, however minuscule or seemingly
irrelevant, it could be as different as you
please in any psychological respect you
choose.... It is doubtful that many
materialists would regard [this consequence]
as compatible with their materialist tenets;
it seems clear that rit1 is not compatible
with the claim that the mental is determined
wholly by the physical
.
(my emphasis)
This example parallels Petrie's in the following respects.
First, Kim considers two possible worlds which are
^^Kim (1987) p. 319.
^^Kim (1987) p. 321. For other versions of this
example see Kim (1989) p. 41, and Kim (1990) p. 23.
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discernible with regard to the base set of properties and
therefore do not themselves falsify any global
supervenience claim, and he concludes that some other
feature apparently exemplified by the two worlds is
compatible with the truth of global supervenience. in
Petrie's case the "other feature" is the falsehood of
strong supervenience. In Kim's example the other feature
is the apparent lack of determination of the mental by the
physical. Second, like Petrie, Kim does not establish that
the example really is compatible with the truth of global
supervenience. An argument is needed that such a partial
description of a model of logical space can be extended to
a complete model on which the relevant global supervenience
thesis is true, the dependence/determination claim is
false, and the plenitude of possibilities is respected. No
such argument is presented, so the counterexample is
incomplete
.
There is an important disanalogy with Petrie's
example: while the principle of isolation can be used
merely to illustrate the incompleteness of Petrie's
example, it provides us with a proof that Kim's example
cannot succeed even if it were filled out. One can use (I)
to demonstrate that if Kim's worlds are possible, then
either global psychophysical supervenience is false or
there is no lack of determination of mental by physical
properties
.
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Before we do so however, i need to introduce a
variation on the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties. For any object x and any property P,
let's say that P_is intrinsic to y iff having P is a
necessary condition for being a duplicate of x. On the
other hand, P_is extrinsic to x iff having P is not a
necessary condition for being a duplicate of x. Note that
all intrinsic properties will be intrinsic to every object
which instantiates them. On the other hand, some extrinsic
properties will be intrinsic to some objects and extrinsic
to others. For example, suppose that my hand is presently
within two inches of my printer's printer ribbon. In this
case, assuming that my printer ribbon is a part of my
printer(I), the extrinsic property of having a part within
two inches o f a printer ribbon is intrinsic to my printer,
t>ut extrinsic to my hand. No duplicate of my printer, as
it is now, can fail to have a part two inches from a
printer ribbon. But a duplicate of my hand may lack such a
part. With this distinction we can respond to Kim's
objections without begging any questions against him.
Kim asks us to imagine a possible world, W, which
differs physically from the actual world, @, only by
containing an extra ammonia molecule somewhere in the rings
of Saturn. This minute physical difference is accompanied
by the complete lack of any mental states. Let's name the
extra ammonia molecule, 'e', and the property of having no
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sentient parts, *N'. (Also, note that I make full use of
mereology, and, for simplicity, l follow Lewis in assuming
that a possible "world is the mereological sum of all the
possible individuals that are parts of it" Clearly,
since W has N (in other words, no part of W is sentient),
the mereological difference, W minus e (W-e)
,
also has N.
Two exclusive and exhaustive possibilities arise. Either N
is intrinsic to W-e, or it is not.
Suppose N is intrinsic to W-e. By the principle of
isolation there is another world, W', which contains only*
s psi^foct duplicate of W-e. Since W-e has N and W'
contains only* a duplicate of W-e, W' also has N (i.e., W'
also lacks sentient parts)
. But, of course, @ has many
sentient parts. Thus, we can conclude that @ and W' are
mentally discernible. Next we establish that @ and W' are
physically indiscernible. Note that by stipulation the
only physical difference between W and @ is that W has e
and @ does not! So W', which contains only* a duplicate of
W-e, must be physically indiscernible from @. In fact, the
only physical difference between W and both @ and W' is
that W contains the extra molecule, e, while W' and 0 do
not. Thus, W' and 0 are physically indiscernible and
mentally discernible: global psychophysical supervenience
is false! With isolation we have established that if N is
^^Lewis (1986a) p. 69.
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intrinsic to W-e, Kim's example is not compatible with the
truth of global psychophysical supervenience
.
The other possibility is that N is extrinsic to W-e.
If so, the preceding argument for the falsity of global is
blocked. The problem is that if N is extrinsic to W-e,
then, when we isolate (a duplicate of) w-e, we no longer
have any guarantee that it will have N and thereby be
mentally discernible from @. We need isolation to falsify
global, but isolation is useful only when we know that the
properties involved are intrinsic to the isolated
individuals. So if N is extrinsic to W-e, we can defeat
the example only if we can argue that the apparent lack of
psychophysical determination is illusory - and so we can.
If N is extrinsic to W-e, then W-e has N because of
its relations (or lack thereof) to some part(s) of W that
are not parts of W-e. But the only other part of W is e.
We are left with the conclusion that whether a duplicate of
W-e (or @) has N is determined by its relations (or lack
thereof) to an object like e. A minute physical difference
between W and 0 accounts for the fact that 0 has sentient
parts and W does not. Thus, if N is extrinsic to W-e,
while global psychophysical supervenience may be true, the
apparent lack of determination of the mental by the
physical is defeated.
In conclusion, N is either intrinsic or extrinsic to
W-e. If N is intrinsic to W-e, the example is inconsistent
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with global psychophysical supervenience in which case
global supervenience is strong enough to rule out the
possibility envisioned by Kim. On the other hand, if n is
extrinsic to W-e, the example is perfectly consistent with
the determination of the mental by the physical and thus it
is no threat to the claim that global supervenience is a
meaningful determination relation. Either way, Kim's
example is demonstrably incapable of illustrating that
global supervenience is compatible with a lack of
determination of supervenient by subvenient properties.
2 . "Weird" Dependence
One might object that it is problematic enough that
global supervenience is compatible with the kind of weird
functional dependence (or determination) relation which
obtains if N is extrinsic to W-e. It seems that any
supervenience relation that doesn't rule out the
possibility of my sentience being determined by the non-
existence of one extra molecule in the rings of Saturn is
not a supervenience relation worthy of serious attention.
Bizarre functional dependence seems no more acceptable than
independence
.
This response is misguided. The fact is, no
supervenience thesis, on its own, is capable of ensuring
"the right kind" of dependence (or determination) . To see
that this is so, consider the following argument against
137
the adequacy of strong supervenience that parallels Kim's
objection to global.
The Argument: Strong supervenience is too weak a
dependence relation because it is compatible with the
possibility of a non-sentient
,
near physical duplicate of
George Bush. Call this mindless entity, 'Bushless'.
Imagine that the only physical difference between the
actual world and Bushless' world is that Bushless has one
atom in his brain than Bush has in his. So an extra
atom, e, is lodged somewhere in Bush's brain. The fact
that Bush is sentient while Bushless is not, seems
incompatible with any appropriate dependence of the mental
on the physical. But it is not incompatible with strong
psychophysical supervenience. First of all. Bush and
Bushless are not physically indiscernible. Second, for
some reason. Bush's sentience is so dependent on e that no
physical duplicate of Bushless is sentient. This is a case
of weird dependence which is not incompatible with the
truth of strong psychophysical supervenience.^^
This argument shows that strong supervenience, like
global, is compatible with cases of weird dependence. It
does not show that strong supervenience is an inadequate
dependence relation. The truth is, both strong and global
supervenience guarantee that there is some dependence of
^^The possibility of paralleling Kim's examples with
examples like this was something I learned from Sider. See
Pauli and Sider (1992)
.
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supervening on subvening properties. As we have already
seen, the strong supervenience of S on B ensures a
functional dependence of S-properties on B-properties
:
every member of the Boolean closure of B is associated with
a unique member of the Boolean closure of S. Likewise, if
S globally supervenes on B then there is a function whose
domain is possible global distributions of B-properties and
whose range is possible global distributions of S-
properties. The details of this functional determination
relation depend on which precise analysis of global A-
indiscernibility one accepts, and will not be considered
until chapter VI. in any case, just as strong
supervenience is mute on which subsets of B-properties
determine which subsets of S-properties, global
supervenience is mute on which distributions of B-
properties determine which distributions of S-properties.
The existence of some such function is ensured, but its
values are not - and we may find them to be "weird".
It is a mistake to expect supervenience theses to rule
out cases of "weird dependence". All we can expect from
supervenience theses is the assurance that the subvening
properties of an individual (or their distribution across a
world) uniquely (i.e., functionally) determine the
supervening properties of that individual (or world)
.
Discovering the nature of the determination relation (e.g.,
discovering which neurological properties determine which
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psychological properties is (primarily) the business of
empirical scientists studying the properties in
question. To expect more from supervenience is to
misunderstand its nature.
3_:—Kim's Second Argument
With this clarification in mind, l turn to Kim's
second example against the strength of global
supervenience
.
If that doesn't convince you of the weakness
of global supervenience as a dependency
relation, consider this: it is consistent
with global supervenience for there to betwo organisms in our actual world which,
though wholly indiscernible physically, are
radically different in mental respects (say
your molecule-for-molecule duplicate is
totally lacking in mentality)
. This is
consistent with global supervenience because
there might be no other possible world that
is just like this one physically and yet
differing in some mental respect.^’
We are to imagine that I actually have a perfect
physical double. Despite Kim's claim that my double and I
are wholly indiscernible physically (in which case the
actual world is a very strange world indeed)
,
I think he is
really only asking us to imagine a version of the standard
twin—earth scenario according to which I have a perfect
^®See Hill (1991) p. 5.
^^Kim (1989) p. 42.
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physical duplicate in somewhat different physical
surroundings. ‘O Kim asks us to imagine that my molecule
for molecule double is totally lacking in any positive
mental properties.
In response I offer the following dilemma. Either
some (positive) mental property of mine is intrinsic to me
or they are all extrinsic. If one or more is intrinsic
then, by (i)
,
there is a world, M, containing only* a
duplicate of me and another world, D, containing only* a
duplicate of my non-sentient double. Since my actual
double is a physical duplicate of me, the worlds which
result from isolating us, namely M and D, will be
physically indiscernible. I have some intrinsic mental
property, P, so my duplicate in M also has P. But my
actual physical double has no mental properties; it fails
to have P. Hence, its duplicate in D also fails to have P.
M and D are physically indiscernible, mentally discernible
worlds. Either global psychophysical supervenience is
^°Although I think I have correctly interpreted Kim
here, it is only fair to point out that if I am wrong and
Kim did mean that my physical double and I are physically
indiscernible so we have the same extrinsic physical
properties (e.g., we are in the same position in different
epochs of some kind of world of eternal physical
recurrence)
,
then the example cannot be dismissed as
readily. Specifically, the second horn of the dilemma
presented in the text would have to be fleshed out in much
greater detail. Whether isolation could be used to respond
successfully to the example would depend on subtle details
not provided by Kim.
^^By "positive mental properties", I mean to exclude
properties such as not being sentient which even rocks have.
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falsified or, on the supposition that global is true, the
example is shown to be impossible. This shows that if ^
of my actual mental properties are intrinsic, global
psychophysical supervenience is strong enough to rule out
the possibility Kim envisions in the example. on the
other hand, if all my mental properties are extrinsic,
since extrinsic properties are those properties that can
differ between duplicates, it is possible that my physical
duplicate and I share no mental properties. No lack of
psychophysical dependence has been established, however,
for my extrinsic mental properties may depend on extrinsic
physical properties I have and my physical duplicate lacks.
4. Intermediate Conclusion
With the aid of isolation, we have seen the inadequacy
of Kim's influential arguments for the comparative weakness
of the functional dependence relation provided by global
supervenience vis-a-vis that provided by strong
supervenience It must be emphasized, however, that these
results do not hinge essentially on (I)
:
other plenitude
principles could be used to refute Kim's examples. So the
lesson is not that philosophers must choose between
accepting Kim's counterexamples or the principle of
isolation. Rather, it is a more general choice between the
^^Kim apparently holds that at least some mental
properties are intrinsic: see Kim (1982) p. 59.
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plenitude of possibilities and Kim's examples.
Nonreductive materialists can take heart. Global
psychophysical supervenience may yet be of service in the
characterization of materialism.
The advantages of global supervenience come at a
price, however. m order to be assured that global will
not be trivially satisfied, one must be assured that the
plenitude of possibilities is respected. But when
supervenience theses are interpreted as involving
restricted quantifiers, our principle of isolation becomes
much less plausible. This is important because, although
there are some dissenters, the majority of present day
materialists think materialism is a contingent thesis.
—Isolation and Contingent Supervenience
i-: Obiections to Isolation
I have few doubts that there is a plenitude of
unactualized possibilities. Principles, such as the
principle of isolation, however, which put some flesh on
the bones of programmatic affirmations of plenitude, are
more controversial. For instance, consider (I)'s role in
my response to Kim's second counterexample to the strength
of global. From the (stipulated) possibility of a universe
^^Among the dissenters are Tye (1983), and Teller
(1984a)
.
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somewhat like our own, except for the existence of a pair
of people who are physical duplicates, (I) is used to
derive the existence of two other worlds, one containing
only* a duplicate of the first member of the pair the other
containing only* a duplicate of the second member. One
might be suspicious of the possibility of such worlds.
First of all. If we isolate temporal stages with no
temporal dimension, we have the odd consequence that there
are possible worlds with instantaneous temporal duration,
and small finite spatial dimensions, one may doubt whether
such worlds are really possible.
Things are even stranger if we isolate temporally
extended individuals. in this case, we get two worlds
which are composed of only* a human being that exists for
some finite temporal duration (e.g., 24 hours). Consider
the process of breathing. if a world contains a physical
duplicate of any temporally extended segment of me, it
^oritains an object that breathes. As I breathe, oxygen
atoms are being absorbed into my body through my lungs.
Consider what goes on at the surface of my duplicate lungs
in my isolated duplicate. Spontaneously, new oxygen atoms
are appearing, atoms which didn't exist in that world the
moment before. Puzzling questions arise: since there is
never any air in his lungs, why does my duplicate's chest
expand when he "breathes"? Similar puzzles attend other
metabolic functions. Such a world is very peculiar indeed.
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of the central role
The objection is important because
isolation played in my response to Kim's arguments against
the adequacy of the functional dependence/determination
relation provided by global supervenience
. if isolation is
false, although Kim's examples would be incomplete in the
same way Petrie's is (because he has not shown that the
partial model of logical space can be completed in a way
that respects plenitude and fails to falsify the relevant
global supervenience thesis)
,
l would have failed to
demonstrate that they cannot be successfully completed.
The classic response to this sort of objection is to
distinguish metaphysical possibility from more restricted
(but perfectly legitimate and important) forms of
possibility such as nomological possibility. The claim
would be that such worlds are nomologically impossible yet
metaphysically possible. Even if this response succeeds,
however, the objection successfully illustrates one of the
major limitations of isolation: worlds which contain only*
a duplicate of some part of another world are likely to
violate the laws of that other world.
Consequences for Contingent Global Supervenience Theses
It is commonly assumed that materialism is
contingently true (or false) Those who accept this
view and wish to formulate materialism as a supervenience
^^See Horgan (1982), Lewis (1983), and Petrie (1987).
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One
thesis must use a restricted supervenience thesis,
common way of restricting supervenience is to quantify over
only nomologically accessible worlds and their inhabitants.
Both Kim and Petrie advocate restricting psychophysical
supervenience theses in this way.« But we just saw that
while isolation preserves metaphysical possibility, it
fails to preserve nomological possibility: there is no
assurance that if the first world is nomologically
possible, the isolated world will also be nomologically
possible. Thus, my responses to Kim's counterexamples to
the strength of global supervenience have to be qualified.
Since my arguments are based on isolation, they do not
succeed in establishing that the truth of such a restricted
global psychophysical supervenience thesis is inconsistent
with the lack of functional determination of the mental by
the physical which Kim takes to be illustrated by his
examples. Global supervenience theses which only quantify
over all nomologically possible worlds may be as weak as
Kim claims.
We seem to have a dilemma. One option is to abandon
the claim that materialism is contingent, formulate
materialism as a metaphysically necessary global
supervenience thesis, and use isolation to defend global
supervenience from Kim's examples. The other option is to
stick with the claim that materialism is contingent and
^^See Kim (1984c) p. 49; Petrie (1987) p. 120.
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abandon the hope of formulating materialism as a global
supervenience theses. Fortunately, however, this is a
false dichotomy. One can continue to formulate materialism
as a contingent supervenience thesis and accept my response
to Kim's arguments if one substitutes an appropriate
restriction on the quantifiers in (O') for the restriction
to nomologically possible worlds. Specifically, the set of
worlds to which the quantifiers in (G-) are restricted must
be closed under the operation of isolation: when isolation
is applied to any part of any member of that set, the
resulting world must also be a member of the set.
Surprisingly, such formulations already exist. Both
Terrence Morgan and David Lewis have, during the course of
their discussions of materialism, proposed contingent
supervenience theses which appear to meet our requirements.
They both argue that although materialism is best
formulated as a contingent supervenience thesis, the
quantifiers should not range over all or only nomologically
possible worlds. We should not quantify over all
nomologically possible worlds because there may be some
nomologically possible worlds with spiritual substances
which have no effects on anything non-spiritual. As Morgan
says
,
One major problem concerns Cartesian souls,
and other kinds of spiritual substances like
angels or God. We who claim that the
microphysical facts determine all the facts
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want to deny that such beings exist in our
However, we need not deny
ly.ll
there are some possible worlds in whichthey do exist and in which the microphysicallaws of our world are never violated in
with the^^^^r^^^®
spirits would not interfere
ordinary operations of physicallaws upon physical substances
Horgan and Lewis also argue that we should not restrict the
quantifiers to only nomologically possible worlds. Lewis
points out that if materialism were defined as the thesis
that no two nomologically accessible worlds differ mentally
without differing physically, materialism would be true "at
a world where [intuitively] materialism is false but
spiritual phenomena are correlated with physical phenomena
according to strict laws"."^^
Their solutions to these difficulties are slightly
different.^® I will focus on Lewis's solution. He begins
by defining an alien property as one that (i) is not
instantiated in the actual world, and (ii) is not
analyzable as a conjunctive property or a structural
property whose constituents are all instantiated in the
actual world. He then presents the following definition of
materialism:
^^Horgan (1982) pp. 34-35.
'^^Lewis (1983) p. 363.
^®See Horgan (1982) pp. 35-36 for his original
proposal, and Horgan (1984) pp. 36-37 for a discussion of
Lewis's objection and the amended version.
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Among worlds where no natural propertieslien to our world are instantiated, no two
sucfworids°l?h f physically; any twoh worlds t at are exactly alikephysically are duplicates/^
It is worth noting that Lewis developed and defended this
thesis as the best formulation of materialism long before
Kim voiced his objections to the adequacy of global
supervenience as a formulation of materialism.
Nevertheless, it turns out that the set of worlds with no
alien natural properties is closed under isolation. in
other words, for any world w in the set of all worlds with
no alien properties and for any world v which is such that
isolation has the consequence that if w exists then v
exists, it follows that v is also in the set of non-alien
worlds. This is because isolation only states that if
something already exists as part of a world, then a
duplicate of that thing can exist in isolation. The
resulting world clearly cannot have any natural properties
which are alien to the original world for it contains only*
a duplicate of part of that world. This means that anyone
who accepts Lewis's formulation of materialism can hold
both that materialism is contingent and that Kim's
criticism of global supervenience as a formulation of
materialism is refuted by my arguments from the previous
section.
^’Lewis (1983) p. 364.
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Let me reiterate that roy demonstratinn that Kim's
counterexamples to the strength of global supervenience
could not be successfully completed hinged on the adequacy
of isolation. since the set of all nomologically possible
worlds IS not closed under isolation, one cannot use
isolation to defend the adequacy of global supervenience
theses which quantify over only such worlds. The worlds
which I rely on in the demonstration may not be
nomologically possible and therefore may not be relevant to
the truth of the nomological global supervenience thesis.
Fortunately, however, both Morgan and Lewis have provided
independent reasons against formulating materialism in this
way. And at least Lewis's alternative has the consequence
that the set of worlds relevant to the truth of materialism
is closed under isolation. This means that my original
defense of global supervenience can be adopted by anyone
who believes materialism is a metaphysically contingent
thesis as long as one accepts Lewis's formulation of
materialism. This appears to be an argument of sorts for
Lewis's formulation of materialism (or one relevantly
similar to it)
.
3. Conclusion
We have found (i) that my defense of global
supervenience can be used to defend contingent global
supervenience theses, and (ii) that the formulation of
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materialism which Lewis finds most plausible on independent
grounds is strong enough to be vindicated by my defense of
global supervenience. Consequently, l think my defense of
global supervenience is successful enough to justify a
detailed examination of exactly how the general statement
of global supervenience should be understood. in the next
chapter I engage in that investigation.
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CHAPTER V
GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE: A CLOSER LOOK
A. Introduction
In the introduction to chapter IV, l noted that the
canonical formulation of global supervenience is ambiguous.
(G) s globally supervenes on B for any possible
worlds, w and z, if w and z are B-indiscernible
then they are S-indiscernible as well.
Explicated in terms of the standard notion of individual
indiscernibility
,
(II) For any set of properties. A, x and y are A-
Indiscernible for any P in A, Px iff Py,
global supervenience is a relation between classes of
propositions: properties instantiated only by possible
worlds. When I want to indicate that (G) is to be
interpreted in this way I will refer to it as (Gt) .
Most who actually use (G) to formulate global
supervenience, however, interpret it the way we did in
chapter IV. S and B range over classes of properties.
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individual A-indiscernibility (defined in (li)) is
distinguished from a new relation of global A-
indiscernibility (A-indiscernibility between worlds
^
,
and
(G) IS interpreted in terms of the latter. When I want the
reader to interpret (G) in this way, I refer to it as
(Gk)
As I noted in chapter IV, (Gk) is also susceptible to
different interpretations depending upon one's
understanding of global A-indiscernibility. Definitions of
this notion which are precise fail to be suitably general,
and no precise, suitably general definition has any
currency in the literature. For instance, Kim has often
said that two worlds, w and z, are A-indiscernible iff for
every property P in A and every object x, x has P in w iff
X has P in z.^ Although this definition is precise, it is
not sufficiently general. On this definition, any worlds
^ith distinct domains of individuals are A—discernible for
every class of properties. A, and are, therefore, incapable
of falsifying any global supervenience thesis. This lack
of generality is illustrated by the following example.
For any world-bound individual, b (or, for Kripkeans,
a world-object pair <w,b>)
,
Let us call the property, being
a counterpart of b . a counterpart property. Now, according
to Lewis's doctrine of anti-haecceitism, representation de
^'K' in honor of Kim who interpreted it in this way.
^See Kim (1984) p. 168.
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re supervenes on qualitative character. What this means is
that any two worlds that are globally indiscernible with
respect to qualitative properties will be globally
indiscernible with respect to counterpart properties. The
problem is that on Kim's definition of global A-
indiscernibility, worlds with different domains of
individuals are incapable of falsifying any global
supervenience thesis, including this one. Even if we apply
Lewis's analysis of de re modality to Kim's definition so
we allow for worlds with world-bound individuals to have
"the same domain of individuals", the global supervenience
formulation of anti-haecceitism will be trivially
satisfied. Specifically, let us say that two world-bound
individuals are the same trans-world individual iff they
are each a counterpart of the other. Let us also say that
two worlds have the same domain of transworld individuals
iff each individual in either world has a unique
counterpart in the other world, and the counterpart
relation between the individuals in the two worlds is
symmetric. Now if we interpret Kim's definition of global
indiscernibility as requiring A-indiscernible worlds to
have the same domain of transworld individuals (as opposed
to Lewisian individuals which are world-bound)
,
Lewisian
worlds can be A-indiscernible. But even with this
interpretation of Kim's definition, Lewisian worlds with
different domains of transworld individuals are always
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globally discernible with respect to any set of properties.
This means they are incapable of falsifying any global
supervenience thesis. Thus, on Kim's definition, worlds
that differ only haecceitistically (i.e. worlds that are
qualitatively identical but are inhabited by different
transworld individuals) do not falsify the global
supervenience of counterpart properties on qualitative
properties. But, clearly, such worlds are precisely the
sorts of worlds that Lewis intends anti-haecceitism to rule
out. So Kim's definition of global indiscernibility makes
global supervenience incapable of adequately expressing
anti-haecceitism.
The goal of this chapter is to develop precise,
general definitions of global supervenience. In order to
be suitably general, a definition of global supervenience
must allow worlds with distinct domains of individuals (or
different spatiotemporal structures^) to falsify global
supervenience theses, and it must allow relations as well
In Pauli and Sider (1992), we said that w and z are
A-indiscernible iff for any spacetime region, r, in w, and
any property, P, in A, an individual instantiates P at r in
w iff some individual instantiates P at r in z . While it
our purposes, this definition is not sufficiently
general either. It has the consequence that global
supervenience theses are trivially satisfied by worlds with
different spatiotemporal structures because any such worlds
are globally discernible with respect to any base set. So
in this case, for reasons analogous to those given in the
anti-haecceitism example, the definition fails to be
general enough to allow interesting theses about the
supervenience of spatiotemporal structure such as
Leibnizian relationalism, to be formulated in terms of
global supervenience.
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Also,
as properties into the supervenient and base sets,
we should aim to capture the three desiderata that
motivated global supervenience in the first place: it
should be a multiple domain, nonreduct ive supervenience
relation capable of expressing holistic determination
theses
.
I will argue that there are two substantively
different, precise, general global supervenience relations
worthy of further development. it is worth noting at the
outset that this difference is not the difference between
(Gk) and (Gt)
.
Inspiration for both the weaker and the stronger of
these two new global relations is provided by the model-
theoretic determination relations developed by Geoffrey
Heilman and Frank Thompson (1975, 1977). Thus, In section
B, I present and compare Heilman and Thompson's (H&T's)
determination relations. In section C, I show that their
weaker determination principle is really a model—theoretic
version of (Gt) . Then I show that given a natural way of
correlating classes of propositions and classes of ordinary
properties (and relations)
,
(Gt) is equivalent to (Gk) on a
suitably general analysis of global A-indiscernibility
. In
section D, I formulate the stronger global relation, and
show that it is genuinely independent of the weaker
version. In section E, I illustrate the importance of
allowing relations into the sets related by global
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supervenience, and I show how this can be done. Finally,
in section F, 1 reconsider the central arguments of chapter
IV in light of the two new global supervenience relations
developed in sections C and D.
B_. Heilman and Thompson 's Determinat i on Princinlf^t.
The term "global supervenience" was introduced into
the literature by Kim by way of Paul Teller/ But the
basic Idea behind global supervenience was first discussed
in detail by H&T in the course of presenting their version
of nonreductive physicalism which consists of either of two
"determination" principles, and a principle of physical
exhaustion/ I am only concerned with their determination
principles
.
Both determination principles are model-theoretic
variants of (and inspirations for) later formulations of
global supervenience. According to one, all truth is
determined by physical truth. According to the other, the
^Kim (1984) p. 167. Kim credits Teller with
introducing the term, but Teller's paper was unpublished at
the time.
^According to the principle of physical exhaustion,
every (scientifically possible) entity is an aggregate of
entities referred to in theoretical physics (e.g., quarks,
electrons, photons, etc.) or a set-theoretic construction
composed of such entities.
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extension of all predicates is determined by the extension
Of the predicates of mathematical physics/
H&T argue for the need for a model-theoretic
characterization of determination thus:
If one kind or realm of facts determines
another, then, at a minimum, the truth
values of sentences expressing facts in thelatter realm cannot vary without variance ofthe truth values of sentences expressingfacts of the former kind. What cannothappen happens under no scientifically
possible circumstances. Circumstances arepossible if they are compatible with what isfixed. A model-theoretic characterization
of determination is in order.
^
One wonders whether the first sentence is true.
Couldn't one realm of facts determine a second even though
there are comparably few sentences that express any facts
about the first realm? What if the language involved (say
Scientific English) has many predicates that express
attributes characteristic of the determined realm but few
H&T say that "predicates of mathematical physics"include
those which might be drawn from texts
concerning elementary particles, field
theory, space-time physics, etc, as well as
identity, the part-whole relation, '<', of
the calculus of individuals, and a full
stock of mathematic predicates (which, for
convenience we may suppose are built up
within set theory from 'e'). (H&T (1975) p.
553)
^Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
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predicates expressing attributes of the determining realm?
In this case, it is unlikely that "the truth values of
sentences expressing facts in the latter realm cannot vary
without variance of the truth values of sentences
expressing facts of the former kind". This suggests that
it would be preferable to define determination as a
relation between non-linguistic entities. l put the
objection aside for now.
H&T let ' 0 ' and 'ij;' range over sets of nonlogical
terms of some language capable of expressing all the truths
(theorems) of present scientific theory, and 'a' denote a
set of model structures representing "scientific
possibilities". Given that two models are elementary
equivalent (m eleq n) iff exactly the same sentences are
true in each model, and m |0 = the model structure that
results when the interpretations of all expressions not in
0 are omitted from m, they go on to formulate "the notion
of a complete 0 characterization of the world uniquely
determining a complete ij; characterization"^:
(HTTD) In a structures, 0 truth determines ij) truth iff
( Vm) ( Vn) ( (m, nea & m |0 eleq n| 0 ) ^ mlij; eleq n|il;).
®Hellman and Thompson (1975) p. 558. By a "model
structure" representing a scientific possibility they mean
an interpretation (of some language capable of expressing
all scientific truths) on which all theorems of any science
are true.
^Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558.
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According to H&T,
The intuitive appeal of this notion is
clear. Given a full characterization ofthings in 0 terms, one and only one full
characterization in i|i terms is correct.Once the 0 facts have been established, so
are the i|; facts.
The best way to understand (HTTD) is to contrast it
with H&T's other determination relations:
(HTRD) In a structures, 0 reference determines i]j
reference iff VmVm
' ( (m, m ' ea & m|0 = m'|0) m
1
1|; =
m'
I
i|j)
1
0
Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 558. H&T also
require that in the interesting case - namely where <p
contains precisely the vocabulary of mathematical physics,
i|i IS the non— logical vocabulary "needed to describe any
phenomena in any branch of science" (1975, p. 555 ), a isthe set of structures representing scientifically possible
worlds, and T is the whole of scientific theory - a will
contain only a proper subset of the models of T. Any model
of T in which the vocabulary of pure arithmetic gets a non-
standard interpretation will not be included in a. The
restriction on a is a way of eliminating models which do
not seem to model any real possibility. See Heilman and
Thompson (1975) p. 563 and elsewhere. Also see Tennant
(1985) p. 349.
Phillip Bricker has pointed out that it is peculiar
that H&T do not take this opportunity to restrict a to
models where all necessary truths, including analytic
truths, are true. Without this additional constraint, it
is hard to see how models where 'bachelor' receives a
different interpretation from 'unmarried male' are going to
be ruled out. Surely, some such models validate the
theorems of mathematical physics, and H&T claim that all
truths are fixed by physical truths. Teller (1984a) has
presented a similar objection to which Heilman (1985) has
replied
.
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That IS, If any two structures in a agree onthe references they assign to the 0 terms;i.e. their restrictions to the 0 vocabularyare identical; then they agree on the
^
references they assign to the i|i terms; i.etheir restrictions to the il; vocabulary are*'Identical.’^ ^
So in order for 0 reference to determine ijr reference,
models that assign the same extension to the 0 vocabulary
must assign the same extension to the ijr vocabulary.
It is simple to show that (HTRD) does not entail
(HTTD)
. Suppose 0 = (P), ij; = (qj and a = {Ml, M2}.
Qa Qb ^Qa
-Qb
Pa
-Pb
-Pa Pb
Ml
I
0 = <{a,b}
,
<P, ( a
}
M2
I
0 = <(a,b)
,
<P,
Ml |0 # M2|0, so (HTRD) is trivially satisfied. But (HTTD)
is falsified by these models. There is a 0-isomorphism
between these two models (a one-one function from the
domain of Ml to that of M2 which preserves all 0-
predications)
,
the function from Ml to M2 which taJces a to
^Heilman and Thompson (1975) p. 559.
^^My notation indicates that a model consists of an
ordered set whose first member is a set (the domain of
discourse)
,
and whose second member is a set of ordered
pairs (the interpretation function) . When the
interpretation function only involves a single predicate
(as in this case)
,
I drop the set braces around the lone
ordered pair representing the interpretation function.
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b and b to a. Thus, the same <p sentences are true in Ml
and M2: namely, 3xPx, ^VxPx, and their entailments statable
in the 0 vocabulary. Thus, Ml |0 eleq M2 | 0 . But, clearly,
MlU is not eleq M2 |^,: the sentence, VxQx, is true in M2
and false in Ml. So (HTRD) does not entail (HTTD)
It is no surprise that (HTTD) does not entail (HTRD)
either. Proof: Suppose 0 = (P), 4, = jq,, a = (M3, M4 )
.
M3
Qa
-^Qb
Pa
-Pb
M4
--Qa Qb
Pa
-^Pb
M3 lij = <{a,b}, <Q,{a)»
M3 0 = <{a,b)
,
<P, (a)»
M4 ij; = <{a,b)
, <Q, {b}»
M4 0 = <(a,b}
, <p, {a}»
In this case, 0 reference fails to determine iji reference
because M3
| 0 = M4|0, but M3
|
ij; ^ M4
1
1|; . On the other hand,
the 0 truths in M3 = the 0 truths in M4 = 3xPx and -VxPx
and all their entailments stateable with the logical
expressions and the 0 terms. Thus, M3
|
0
is elementarily
equivalent to M4|0. The set of ^ truths in M3 also equals
the set of i|; truths in M4 . In both cases the only truths
stateable in the ij; vocabulary (plus the logical vocabulary)
are 3xQx and -VxQx, and their i|i entailments. Thus, in this
case, 0 truth determines i|; truth. This establishes that
(HTTD) does not entail (HTRD)
.
^^Note that Pa is not a 0-truth because 'a' is a
non-logical term which is not a 0-term.
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Essentially, truth determination holds (non-trivially)
as long as there is both a 0-isomorphism and a ij;-
isomorphism between the two models. But non-trivial
reference determination requires the identity mapping
between the two models to be such that if it is a 0-
isomorphism then it is a i|f- isomorphism. Of course, if
there is no identity mapping, or if it fails to be a 0-
isomorphism (as was the case between Ml and M2 ) then
reference determination is trivially satisfied. in cases
where the antecedent of reference determination holds,
reference determination is clearly stronger than truth
determination. This can be seen by reflection on M 3 and M4
.
Specifically, note that the sentence, " 3x(Px & Qx)", is
true in M 3 and false in M4 . This is compatible with 0
truth determining ij; truth because the sentence contains
both 0 terms and ij; terms. But it is not compatible with
the determination of i|j reference by 0 reference. As long
as it isn't trivially satisfied (because the antecedent
fails to hold)
,
reference determination is sensitive to
differences to which truth determination is not. This is
an important difference that foreshadows the essential
distinction between our two global relations developed
^^Here I am assuming that 0 ni|; = the empty set. H&T
allow this to be the case. H&T suggest that in order to
characterize physicalism, however, the 0 vocabulary be a
(non-empty) proper subset of the i|r vocabulary.
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below. Before we develop this difference, however, we need
to clarify the relationship between (Gk) and (Gt)
.
Reconciling fGk^ and rnt-)
^ Suitab]p
—
Definition of Global A-Indiscernibi 1 i ty
(Gt) is quite clearly an descendent of (HTTD) where
models are replaced by worlds and sentences by propositions
(or facts)
. As I mentioned in chapter IV, a significant
number of philosophers understand global supervenience this
way. Of course, Kim and others interpret (G)
differently, along the lines of (Gk)
.
(Gk) appears to be a
descendent of (HTRD)
. This would indicate that it is in
some sense stronger than (Gt)
. We need to determine the
nature of the relationship between (Gt) and (Gk)
Surprisingly enough, Kim claims they are equivalent.
After defining the global supervenience of A on B as in
(Gk)
,
he continues:
Some writers individuate worlds in terms of
what truths (or states of affairs ) hold in
them, explaining supervenience something
like this:
[ (Gt)
]
A globally supervenes on B just in
case there are no two worlds indiscernible
with respect of truths of kind B and yet
discernible in respect of truths of kind A.
^^Among them are Currie (1984) pp. 348-350; Lewis
(1983) p. 362; Haugeland (1982), and Lepore and Loewer
(1989) pp. 177-178.
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But this IS an equivalent idea [to (Gk)
l
since we may assume that all the truthsholding in a world are fixed, in the
s andard ways, by the "singular truths" that
distribution Of theavailable properties over individuals.^^
In order to determine whether (Gk) really is
equivalent to (Gt) we need an analysis of global A-
indiscernibility. At one time, Kim would have said that
two worlds are A-indiscernible iff the same individuals
have the same A-properties in both worlds. i criticized
this definition in the introduction to this chapter because
It makes all global supervenience theses trivially
satisfied by worlds with different domains of individuals.
For essentially the same reasons, one cannot expect to
establish the equivalence of (Gk) and (Gt) using this
limited characterization of global A-indiscernibility
. The
problem is that if the A-truths are all general (i.e., non-
singular) propositions, then worlds with disjoint domains
may well be indiscernible (in the sense of (ii) ) regarding
the A-truths.''® But, of course, all such worlds are A-
16 *Kim (1988) p. 137. Kim explicitly cites Haugeland
(1982) as someone who formulates global this way (Kim
(1988) p. 149, note 17).
^^See Kim (1984) p. 168.
^®This line of thought is perfectly compatible with
Kim's claim that all truths are fixed by the singular
truths. It is of the nature of determination (or "fixing")
relations, that the same general truth (e.g., 3xFx) could
be "fixed" by different singular truths in different worlds
(continued.
.
.
)
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discernible according to Kim's old definition of global A-
indiscernibility. So we need a new, general definition of
global A-indiscernibility in order to really establish the
equivalence: it must apply to worlds with different
individuals (and different locations)
. Kim appears to be
aware of the need for a general definition of global A-
indiscernibility in order to establish the equivalence.
Shortly after presenting (Gt)
,
he continues thus:
As we just noted, indiscernibility for
worlds is more difficult to characterize if
we take global supervenience in full
generality, allowing domains of individuals
to vary from world to world. Consider for
example two worlds with disjoint domains ofindividuals. What is it to say that two
such worlds are indiscernible in respect of
a certain class of properties, say physical
properties? Clearly, in evaluating these
worlds for indiscernibility we must consider
only general truths, disregarding singular
truths all together; for otherwise, no two
such worlds would be
indiscernible.
.. [Refusing to allow worlds
with disjoint domains to be A-indiscernible]
means that the existence of the following
two worlds would not violate psychophysical
( . . . continued)
(e.g.. Fa in one world, Fb in another). Thus, we still
have to account for the case where only general truths arebeing considered and some of the possible worlds have
distinct (or even disjoint) domains.
One might object that perhaps Kim meant the A-truths
to include singular propositions concerning which
individuals have which A-properties
,
in which case his
original definition of global A-indiscernibility appears
more reasonable. But as long as one allows the set of A-
hi'uths to contain general A—truths not derivable from any
singular A-truths in the set, as I think one should, then a
more general notion of global A-indiscernibility is needed
to establish the equivalence.
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supervenience: worlds w and v, with disioint
ooin^n/^ individuals, agree completely inp int of generalized physical truths rwp
~~
ln
Of w to that of V sunh
_
i the former ha s physical property pin_case f(x) in the Ta;i-er ha.
similarly for relations) but the two worldsare radically different psychologically -
say w IS much like our world whereas v iswholly lacking in mentality. Common
references these days to "Twin Earth," whichIS just like this earth in all physical
respects," make sense only if singular
truths are excluded from the basis of
comparison. Also, common talk of "overall
similarity" between worlds, familiar from
semantics for counterfactuals
,
tacitly
assumes the meaningfullness of similarityjudgments for worlds with disjoint domains
of individuals.^’
Although Kim did not go on to prove that (Gt) and (Gk) are
actually equivalent (see note 20), the definition of global
A-indiscernibility suggested in the parenthetical comment
can be used to construct such a proof.
Kim suggests that two worlds "agree completely in
point of generalized physical truths" iff there is an
appropriate isomorphism between them. His parenthetical
comment inspires the following characterization of global
A-indiscernibility. Where A is any set of properties (and
relations)
,
w and z are any worlds, and
Kim (1988) pp. 138; my emphasis. In the next
sentence Kim switches topics without reconsidering the
equivalence of (Gk) and (Gt) . The sentence reads, "There
is a second problem; how are we to compare worlds with
domains with different cardinalities?".
167
an A-isomorphi sm betwp.^n w anri ^ = f i c, ^
one-one function from the parts of w to the parts
of z such that for any n-place relation (or
property), r, in a, and for each part of w,
,
X2, X3,..., Rx^...x^ iff Rf (x^) . . . f (x^) .20
(GI) For any class of properties and relations, A,
possible worlds, w and z, are globally A-
indiscernible there is an A-isomorphism
between w and z
.
This definition of global A-indiscernibility is
suitably general because it has the consequence that worlds
with different domains of individuals (or spacetime points)
can falsify global supervenience understood in terms of
(Gk)
. Another respect in which it is more general than
previous definitions of global A-indiscernibility is that
global A-indiscernibility is defined even when A includes
relations. The significance of this latter feature will be
discussed in section E.
2 . The Reconciliation
In order to see if (Gk) supplemented by (GI) and (ISO)
is equivalent to (Gt)
,
we begin by consolidating (Gk) and
(GI) into a single thesis, (Gw)
,
and restating (Gt) to make
^“^Note that if w=z, then f is an A-automorphism.
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It clear that the truths are non-linguistic entities.
Assume that S and B are sets of properties and relations.
(Gw) S globally supervenes on B for any worlds, w
and z, if there is a B-isomorphism between w and
z (they are B-isomorphic) then there is an s-
isomorphism between w and z (they are S-
isomorphic as well)
.
(Gt) S globally supervenes on B if any worlds, w
and z, are indiscernible with respect to B-truths
(the same B-propositions are true in w and z)
,
then w and z are indiscernible with respect to S-
truths (the same S-propositions are true in w and
z) .
To establish their equivalence, we need to prove that
for any set of properties and relations. A, and any
worlds, w and z, w and z are A-isomorphic iff w and z are
indiscernible with respect to A-truths. It follows
trivially from (i) that (Gw) and (Gt) are equivalent
definitions. Clearly, in order to establish (i)
,
we need
to say, for any class of properties (and relations)
,
A,
which true propositions are A-truths and which are not.
I begin by noting that the relation, is A-
isomorphic to
,
is an equivalence relation. It generates
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possible worlds.
a partition on the class of all For any
cell in the partition, there is a preposition that is true
at all and only the members of that cell. if propositions
are classes of worlds, the proposition in question is the
class of all and only the members of the cell; otherwise,
we can identify the proposition associated with any
particular cell as the conjunction of all propositions true
at all members of the cell. We call such propositions
maximal A-propositions. They are maximally specific ways a
world can be with respect to the properties and relations
in A (but not with respect to who or what instantiates
them)
.
We have one maximal A-proposition for each cell of the
partition of the class of possible worlds induced by the
A-isomorphic to relation. Now, for any class of
properties, A, let us say that P is an A-proposition iff
for every maximal A-proposition, M, either M entails P or M
entails -iP.^^ A-propositions may be true at worlds from
cells of the partition, but if they are true at
one world in any cell of the partition induced by the is
A-isomorphic to relation, they are true at all worlds in
that cell. Now I define an A-truth as any true A-
proposition. This has the consequence that if no
^^This is essentially the same method of
characterizing A-propositions introduced (to me) by Ted
Sider. We make use of it in section V of Pauli and Sider
(1992) . Note that on this definition all necessary truths
are A-propositions.
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haeoceities are members of A, then no singular propositions
are A-truths. This consequence illustrates that our notion
Of an A-truth approximates H&T's notion of a 0-truth. 22
In any case, it follows that w and z are discernible
with respect to A-truths (some A-proposition is true at w
and false at z) iff the maximal A-proposition true at w is
false at z. But, the maximal A-proposition true at w is
false at z iff w and z are in different cells in the
partition induced by the is A-isomorphic to relation.
In other words, different maximal A-propositions are true
at w and z iff w and z are not A-isomorphic. But this
means that w and z are discernible with respect to A-truths
iff they are not A-isomorphic. The proof is complete. On
the preceding definitions of "A-indiscernible worlds" and
"A-truths", (Gw) and (Gt) are equivalent definitions
.
We have good reason to consider (Gw) - or (Gk)
supplemented with (GI) - a suitably general definition of
global supervenience: it unifies the two divergent
interpretations of (G) in a natural way, and it accords
with definitions of global supervenience and global truth
determination offered by a significant number of
philosophers
.
To verify that this consequence accords with H&T's
notion of a 0-truth, see note 14 and the discussion of the
difference between (HTTD) and (HTRD) on page 158.
^^I trust the reader can mentally substitute corner
quotes when appropriate.
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On the other hand, it is worth noting that Kim's
original understanding of (Gk)
, which basically required
both isomorphisms to be (transworld) identity mappings,
does appear to be the legitimate possible worlds
formulation of (HTRD)
. What seems to have happened is that
in the quest to make (Gk) a suitably general global
supervenience relation, it has been somewhat weakened.
After all, as I mentioned above in my discussion of H&T's
determination relations, in cases where (HTRD) is not
trivially satisfied (or, more precisely, in cases where a
is closed under automorphic images)
,
reference
determination is stronger than truth determination. Once
again, the reason for this is that reference determination
requires the only relevant 0-isomorphism between the models
(i.e. the identity mapping) to be a ijj- isomorphism as well,
while truth determination allows other non-identity
mappings to be relevant isomorphisms, thereby opening up
the possibility that the 0-isomorphism is not a i|t-
isomorphism. This explains why the fact that the sentence,
3x(Px & Qx) "
,
is true in M3 and false in M4 is compatible
with 0 truth determining ij; truth but not with 0 reference
determining iji reference. Likewise, on Kim's original
definition of global indiscernibility
,
the only relevant B-
isomorphism between worlds is the identity mapping. And it
had better be an S-isomorphism as well. On the new, more
general definition of global indiscernibility, however.
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worlds can be B-indiscernible in virtue of one B-
isomorphism, and S-indiscernible in virtue of another. By
abandoning the requirement that the base isomorphism be a
supervenient isomorphism, the relationship has been
weakened.
There is a way to restore the strength to global
supervenience without abandoning its new-found generality.
What we need is a version of global supervenience that
maintains the requirement that the base isomorphism be a
supervenient isomorphism. The relation developed below is
really a strengthened, generalized descendant of reference
determination, as should soon become apparent.
D_;—Stron cf Global Supervenience
i-:—Inspiration from the Literature
In a footnote, H&T provide us with the basis for a new
global supervenience relation. They claim that
if a is closed under automorphic images,
then [ (HTRD) ] is equivalent to the condition
that any bijective map between domains of m
and m' which is a 0-isomorphism is a ij;-
isomorphism.
^^Hellman and Thompson (1975) p. 559. An
automorphism, is an isomorphism between models with the
same domain. An automorphic image of a model is an
isomorphic model with the same domain.
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strictly speaking, H&T are incorrect. on the other
hand, if „e restrict ourselves to models with the same
domain of individuals, H&T-s equivalence holds.
m
any
25Th© pirobl 0in 9iris©s hjcp i
models with distinct domains (H&T ( 1977 ) nthe only models in a are:
^
^ P- 326). Suppose
M
Qa
Pa
N
^Qb
Pb
Neither M nor N has any automorphic imaqes. So
But^not^^^^^^^D Q-reference because M|P nIp.
onlv P-i^nm^^
isomorphism is a Q-isomorphism because the
isomorphism?'''' ^ Q"
Closed under automorphic imaqes
^ same domain of individuals
VmVn??M^
every 0-isomorphism is a il;- isomorphism iff'(( ,nea & m |0 = n| 0 ) ^ m|i|; = n|4/). Left to riqhf
0-isomorphism is a i|;- isomorphism, and suppose
^ m|0 = n|0. So for an^
the
domain of m, x is in the extension ofsame 0 predicates in both m and n. Hence there is a 0-isomorphism between m and n which is an identity mapping.Thus, by our conditional assumption, the identity mappinqetween m and n is also a i|i-isomorphism
. So every obiectas the same i|;-predicates apply to it in both m and n: mU
= n
1
.
I
^
Right to left. Suppose VmVn((m,nea & m|0 = n| 0 ) ^ mliljn|y). Now consider any 0-isomorphism, f, between two
models m and n. Since a is closed under automorphicimages, there is a model m' which is an automorphic image
of m and such that m' |0 = n|0. To see that this is so,
consider the permutation of the domain of m (D(m)), g,which takes each member of D(m) to the individual in D(m)
that f takes to D(n)
.
Let m' be the automorphic image of m
under permutation, g. So g is an automorphism from m to
m'. Now since g is an automorphism and for any individual
in D(m) it selects the same individual in m' as f selects
in n, the composition of g ^ and f is the identity mapping
between n and m'. Thus, since f is a 0-isomorphism between
m and n, and g is an overall isomorphism between m and m',
the identity mapping between n and m' (which is the
(continued. .
.
)
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case, I want to focus on the global supervenience relation
that results when the claim "every 0-isoraorphisir, between
models is a i|.-isomorphism-' is translated into a possible
worlds framework;
(Gs) s globally supervenes on B for any worlds w
and z, every B-isomorphism between w and z is an
S- isomorphism.
2. The Need for rCs)
It should be no surprise that (Gs) - for strong global
is stronger than (Gw)
. if every B-isomorphism between
any two worlds is an S-isomorphism, then any two worlds
which are B-isomorphic are S-isomorphic as well. So (Gs)
entails (Gw)
. To see that (Gw) does not entail (Gs)
,
consider the following worlds
W1 W2
Qa
-Qb
-Qc Qd
Pa
-Pb Pc
-.pd
^^
( . . . continued)
composition of g ^ and f) must be a 0-isomorphism. But
this means that each 0-predicate has the same extension in
m' as it has in n, Thus m'|0 = n|0. But then m'|4r = n|ilJ,
so all i|/-predicates have the same extension in m' as in n.
This means that the identity mapping from between m' and n
is a i|f-isomorphism
. Since g is an automorphism from m to
m', f, which is the composition of the identity mapping
from n to m' and g‘\ must be a i|f- isomorphism as well.
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The function which takes a to o and b to d is the only P-
isomorphism between these worlds. Likewise, the only Q-
isoitiorphism is the function which takes a to d and b to c.
These are different isomorphisms, so, while these worlds
are not counterexamples to the (Gw)
-supervenience of Q on
P, they are counterexamples to the (Gs)
-supervenience of Q
on P. This proves that (Gs) is formally stronger than
(Gw) .27
The fact that W1 and W2 are formally consistent with
the (Gw)
-supervenience of Q on P strongly suggests that
(Gw) is too weak to capture all determination relations
which should be expressible in terms of global
supervenience. in order to see this, think of P as the
physical property of having a head composed of plastic,
and, just to make the example vivid, let us refer to
individuals that have -P as metal heads. 2® Finally, think
of Q as the property of being conscious. So there are two
individuals in Wl: one is a metal head and the other is a
plastic head; one is conscious and the other isn't. Things
Unlike Petrie's and Kim's examples, in this example
the two worlds are indiscernible with respect to the base
properties, so the global supervenience thesis is not
trivially satisfied. On the other hand, like Petrie's and
Kim's examples, we are not taking account of the plenitude
of possibilities so we have not established that (Gw) is
metaphysically weaker than (Gs) . That will be established
in section 3.
^®Nothing hinges on this, purists are welcome to
replace all occurrences of "metal" with "non-plastic" in
what follows.
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are likewise in W2
. The important difference is that in Wl
only the plastic head is conscious, while in W2 only the
metal head is conscious. m fact, the only individual
which has the property of being a metal head, being some
distance from a single plastic head, and having no other
irreducibly relational properties to other metal heads or
plastic heads is conscious in W2 but unconscious in Wl. wi
and W2, if possible, would prove that the physical
properties of (and relations between) an individual and all
Its worldmates do not fix the individual's mental
properties, because physical duplicates from physically
indiscernible positions in physically indiscernible worlds
have different mental properties.
Global supervenience is supposed to express relations
of holistic determination. Here we seem to have a lack of
holistic determination of the mental by the physical. (Gs)
is sensitive to this lack for the existence of Wl and W2 is
incompatible with the (Gs)
-supervenience of Q on P. Yet,
according to (Gw)
,
these worlds do not constitute a
counterexample to the global supervenience of Q on P. This
indicates that (Gw) is not strong enough to be the global
supervenience relation intended by those materialists who
were lead to abandon strong and weak supervenience (as
formulations of materialism) because of the "context
dependence" of mental properties. It is important to see
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if (GW) can capture this sort of holistic determination
relation. if not, a need for (Gs) has been established.
A promising defense of (Gw) runs as follows. We begin
by pointing out that by including the base property in the
supervenient set, (Gw) can accommodate the intuition that
W1 and W2 are inconsistent with an important global
supervenience thesis involving only P and Q. Specifically,
these worlds do falsify the global supervenience of PuQ on
P according to (Gw)
. Although there is a P-isomorphism
between W1 and W2
,
{<a,c>, <b,d>}, since it fails to be a
Q-isomorphism, there is no PuQ-isomorphism between these
worlds. So the advocate of (Gw) can claim that this is
what accounts for the intuition that there is no real
determination relation between these worlds. in general,
it seems that when two worlds satisfy (Gw) even though none
of the base isomorphisms are supervenient isomorphisms, one
can defend (Gw) from the conclusion that it is too weak by
pointing out that the (Gw)
-supervenience of the union of
the base set and the supervenient set on the base set is
falsified by the worlds after all.
This defense of (Gw) may seem implausible because it
requires one to reinterpret the claim that S globally
supervenes on B as the claim that SuB globally supervenes
on B. After all, philosophers speak of the supervenience
of values on facts (or the mental on the physical) ; they do
not speak of the supervenience of facts and values on facts
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(or the mental and the physical on the physical). or do
they?
According to Heilman and Thompson,
The principle of Physical Determination ofTruth states roughly that all the truths
statable in the language of mathematical-physics fix ^1 the truths statable in
language whatsoever
<p is the class of
mathematical-physical terms... i|j includes allterms needed to formulate truths in anybranch of science.
Clearly, the truths of mathematical-physics will be a
subset of the truths statable in any language. So 0 will
be a subset of ijr
. Next consider Lewis's formulation of
materialism:
Among worlds where no natural properties
alien to our world are instantiated, no two
differ without differing physically; any two
such worlds that are exactly alike
physically are duplicates.
If worlds do not differ qualitatively in any way (i.e., do
not fail to be duplicates) without differing physically,
then all respects of qualitative difference, including the
base properties, should be included in the supervenient
^^Hellman and Thompson (1977) pp. 310-311.
^°Lewis (1983) p. 364.
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set. Haugeland presents a similar formulation of
materialism.^^
Clearly, then, there are statements of global
supervenience which are naturally interpreted in the way
that an advocate of (Gw)
,
who is worried about worlds like
W1 and W2, would be advised to formulate them. So this
response on behalf of (Gw) is not as ad hoc as it may have
appeared. Nevertheless, it is unsuccessful. The weakness
of (Gw) vis-a-vis (Gs) which is analogous to that of truth
determination vis-a-vis reference determination, can be
illustrated by somewhat more complicated examples of the
same sort.
(Gw) only requires all worlds that have a B-
isomorphism to have some S-isomorphism, although the B-
isomorphism need not be an S-isomorphism. If s includes B
as a subset, then (Gw) is satisfied only if all worlds that
are B-isomorphic are such that at least one of the B-
isomorphisms is an S-isomorphism. (Gs) is still stronger
because it requires every B-isomorphism to be an S-
isomorphism. One BuS isomorphism between two worlds is
insufficient to establish worlds as compatible with (Gs) .
Once we consider worlds with three or more individuals,
this difference between (Gs) and the strengthened version
of (Gw) becomes apparent.
^^Haugeland (1984) p. 1.
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W3
Qa
-Qb Qc
Pa Pb
-Pc
W4
Qd Qe Qf
Pd Pe
-Pf
The (Gw)-supervenience of Q on P is true at a model
with only these worlds in the domain. There is a P-
isomorphism and a Q-isomorphism between these worlds. But
not every P-isomorphism a Q-isomorphism. This shows that
these worlds falsify the (Gs)
-supervenience of Q on P.
Note, furthermore, that there is a P-isomorphism which is a
also a PuQ-isomorphism. For example, consider the PuQ-
isomorphism between W3 and W4 which takes a to e, b to d,
and c to f. This shows that these worlds are also
compatible with the (Gw)
-supervenience if PuQ on P.
Therefore, the (Gw)
-supervenience of SuB on B is not
formally equivalent with the (Gs)
-supervenience of S (or
SuB) on B.^^
In chapter IV. A. 2., I showed that one reason
philosophers have preferred qlobal to local supervenience
is because global appears better suited to formulate
^^For the same reason (Gs) is formally stronger than
this intermediate version of global:
(Gi) S globally supervenes on B for any worlds, w
and z, if there is a B-isomorphism between w and
z then some B-isomorphism between w and z is an
S-isomorphism as well.
We can see this because S (Gi) -supervenes on B iff SuB
(Gw) -supervenes on B.
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holistic determination relations. For example, many claim
that the mental properties of individuals are determined by
more than just the intrinsic physical properties of the
very same individuals: their physical relations to other
individuals and the physical properties of the individuals
they are related to also play a role. This lead, I think,
to the idea that the best way to formulate psycho-physical
supervenience is as global supervenience thesis. The idea
was that, at the very least, physically indiscernible
individuals from physically indiscernible locations in
physically indiscernible worlds have the same mental
properties. That much had to be true. This was
abbreviated by saying that the distribution of physical
properties across a world determines (or fixes) the
distribution of mental properties, or that physically
indiscernible worlds are mentally indiscernible, or that
worlds with the same physical truths have the same mental
truths. But when these abbreviations are formulated
explicitly in terms of (Gw) they are insensitive to a
crucial aspect of the original idea that the mental is
holistically determined by the physical.
For example, consider W3 . I stipulate that the
inhabitants of W3 are in all interesting respects
spatiotemporally indiscernible from one another: they are
spatially equidistant from one another, created at the same
time, and destroyed simultaneously at some later time.
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Also let us return to our earlier suppositions regarding
the Identity of the properties P, and Q. As before, l will
refer to individuals with
-P as metal heads. Now, in W3
there are two plastic heads, a and b. Each is a certain
distance from a metal head and the same distance from
another plastic head. Supposing, once again, that P and
-P
are the only physical properties, it follows that a and b
are physical duplicates in physically indiscernible
positions in W3
. And clearly, since a and b are both
inhabitants of W3 they are inhabitants of physically
indiscernible worlds. But one is conscious and the other
IS not. So just W3 provides us with a case where
physically indiscernible individuals from physically
indiscernible locations in physically indiscernible worlds
are mentally discernible. This is incompatible with the
idea that the mental properties of an individual are
holistically determined by the physical properties of that
individual and its surroundings. (Gs) is sensitive to this
failure of the holistic determination of Q by P, for W3 is
incompatible with the (Gs) -supervenience of Q on P. (Gw)
is not sensitive to this failure for W3 itself (as well as
the pair of W3 and W4) is formally consistent with the
(Gw) -supervenience of Q (and QuP) on P. Therefore, (Gw) is
(at least formally) weaker than the core idea of holistic
property determination which motivated global supervenience
theses in the first place. (Gs) more faithfully expresses
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of
such holistic determination relations. The strength
(HTRD)
,
and then some, has been regained in a much more
general formulation.
3_
,
The Metaphysical Inequivalence of (Gs^ anr^
The preceding arguments for the significance of (Gs)
have all been based on vastly oversimplified models of
logical space. Thus, it is worth reflecting on the
metaphysical significance of these arguments. For example
I used W1 and W2 to prove that (Gw) does not formally
entail (Gs)
:
W1 W2
Qs
-’Qb
-,QC Qd
Pa
-Pb Pc ^pd
The only P-isomorphism fails to be a Q-isomorphism, yet
there is some Q-isomorphism between them.
Given my arguments in chapter IV, it is natural to
expect that I would defend the metaphysical significance of
this result by arguing that it violates no principles of
plenitude - specifically, that it does not violate
isolation. To do this some additional stipulations
concerning the nature of the properties, P and Q must be
included. We need to know whether they are intrinsic
properties, or, if not, precisely how or whether P depends
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on Q. Also, even if we adjusted the example accordingly,
it would not prove that (Gw) is metaphysically weaker than
(Gs)
. This is because a model of logical space which
includes impoverished worlds such as Wl and W2 and accords
with plenitude principles may still be a very impoverished
model. For example, there is no plausible plenitude
principle I can think of that would allow one to infer the
existence of a world anything like the actual world from
worlds like Wl and W2
.
What we really need is an independent argument that
shows that (Gw) is indeed metaphysically weaker than (Gs)
.
We need to establish
(NCE) There exist sets of properties (and relations) s
and B such that S globally supervenes on B
according to (Gw)
,
but S fails to globally
supervene on B according to (Gs)
.
Let S be the (unit set of the) property of being the first
planet to exist and let B be the (unit set of the) property
of being such that there is a unique first planet to exist.
Clearly, any two worlds which are B-isomorphic are S-
isomorphic as well: any possible worlds which have the same
number of individuals and are such that there is a first
planet must be such that there is some isomorphism which
takes the first planet of the one world to the first planet
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of the other world. Thus s (Gw)
-supervenes on B. But not
every B-isomorphism is an S-isomorphism. in tact,
supposing that there was a first planet in the actual
world, consider any of the B-automorphisns on the actual
world which fails to take the first planet to itself. it
fails to be an S-automorphism. Plenitude principles are of
no relevance here. We clearly have found sets of
properties that are globally supervenient according to (Gw)
but not according to (Gs)
. Thus, we have established that
(Gw) is metaphysically weaker than (Gs)
So far, I have argued for the need to supplement (Gw)
with a stronger version of global supervenience
. So why
not simply replace (Gw) altogether? The main positive
reason not to abandon (Gw) is that it captures the idea
that truths of one kind determine truths of another kind
(as I will confirm in chapter VI)
,
and the literature is
clear that global supervenience is often understood in this
way.
Besides its equivalence to (Gt)
,
there is other
evidence to support the contention that (Gw) is a more
faithful representation of earlier formulations of global
supervenience. For example, on (Gs) but not (Gw), a global
supervenience claim can be falsified by a model with only a
^^Likewise, SuB (Gw) -supervenes on B, but not every B-
isomorphism is an SuB-isomorphism. Thus, S (Gi) -supervenes
on B (see note 39) yet S fails to (Gs) -supervene on B.
Once again, plenitude principles are not relevant here.
Thus, (Gi) is also metaphysically weaker than (Gs) .
186
single world in the domain because plenty of worlds will
have B-automorphisms which fail to be S-isomorphisms (e.g.,
W3). But on the generic formulation of global, (G)
,
whether it is interpreted along the lines of (Gk) or (Gt)
,
there have to be at least two possible worlds in a model in
order for that model to falsify (g)
.
Likewise, there have
to be at least two possible worlds in any model sufficient
to falsify (Gw)
.
On the other hand, one should not overemphasize the
importance of such considerations. Most who understood
global supervenience along the lines of (Gk) were really
only interested in one isomorphism between any two worlds.
If it was a B-isomorphism it had better be an S-isomorphism
as well. For example, Kim often said that two worlds are
A-indiscernible iff the same individuals exist in both
worlds and have the same A-properties in each, so only
identity mappings between worlds were capable of falsifying
global supervenience theses. Likewise, in Pauli and Sider,
we restricted the relevant isomorphisms to those that
preserved spatiotemporal location. Under these
constraints, there is no difference between (Gw) and (Gs) .
The claim that for any two worlds, if there is an identity
mapping which is a B-isomorphism then there is an identity
mapping which is an S-isomorphism is true iff, between any
two worlds, every identity mapping which is a B-isomorphism
is an S-isomorphism. Thus many explicit statements in the
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literature are incapable of differentiating between (Gw)
and (Gs)
. It is only when the limitation to identity
mappings has been set aside, and truly general versions of
global supervenience are sought, that the difference
between (Gs) and (Gw) becomes apparent. And in this
context It is clear that both are legitimate construals of
global supervenience. (Gw) captures the notion of truth
determination which some have taken to be the essence of
global supervenience, while (Gs) recaptures the
characteristic strength of H&T's reference determination
relation that was lost when (Gk) was generalized in terms
of (GI) : namely the requirement that the base isomorphism
be a supervenient isomorphism as well. So we seem to have
two global supervenience relations worthy of further study
and development.^^
E. The Importance of Relations
Having seen that we should abandon neither (Gw) nor
(Gs)
,
I want to consider an objection to the adequacy of
both relations that may occur to someone who is used to
^^The essential difference between (Gw) and (Gs) is
paralleled in two alternative definitions of determinism
discussed by Butterfield (1989). He finds the weaker
definition, the one analogous to (Gw)
,
to be the preferable
formulation of determinism, at least for a substantivalist
about spacetime.
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thinking of global supervenience as a relation between sets
of properties.
As we saw in chapter IV, one of the (reputed)
advantages of global supervenience is that it is a version
of multiple-domain supervenience. The globally
supervenient properties can be possessed by one class of
objects (e.g., macrophysical objects) and the subvening
properties by another class (e.g., their microphysical
parts)
. This makes global supervenience appropriate for
formulating the important thesis that everything is
determined by the microphysical realm. For an example of
this sort of (global) supervenience claim consider Lewis's
doctrine of Humean supervenience:
Humean Supervenience ... is the doctrine that
all there is to the world is a vast mosaic
of local matters of fact.
. .We have geometry:
a system of external relations of
spatiotemporal distance between points.
Maybe pcpints of spacetime itself, maybe
point—sized bits of matter or aether or
fields, maybe both. And at those points we
have local qualities: perfectly natural
intrinsic properties which need nothing
bigger than a point to be instantiated. For
short: we have an arrangement of qualities.
And that is all. There is no difference
without difference in the arrangement of
qualities. All else supervenes on that. ^^
^^Lewis (1986a) p. x; my emphasis. Lewis actually
advocates a restricted version of this thesis. First, it
is a metaphysically contingent thesis: it holds at a world,
w, iff all the worlds with no natural properties alien to w
are such that none of them differ in any way without
differing in the arrangement of point qualities. Second,
(continued . .
.
)
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One who thinks of supervenience as a relation between
sets of properties might try to formulate Humean
supervenience as the claim that all properties globally
supervene on the set of perfectly natural properties of
spacetime points (call it •?•). Fix the distribution of
the point qualities, P, one might say, and all else is
fixed. Now consider the property of being alive, L. As we
have interpreted Humean supervenience, it implies that L
globally supervenes on P. (Gs)
,
however, is too strong to
capture this claim. Since my computer and I are P-
indiscernible (neither of us is a point so neither of us
has any of the point qualities)
,
there will be some P-
automorphism on the actual world that takes me to my
computer and my computer to me. But I am alive while my
computer is not so that P-isomorphism is not an L-
isomorphism and L does not (Gs) —supervene on P.
The argument generalizes. If (Gs) is the correct
formulation of global, then macro-properties such as being
a chair, being red, or being human will all fail to be
globally supervenient on the set of microphysical
properties. But global supervenience, being a multiple-
domain relation, is supposed to be ideally suited to
capture such theses. One might conclude from this that
^^
( . . . continued)
it fails for non-qualitative properties such as
haecceities
.
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(Gs) is actually too strong to be a legitimate formulation
of global supervenience after all.
If one approaches Lewis's claim without the bias that
global supervenience is exclusively a relation between sets
of properties
,
however, it is apparent that Lewis is not
claiming that all qualitative properties are globally
supervenient on P. Rather, he is claiming that they are
globally supervenient on PuR, where R is the set of all
natural spatiotemporal relations. After all, Lewis said
that "we have geometry: a system of spatiotemporal distance
relations between points". That is part of the
supervenience base. And note that my counterexample to the
(Gs)
-supervenience of L on P is no counterexample to the
(Gs)
-supervenience of L on PuR. The P-automorphism which
takes me to my computer is not a PuR-automorphism. My
computer and I stand in different spatiotemporal relations
to infinitely many objects.
This example illustrates the importance of allowing
relations in the sets related by (Gs)
—supervenience
. It
can be adapted to make the same point about (Gw) : worlds
that are P-isomorphic might fail to be L-isomorphic because
worlds with different arrangements of the same point
particles with the same natural properties might fail
^*^In chapter VI, I will argue that strictly speaking,
we need to make the base isomorphism preserve the
part/whole relation in order to capture Lewis's
supervenience claim. I ignore this complication for now.
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Thus, L does
completely to have any living inhabitants,
not (GW)
-supervene on P either. But it is plausible that L
does (Gw)
-supervene on PuR: worlds which have some PuR-
isomorphism (have the same number of point particles with
the same natural properties distributed in the same way
over space and time) may well be L-isomorphic
.
When one thinks about it, it is to be expected that
many global (and local) supervenience relations will
involve relations. A major advantage of (Gw) and (Gs) over
traditional formulations of global supervenience is they
are both well-defined when relations are included in the
base set or the supervenient set.^^ in the next chapter.
It is by including relations in the sets related by(Gs)
-supervenience, especially the part-whole relation,
that its multi-domain character is assured. Otherwise
|
(^s)
-supervenience would entail weak supervenience, and
since weak supervenience is a single-domain relation, (Gs)
would fail to be a multi-domain relation after all. To
prove that the (Gs)
-supervenience of any set of properties
on any other set of properties entails their weak
supervenience, suppose S (Gs) -supervenes on B, where S and
B both contain no relations. Then every B— isomorphism is
S-isomorphism
. To prove that S weakly supervenes on B
suppose that in some world, w, two individuals, x and y,
are B-indiscernible, and show that they must be S-
indiscernible
. Since they are B-indiscernible, there is a
B—automorphism on w which takes x to y, y to x, and every
other inhabitant of w to itself. Because B-automorphisms
are B-isomorphisms and every B-isomorphism is an S-
isomorphism, this B-automorphism on w must be an S-
isomorphism as well. Thus, x and y share the same S-
properties, and so they are S-indiscernible
.
(Gw)
,
on the
other hand, does not formally imply (W)
,
even for sets of
properties: consider a model of logical space with only one
world in the domain (so (Gw) is trivially satisfied) but
which contains objects that are B-indiscernible but S-
discernible
.
(continued. .
.
)
192
we will introduce versions of local supervenience which,
unlike (S) and (W)
,
also hold between sets of properties
and relations. First, however, I must deliver on a promise
I made in chapter IV.
—
Petrie and Kim ReconsiderpH
i-i
—
Petrie's Counterexampl p
Petrie's example is based on the following worlds:
Qx
-Qy
Px Py
^Qx '
-.Qy '
Px '
-.Py I
In chapter IV, l argued that although Petrie's example
shows the formal inequivalence of global and strong, it
fails to establish that global is metaphysically weaker
than strong because it fails to establish
. continued)
In fact, with an appropriate plenitude principle one
can show that (Gs) -supervenience of properties
. as I have
presently formulated it, entails strong supervenience.
Proof: assume S (Gs) -supervenes on B. Then we suppose that
two possible individuals, x and y, are B-indiscernible . To
prove that they are S-indiscernible consider a world that
is a duplicate of the mereological sum of x's world and y's
world. If such a world always exists (which is
controversial) then we can argue as I did above that the
(Gs) -supervenience of S on B implies that x and y are S-indiscernible as well.
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(CE) There are sets of properties S and B such that s
supervenes globally but not strongly on B.
In order for Petrie to prove that the unit sets of Q
and P are such sets, he would have to establish that Q
globally but not strongly supervenes on P. But in order to
establish that Q globally supervenes on P Petrie would have
to establish that, of all the possible worlds, none are P-
indiscernible and Q-discernible
. Just exhibiting two
possible worlds which fail to be P-indiscernible is not
enough.
I used the principle of isolation to illustrate the
incompleteness of Petrie's example. Isolation implies that
if P and Q are intrinsic properties, x and y are atoms (as
is compatible with everything Petrie said) and w is a
possible world, then the following are possible worlds as
well
:
z z
'
Qv
-Qv
Pv Pv'
I claimed that since z and z ' are P-indiscernible but Q-
discernible, Q does not globally supervene on P. Thus (CE)
is not established.
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It is at this point that we need to see whether the
new definitions of global support my response to Petrie's
example. Specifically, we need to be sure that according
to both (Gs) and (GW)
, Q fails to globally supervene on P.
Z and z' are counterexamples to the (Gs)
-supervenience of Q
on P because the one P-isomorphism between these worlds
fails to be a Q-isomorphism; They are also counterexamples
to the (Gw)
-supervenience of Q on P because there is a p-
isomorphism but no Q-isomorphism between z and z'. Thus,
as I claimed at the outset of chapter IV, the differences
between the precise formulations of global are immaterial
to my response to Petrie's argument for (CE)
2 . Kim on The Extra Atom
As you may recall, Kim claims that the metaphysical
significance of Petrie's example is that it shows the
weakness of global supervenience as a relation of
dependence or determination. Kim asks us to imagine a
possible world, W, which differs physically from the actual
world, 0, only by containing an extra ammonia molecule, e,
somewhere in the rings of Saturn. This minute physical
difference is accompanied in W by the complete lack of any
mental states.
Letting N be the property of having no sentient parts,
I argued as follows:
195
Since W has N (in other words, no part of wIS sentient)
,
the mereological difference wminus e (W-e)
,
also has N. Two exclusive
and exhaustive possibilities arise. EitherN IS intrinsic to W-e, or it is not. if nIS intrinsic to W-e, by the principle ofisolation there is another world, W, which
contains only* a perfect duplicate of w-e.Since W-e has N and W' contains only* aduplicate of W-e, W' also has N (i.e., W'
also lacks sentient parts). But, of bourse,
@ has many sentient parts. Thus, we can
conclude that @ and W' are mentally
discernible. Next we establish that @ and
W' are physically indiscernible. Note thatby stipulation the only physical difference
between W and @ is that W has e and 0 does
not! So W', which contains only* a
duplicate of W-e, must be physically
indiscernible to 0. in fact, the only
physical difference between W and both 0 and
W' is that W contains the extra molecule, e,
while W' and 0 do not. Thus, W' and 0 are
physically indiscernible and mentally
discernible: global psychophysical
supervenience is false!
If the existence of e in W is the only physical
<Iiff®^6nce between 0 and W, then any duplicate of W-e,
should be physically isomorphic to W. Thus, there should
be at least one physical isomorphism between W' and 0, the
one that takes each object in 0 to a physical duplicate in
W'. But there will not be any mental isomorphism between 0
and W' because there is nothing in W' which is mentally
indiscernible to me. So (Gw) -psychophysical supervenience
is falsified by the existence of 0 and W'. And if (Gw)-
supervenience is falsified, so is (Gs) -supervenience . The
rest of the argument (concerning what happens if N is
extrinsic to W-e) is not affected by the different
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definitions of global. Thus, as I claimed in chapter iv my
response to Kim-s objection applies no matter which of the
suitably general formulations of global supervenience is
adopted.
G. Conclusion
In this chapter I illustrated the need for a suitably
general definition of global supervenience, and I extracted
two candidates from the literature. Along the way I have
also shown why it is important to formulate global
supervenience in such a way that relations are allowed into
the base and supervenient sets. Finally, i have shown that
my arguments in chapter IV would stand no matter which of
the two formulations of global supervenience one accepts.
In the next chapter I will formulate and investigate
generalized, multi-domain, local supervenience relations
inspired by (Gw) and (Gs)
.
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CHAPTER VI
GENERALIZED LOCAL AND GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE RELATIONS
A. Introduction
Consider the classic distinction between primary and
secondary qualities (conceived of in roughly the Lockean
way as powers in objects). The secondary qualities of an
individual are supposed to depend on the primary qualities
of, and relations between, the individual '
s
microphysical
parts. This sort of dependence should be expressible in
terms of supervenience
. For example, pliability (to some
determinate degree) is plausibly locally supervenient on
some set of microphysical properties and relations. if one
possible individual is more pliable than another, either
their microphysical parts have different microphysical
properties or they stand in different external relations to
one another. Many natural kind properties, such as being a
water molecule, seem to locally supervene in this way. We
could use (Gs) or (Gw) to formulate such dependence
relations as supervenience theses, but that would not
reflect their status as local determination relations.
And, as I showed in chapter IV. A. 2., if we try to capture
these relations in terms of (S) or (W)
,
we will fail.
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may protest that
The advocate of strong supervenience
strong supervenience can capture the supervenience of
pliability on structural properties of macrophysical
individuals, where the structural properties are themselves
"composed of" the microphysical properties and relations.
Since the structural properties are properties of the
pliable individuals, we are no longer faced with a multiple
domain supervenience relation. But what about the
dependence of pliability on the microphysical properties
and relations themselves? Aren't these the properties (and
relations) on which pliability ultimately depends?
Clearly, we need a local supervenience relation capable of
expressing at least the functional component of the
metaphysically significant dependence relations holding
between the macrophysical and the microphysical realm or
between the properties of wholes and the properties of, and
relations between, their parts. Since (Gs) and (Gw) can
express global multiple domain determination relations, it
seems advisable to formulate relations of local multiple-
domain supervenience on analogy with (Gs) and (Gw)
.
In section B, I develop such local supervenience
relations. In section C, I present my final formulations
of the two global supervenience relations. In section D, I
consider the formal and metaphysical entailment relations
among our new generalized supervenience relations. In
section E, I consider the kind of correlation and
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functional dependence relations between supervenient and
base properties entailed by these relations. Finally, in
section F, 1 consider their status as nonreductive
dependence relations.
—Generalized Local Supervenience
2^ Initial Formulations
Let S and B be any sets of properties and/or relations
(Lw) S locally supervenes on B for any possible
objects, X and y, if there is a B-isomorphisiti
between the parts of x and the parts of y then
there is an S~isoinorphisin between the parts of x
and the parts of y.
(Ls) S locally supervenes on B for any possible
objects, X and y, every B-isomorphism between the
parts of X and the parts of y is an S-
isomorphism.
Where
,
(ISO) f is an A-isomorphism between x and v f is a
one-one function from the parts of x to the parts
of y such that for any n-place relation (or
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property), r, in a, and for each part of x,
,
^2, X3,..., Rx^...x^ iff Rf (X,) . . . f (x^)
.
Both (Ls) and (Lw) are less than optimal formulations
of local multiple domain supervenience
. We can see this
most simply by considering cases where the supervenient set
contains only properties. We want our formulation to
capture the idea that no possible individuals can differ
regarding their supervenient properties without differing
regarding the base properties of, and relations between,
their parts. But neither (Ls) nor (Lw) does so.
The problem with (Lw) can be seen by comparing it to
an alternative formulation of the local supervenience of
properties
:
(La) S locally supervenes on B for any possible
objects X and y if there is a B— isomorphism
between the parts of x and the parts of y then x
and y are individually S-indiscernible (have the
same S-properties)
.
According to (La)
,
two possible individuals which have a B-
isomorphism between their parts must themselves be
individually S-indiscernible (although there need not be an
S-isomorphism between their parts) . This more faithfully
captures the idea behind the local supervenience of
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properties than (Lw) does because (Lw) does not require
individuals with a B-isomorphism between their parts to be
S-indiscernible (to have the same S-properties)
: there need
only be some S-isomorphism between their parts. The core
of the problem is that the S-isomorphism between the parts
of two individuals need not take the two whole individuals
to one another, and thus they might be S-discernible. if
the individuals themselves fail to be S-indiscernible, why
should we care whether there is some S-isomorphism between
their parts? We already seem to have a counterexample to
the local supervenience of S on B.
Next consider (Ls) . Let S = {being an H2O molecule)
and B = (the property of being a hydrogen atom, the
property of being an oxygen atom, and the relation of being
bonded to) where being bonded to is understood as a
relation holding exclusively among atoms (e.g., an OH
molecule is never, strictly speaking, bonded to another
hydrogen atom, rather, the oxygen atom in the OH molecule
is bonded to another hydrogen atom to compose a water
molecule)
. Consider any two water molecules, M and W:
M = HOH W = H'O'H'
For S to locally supervene on B according to (Ls) every B-
isomorphism between M and W must be an S-isomorphism. Now
consider the isomorphism which takes OH to H'O'H' and HOH
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to O'H'
.
OH and H'O'H' have the san,e B-properties: neither
IS a hydrogen atom or an oxygen atom, and since they are
not atoms, neither stand in the bonded relation to any
other parts of M or W. So there is such a B-isomorphism
between M and W, and it clearly fails to be an S-
isomorphism. Thus, according to (Ls)
,
M and W are
counterexamples to the local supervenience of s on B. But,
surely, M and W do not really constitute a counterexample
to the basic idea behind the local supervenience thesis
because M and W are individually S-indiscernible
. Also S
really does appear to be locally supervenient on B.
Another problem with (Ls) is that like (Lw) and unlike
(La) it has the consequence that two individuals can be
non-trivial positive instances of the local supervenience
of S on B (for any sets S and B) without being individually
S-indiscernible. (Ls) has this consequence because it
could be that every B-isomorphism between two possible
individuals is an S-isomorphism, yet there is no S-
isomorphism which takes the one (whole) individual to the
other because there is no B-isomorphism taking each
individual to the other (whole) individual.
2. Taking Account of the Part/Whole Relation
The preceding difficulties can be resolved by
requiring the isomorphisms to preserve the part/whole
relation. For example, the B-isomorphism which takes OH to
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H'O'H' and HOH to O'H' does not preserve the part/whole
relation (<)
.
Thus, if we require the isomorphisms to
preserve <, it would be irrelevant to the truth of the
local supervenience of s on B. Also if we require the base
and supervenient isomorphisms to preserve <, then (Lw) will
imply (La) because all isomorphisms between any two
individuals which preserve < must take the two whole
individuals to one another.
But how should we see to it that all isomorphisms
relevant to the truth of a local supervenience thesis
preserve the part/whole relation? One way to do so is
always to reformulate individual local supervenience theses
by adding < to the base set (and in the case of (Lw) to the
supervenient set as well)
. Since our objections point to a
general defect afflicting both (Lw) and (Ls)
,
however, it
would be preferable to replace them with the following
formulations
:
(Lwm) S locally supervenes on B for any possible
individuals, x and y, if there is a B-isomorphism
between the parts of x and the parts of y which
preserves the part/whole relation, then there is
an S-isomorphism between the parts of x and the
parts of y which preserves the part/whole
relation.
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(Lsm) S locally supervenes on B
=^, for any possible
individuals, x and y, any B-isomorphism between
the parts of x and the parts of y which preserves
the part/whole relation is an S-isomorphism as
well
.
These are mereological versions of local
supervenience. But we shouldn't see them as special cases
of local supervenience. Even (S) can be seen as a limiting
case of mereological supervenience: the supervenient
properties of a whole are determined by the subvenient
properties of its non-proper part. In any case, (Lsm) and
(Lwm) appear to be preferable to our non-mereological
formulations (Lw) and (Ls)
,
and I will work with them in
what follows.
3. The Local Supervenience of Relations
Before I go on to reformulate my two global
supervenience relations in light of (Lsm) and (Lwm)
,
I want
to make some remarks about the local supervenience of
relations. The main idea behind the local supervenience of
properties is that no individuals can instantiate different
supervening properties without there being some difference
in the base properties of, or base relations between, their
parts (including their non-proper parts). An individual's
locally supervenient properties depend on (are determined
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by) the distribution of base properties and relations over
that individual's parts. it is ridiculous, however, to
claim that whether an individual stands in certain
supervenient relations depends on, or is determined by, the
distribution of any set of intrinsic properties and
relations over the individual's parts. Two perfect
duplicates can stand in very different external and
extrinsic relations to other individuals. Perhaps the
whole notion of relations being locally supervenient is a
mistake.
To see that it isn't a mistake, it is helpful to note
that globally supervenient relations do not (usually) hold
between entire worlds. Rather they hold between proper
of worlds. Now consider the claim that a relation,
R, is ( Lsm)
-supervenient on some set of properties and
relations, Q, iff every pair of possible individuals are
such that every Q-isomorphism between their parts which
preserves the part/whole relation is an R-isomorphism.
This is a coherent thesis because we avoid the trap of
expecting the total base nature of an individual and its
parts to determine its locally supervenient relations to
other individuals. Instead we only expect the total base
nature of an individual and its parts to determine which of
the individual's parts stand in the locally supervening
relation to one another. No attention is paid to whether
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the individual or its parts stand in R to individuals which
are not parts of the original individual.
Generaliized Global Supervenience : Final Ad-justinents
In light of my decision to work with (Lsm) and (Lwm)
,
it is advisable to consider analogous versions of global
supervenience
:
(Gwm) S globally supervenes on B for any possible
worlds, w and z, if there is a B-isomorphism
between w and z which preserves the part/whole
relation then there is an S-isomorphism between w
and z which preserves part/whole relations.
(Gsm) S globally supervenes on B for any possible
worlds, w and z, every B-isomorphism between w
and z which preserves the part/whole relation is
an S-isomorphism.
These relations have advantages their more general
ancestors, (Gw) and (Gs)
,
lack. For instance, the
preceding example concerning the failure of the (Ls)-
supervenience of the property of being a water molecule is
problematic for (Gs) but not (Gsm) . More importantly,
consider our previous example (from chapters IV. A. 2. and
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qualities and
V.E.) of the global supervenience of all
somewhat natural relations on the set of perfectly natural
microphysical properties and relations, Q. Lewis indicates
that he believes the perfectly natural external relations
are spatiotemporal relations which hold between spacetime
points, or point-particles:
We have geometry: a system of external
relations of spatiotemporal distance between
points. Maybe point sized bits of matter or
aether or fields, maybe both. And at those
points we have local qualities: perfectly
natural intrinsic properties which need
nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short we have an
arrangement of qualities. And that is all.
There is no difference without a difference
in the arrangement of qualities. All else
supervenes on that.^
since the part/whole relation is neither a distance
relation, nor a perfectly natural intrinsic property, Lewis
does not appear to be including the part/whole relation in
the supervenience base. With this point in mind I want to
consider whether this thesis is best formulated in terms of
(Gs) or (Gsm)
.
As before, we call Lewis's base set of microphysical
properties and relations, Q. In chapter V (pp. 184-186) I
argued that the natural external relations in Q were not
preserved by any automorphism which takes me to my computer
^Lewis (1986c) pp ix-x.
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because, for example, my computer and I stand in different
external relations to my television. This was used as an
argument for the importance of allowing relations in the
sets related by supervenience (especially the base set)
.
(Gs) (and (Gw)) appeared capable of capturing Lewis's
supervenience thesis as long as these relations were
included in Q. Strictly speaking, however, because all q-
relations are relations between point-particles (or
points), and neither of us are point-particles, my computer
and I do not stand in any Q-relations to anything: we
aren't the right sort of things. While we stand in less
than perfectly natural external relations such as the
relation of having midpoints which are one-meter apart (or
having nearest points which are one inch apart)
,
it seems
that we do not stand in any of the perfectly natural
distance relations in Q. if this is correct, then, because
neither my computer nor I am a point-particle and so
neither of us instantiate any of the Q-properties or stand
in any of the Q-relations, contrary to what I said in
chapter V, there would be Q-automorphisms on the actual
world which took me to my computer despite taking all point
particles to themselves. Such a Q-automorphism fails to
preserve many important properties such as the property of
being alive. Thus, if we formulate Lewis's plausible
supervenience thesis in terms of (Gs)
,
we get the result
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that it is blatantly false. (Gs) does not appear to
capture the plausible thesis Lewis had in mind after all.
On the other hand, on our new mereological versions of
global supervenience, we can follow Lewis in allowing only
perfectly natural properties and natural external relations
^tween point-particles in Q. For if the Q-isomorphisms
have to preserve the external relations between the point
particles, then, in virtue of preserving the part/whole
relation, they will preserve the less natural external
relations between the things these particles compose. By
requiring the isomorphisms to preserve the part/whole
relation, we ground the less natural spatiotemporal
relations between macroscopic individuals (such as having
midpoints which are one meter apart) on the spatiotemporal
relations between their point-particles. This suggests
that (Gsm) is a more suitable formulation of the
supervenience thesis intended by Lewis than is (Gs) .
Similar remarks could be made in defense of (Gwm) vis-a-vis
(Gw) .
One who is wed to (Gs) or (Gw) could achieve the same
result by reformulating the base set (and in the case of
(Gw), the supervenient set as well) of Lewis' supervenience
thesis by adding the part/whole relation to it. Either
course is probably defensible. And my remarks in chapter
V.E. concerning Humean supervenience and the need to allow
relations in the sets related by supervenience can be
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reinterpreted in either fashion. since I have occasion to
compare local and global supervenience relations, however,
and the local relations are best understood along the lines
of (Lsm) and (Lwm)
,
it suits my purposes to adopt (Gsm) and
(Gwm) as my formulations of global supervenience
henceforth
.
D. Entailment Relations^
1. The Basic Picture
One way to learn more about these four new multiple
domain supervenience relations is to consider the logical
relations among them. Previous proofs that (Gs) entailed
but is not entailed by (Gw) apply equally well to (Gsm) and
(Gwm)
. Surprisingly, however, they do not suffice to
establish that (Lsm) entails but is not entailed by (Lwm)
.
In fact, as I will prove below, if we restrict membership
in the supervenient set to properties, (Lsm) and (Lwm) are
equivalent. Thus, we need to consider the supervenience of
relations to establish the greater strength of (Lsm) . Let
S be the unit set of the relation, is the father of
,
^In this section, except where I explicitly indicate
otherwise, the relevant kind of entailment is some kind of
formal entailment because, for the most part, I will
consider simplified models of logical space without taking
plenitude principles into account. For definiteness, I
will always assume that accessibility is an equivalence
relation, so the relevant formal system would be a version
of S5.
211
and let B be the unit set of the relation is the father
or only child of
. clearly, any two individuals which
are such that there is a Bu{<)
-isomorphism between their
parts would have to be such that there is an Su{<}-
isomorphism between their parts. But not all Bu{<}-
isomorphisms are S-isomorphisms
. For instance, consider
any mereological sum of father and only child where the
father and child have the same number of parts (perhaps
they have the same mass) Any B-automorphism on the sum
which takes the father to the child and the child to the
father fails to be an S-automorphism. This shows that
(Lsm) is indeed stronger than (Lwm)
.
It is no surprise that our local supervenience theses
entail the corresponding global supervenience theses.
Consider (Lsm) and (Gsm)
. Since possible worlds are
possible individuals, if every B-isomorphism between
possible individuals which preserves < is an S-isomorphism,
then any B-isomorphism between possible worlds which
preserves < is an S-isomorphism as well.
Now if I can establish that (Gsm) is independent of
(Lwm)
,
we will have a clear picture of the entailment
relations between our new supervenience relations. First,
I use a version of the example used above to establish the
^There is room for differences of opinion on what are
the parts of any individual. For example, some will take
any mereological sum or difference of parts to be parts.
Others will not. My formulations of supervenience are
neutral on such issues.
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greater strength of (Lsm) to show that (Lwm) fails to
entail (Gsm)
. Let S and B be as before. Consider a model
with one world containing a father-child pair, each with
the same number of parts, and nothing distinct from their
sum. The sum is such that there is a Bu( <}
-automorphism
between its parts and an Su( <}
-automorphism as well. And
no other possible individuals in this world would threaten
the truth of the (Lwm)
-supervenience of S on B. But,
clearly, not every Bu{ <}
-automorphism on the world is an
Su{<)
-automorphism. Consider a Bu{ <}
-automorphism that
takes father to child, and child to father. Thus, (Lwm)
does not formally entail (Gsm)
.
Next we need to establish that (Gsm) does not formally
entail (Lwm)
. To do this I consider the following model
with two possible worlds each of which is viewed as
consisting of two atomic individuals which together compose
a third possible individual, namely the possible world
itself. I stipulate that the worlds have the following
properties: W has P and Q, while z has P and -Q.
Pw
Qw
Pa Pb
Qa Qb
Pz
--Qz
Pc -Pd
Qc Qd
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In this model, P (Gsm)
-supervenes on Q because there is no
Q-isomorphism between w and z
,
and every Qu{ <}
-automorphism
on w and on z is a P-automorphism. p fails to (Lwm)-
supervene on Q, however, because there is a Qu{<}-
isomorphism between the parts of a and the parts of c but
no P-isomorphism between them. Thus, we have discovered
that the following formal entailment relations hold among
our four new versions of local and global supervenience
.
No Restrictions on S or B
(Lsm)
(Lwm) (Gsm)
(Gwm)
2. Special Cases
As I mentioned above, when the supervenient set
contains only properties, then (Lsm) and (Lwm) are actually
equivalent. Since we already know that (Lsm) entails
(Lwm)
,
to prove the equivalence we only need to establish
that for any set of properties, S, and any set of
properties and relations, B, if S (Lwm) -supervenes on B
then S (Lsm) -supervenes on B. So suppose some set of
properties S fails to (Lsm) -supervene on a set of
properties and relations B. Then some pair of possible
objects, X and y, is such that some Bu{ <} -isomorphism, f,
between their parts fails to be an S-isomorphism. So there
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are possible objects, x- and y, which are parts of x and y
respectively and are such that f(x') = y yet x' and y are
S-discernible (they have different S-properties)
. since f
is a Bu{<)
-isomorphism and f(x') = y, it follows that
there is some Bu( <}
-isomorphism between the parts of x' and
the parts of y'. Yet there is no Su{ <)
-isomorphism between
their parts because any such isomorphism would have to take
the two wholes to one another, and they are S-discernible.
Thus the (Lwm)
-supervenience of S on B is false. in light
of our earlier results, this establishes that when
membership in the supervenient set is limited to
properties, the formal and metaphysical entailment
relations between our four generalized supervenience theses
are as follows:
S Contains Only Properties
(Lsm) -H- (Lwm)
(Gsm)
i
(Gwm)
Finally, if the supervenient and base sets only
contain intrinsic properties, we can use isolation to prove
that the four relations are metaphysically (but not
formally) equivalent. The following example illustrates
this point as well as illustrating why (Lsm) and (Lwm) are
formally equivalent when S contains only properties
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although (Gsm) and (Gwm) are not. The example is a slight
variant of our original example in chapter V of the formal
inequivalence of (Gs) and (Gw)
. But instead of having two
worlds each with two individuals, we have six possible
individuals: a is composed of o and d, while b is composed
of e and f.
-Qa
-Qb
-Pa
-Pb
Qc
-Qd
-Qe Qf
Pc
-Pd Pe
-Pf
There is both a P-isomorphism and a Q-isomorphism between
the parts of a and the parts of b which preserves <, but
not every Pu( <}
-isomorphism between the parts of a and the
parts of b is a Qu{ <} -isomorphism. This would appear to
show that, contrary to what I have proven above, when S
contains no relations (Lsm) is not equivalent to (Lwm)
.
Actually, however, (Lwm) is a universally quantified
thesis, and, while a and b are consistent with the (Lwm)-
supervenience of Q on P, c and e (and d and f) are not.
After all, c and e are possible individuals and, according
to (Lwm)
,
any possible individuals that have a base-
isomorphism between their parts which preserves < also have
a supervenient isomorphism between their parts which
preserves <. But while there is a Pu{ <} -isomorphism
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between c and e, there is no Qu{ <}
-isomorphism between
them. Thus this model falsifies the (Lwm)
-supervenience of
Q on P after all.
One may then wonder why our original model from
chapter V (see p. 170) where a and b are worlds does not
falsify (Gwm)
,
too. The reason is that (Gwm) only
quantifies over all possible worlds
. and while the parts of
possible individuals are possible individuals, the proper
parts of possible worlds are not possible worlds. Thus,
the fact that parts of possible worlds may be such that
their parts are Bu{ <}
-isomorphic without being Su{<}-
isomorphic is perfectly compatible with the truth of (Gwm)-
supervenience - except, that is, in situations where the
principle of isolation can be invoked.
This brings me to the final lesson of this example.
If S and B are both sets of intrinsic properties, then
(Gwm) metaphysically (but not formally) entails (Lwm)
because any possible individuals which falsify (Lwm) will
be such that isolated duplicates of those individuals will
falsify (Gwm) as well. After all, the principle of
isolation ensures us that for any possible individual there
is a world containing only* a duplicate of that individual.
So if S and B are sets of intrinsic properties and there
are two possible individuals which have a Bu{<)-
isomorphism, but no Su{ <} -isomorphism, between their parts,
then isolation implies the existence of two possible worlds
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with a Bu{<)
-isomorphism but no Su{ <}
-isomorphism between
their parts. The result does not hold for formal
entailment because not all admissible models of modal logic
validate isolation. The important thing is that if (Gwm)
metaphysically entails (Lwm) for sets of intrinsic
properties, then in light of our earlier results it follows
that all four formulations of supervenience are
metaphysically equivalent when S and B include only
intrinsic properties:
S and B Contain Only Intrinsic Properties
(Gwm) (Lwm) ++ (Lsm) (Gsm)
With these proofs I have established the central
formal and metaphysical entailment relations between our
four generalized supervenience theses. I now consider the
functional correlation and functional determination
relations provided by our new supervenience relations.
E. Correlation and Functional Dependence
1. Introduction
In chapter II (p. 40)
,
I showed that for any property,
P, that strongly supervenes on a base, B, there is some
member of the Boolean closure of B which is necessarily
coextensive with P. It was this correlation relation that
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Kim used to argue that strong supervenience entailed some
kind of intertheoretic reducibility
. In this section I aim
to investigate the correlations implied by our four general
versions of supervenience. since none of them are stronger
than (S)‘, my arguments in support of the nonreductive
character of strong supervenience should apply here as
well
.
In chapter III.B.2., I gave a precise account of the
functional dependence relation implied by strong
supervenience. I showed that if s strongly supervenes on B
then there is a function, f, from the set of B-maximal
properties to the set of S-maximal properties such that for
any possible individual x, and any B-maximal property, B*,
necessarily if B*x then f(B*)x. This gives precise content
to the claim that an individual's S—properties are
determined by, and depend upon, its B-properties
. In this
section I will also characterize the functional dependence
relations implied by our new supervenience relations. Our
results concerning the correlation and functional
determination relations implied by these theses will help
^For any sets of properties
. S and B, if S strongly
supervenes on B then S (Lsm) -supervenes on B. Assume S
strongly supervenes on B so all B-indiscernible possible
individuals are S-indiscernible as well. Now to show that
(Lsm) is true, consider any Bu{ <} -isomorphism, f, between
the parts of any two individuals, x and y. Since B only
contains properties, any part of x, x', must be
individually B-indiscernible to f(x'). It follows from (S)
that x' and f(x') are S-indiscernible as well. Since this
is the case for any part of x and the corresponding part of
y, f must be an S-isomorphism as well.
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US evaluate the philosophical significance of these new
supervenience relations.
Locally supervenient relations raise complications
which are peripheral to my main concerns.^ So I will
limit my remarks concerning local supervenience to the
supervenience of properties. This means that I can take
advantage of the equivalence of (Lwm) and (Lsm) under this
restriction and simplify matters by dealing with both of
these relations at once.
-2-:—(Gsm) , Correlation, and Functional Dependence^
We begin with a definition:
(Cl) Possible individuals, x and y, (from worlds w and
z respectively) are completely A-indiscernible
=df there exists some A-isomorphism, f, between w
and z which preserves the part/whole relation and
is such that f(x) = y.
^The complications involve the difference between the
functional dependence and correlation relations implied by
(Lsm) and (Lwm) . This is something I have not been able to
work out to my satisfaction. Fortunately, these
complications affect neither the nonreductive status of our
local supervenience relations nor their status (or lack
thereof) as necessary conditions for ontological dependence
relations, so I can safely sidestep this issue.
^The arguments in this section were significantly
influenced by, and to some extent modelled on, an excellent
discussion of similar points in Sider (1991).
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To establish the nature of the functional dependence
relation provided by (Gsm)
-supervenience
,
first we need to
prove that the relation of complete A-indiscernibility is
an equivalence relation and therefore partitions the set of
possible individuals. Clearly, being completely A-
indiscernible is reflexive and symmetric. To prove that
it's transitive, consider three individuals, x, y, and v.
We suppose that x is completely A-indiscernible to y, and y
to V, and argue that x is completely A-indiscernible to v.
More precisely, we assume that (i) there is an A-
isomorphism, f, between x's world, w(x)
,
and y's world,
^(y )
!
such that f (x) = y, and (ii) there is an A-
isomorphism, g, between w(y) and w(v) such that f(y) = v.
But then the composition of g and f, gof, is an A-
isomorphism between w(x) and w(v) such that g(f(x)) = v.
Thus, X and v are completely A-indiscernible too. This
establishes that even when A includes relations, the
relation of complete A-indiscernibility is an equivalence
relation on the class of possible individuals. Thus, it
partitions the class into cells of completely A-
indiscernible possible individuals. For any cell in the
partition there is some property which is instantiated by
all and only the members of that cell. Such properties are
instantiated by an individual in virtue of that
individual's total (intrinsic and extrinsic) A-nature. Let
us call such properties complete A-natures . An
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individual's complete A-nature encompasses its A-
properties, the A-properties of its worldmates, and their
Au{<)
-relations to one another. Complete A-natures are
properties but they need not be (and usually will not be)
members of A (or /0(A)).
Given that
(1) S (Gsm) -supervenes on B iff every pair of possible
individuals which are completely B-indiscernible
are completely S-indiscernible^,
and given that being completely A— indiscernible is a matter
of having the same complete A-nature, it stands to reason
that the (Gsm)
-supervenience of S on B ensures that there
is a functional dependence of complete S-natures on
complete B-natures. More precisely,
^Left to right: suppose every B-isomorphism which
preserves the part/whole relation is an S-isomorphism. Now
we assume some arbitrary x and y are completely B-
indiscernible . That means there is a Bu{ <} -isomorphism
between w(x) and w(y) which takes x to y. Thus it must be
an S-isomorphism as well, and consequently x and y are
completely S-indiscernible . For the other direction,
assume that all completely B-indiscernible individuals are
completely S-indiscernible. Now consider an arbitrary
Bu{ <} -isomorphism, f, between worlds w and z. Since f is a
Bu{ <} -isomorphism, for any x in w, x and f(x) are
completely B-indiscernible for all x in w. Thus, by our
assumption, x and f(x) are completely S-indiscernible for
all X in w. But then f must be an S-isomorphism too.
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(GsmD) S (Gsm)
-supervenes on B iff there is a
function, f, from complete B-natures onto (the
set of all) complete S-natures such that for any
possible individual, x, and any complete B-
nature, B*, necessarily if B*x then f(B*)x.
If there was no such function then there would be two
possible individuals with the same complete B-nature but
different complete S-natures. Such individuals would be
completely B—indiscernible yet not completely S-
indiscernible
. Thus, by (1), they would falsify the (Gsm)-
supervenience of S on B. This establishes the left to
portion of (GsmD)
. To establish the other direction,
assume that there is such a function between complete B-
natures and complete-S-natures
. So any pair of possible
individuals that are completely B-indiscernible are
completely S-indiscernible
. Thus, by (1), s (Gsm)
-
supervenes on B.
Now we are prepared to establish the correlation
relation between supervenient and base properties analogous
to the one entailed by (S)
.
Suppose S (Gsm) -supervenes on
B. Consider any property P in set S. I claim that the set
of all possible individuals which have P "follows the
borders" of the partition induced by being completely B-
indiscernible in the sense that for any cell in the
partition, one member of that cell instantiates P iff all
223
members of that cell instantiate P. For proof, suppose
some P in S doesn't "follow the borders" of the partition.
Then there must be some B-cell with at least one member, x,
which instantiates P and another member, y, which does not
have P. Because x and y are from the same B-cell they are
completely B-indiscernible
. But since one instantiates P
and the other doesn't, they are not completely S-
indiscernible, which contradicts our assumption that S
(Gsm)
-supervenes on B in light of (1). Thus, any property,
P, in S is necessarily coextensive with some disjunction of
complete B-natures. More precisely.
(GsmC) If s (Gsm)
-supervenes on B then for any
property P in S (in fact, for any property in
^(S)), there is a set of complete B-natures, N,
such that D(Px x instantiates some member of
N)
similar result can also be obtained for
supervenient relations. Suppose S (Gsm) -supervenes on B.
Consider any relation R in set S. Say that a relation R is
instantiated in a possible individual iff the relation
relates proper parts of that possible individual to one
another. I claim that the set of all possible individuals
which instantiate R "follows the borders" of the partition
induced by being completely B-indiscernible in the sense
that for any cell in the partition, one member of that cell
instantiates R iff all members of that cell instantiate R.
For proof, suppose some R in S doesn't "follow the borders"
of the partition. Then there must be some B-cell with at
least one member, x, which instantiates R and another
member, y, which does not instantiate R. Since x and y are
from the same B-cell they are completely B-indiscernible.
But since one instantiates R and the other doesn't, they
(continued. .
.
)
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Complete B-natures are completely specific ways an
individual can be with respect to the B-properties of
itself, its worldmates and the Bu<-relations between them.
Clearly, if the attribution of any complete B-nature to x
were to be expressed in the predicate calculus (or an
infinitary analogue thereof) the formula would contain
quantifiers (because one needs to express whether x has any
worldmates, and, if so, what their B-properties are).
Also, given that many worlds contain infinitely many
individuals, B-natures, let alone disjunctions of them,
could only be expressed in an infinitary language with
quantifiers and relation symbols. Contrast this with the
kind of correlation relation provided by (S)
:
every
strongly supervenient property was necessarily coextensive
with a disjunction of B-maximal properties. So as long as
the base set has finitely many members, a predicate
expressing a supervenient property is necessarily
coextensive with a finite open sentence constructed out of
predicates expressing base properties and the operators of
disjunction, and negation. It seems, then, that if (S)
® ( . . . continued)
are not completely S-indiscernible : there would not be any
S-isomorphism that preserves the part/whole relation and
takes X to y. That, however, contradicts our assumption
that S (Gsm) -supervenes on B in light of (1). The
preceding establishes that
If S (Gsm) -supervenes on B then for any relation R in
S, there is a set of complete B-natures, N, such that
(Rxy...z x+y+...+z instantiates some member of N) .
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fails to entail the theoretical reducibility of
supervenient disciplines to base disciplines (as I argued
in III.B.), so does (Gsm)
.
^—(Lwm) , Correlation, and Functional Deoendencp
Next we turn to the nature of the correlation and
functional determination relations provided by our new
versions of local supervenience, (Lsm) and (Lwm)
. As I
mentioned above (p. 215)
,
I am ignoring some complications
regarding locally supervenient relations and focussing on
only locally supervenient properties, thereby taking
advantage of the equivalence of (Lsm) and (Lwm) when S
contains no relations. I will work with the relation as
formulated in (Lwm) but my remarks apply equally to the
(Lsm) -supervenience of properties.
If S (Lwm) -supervenes on B then any individuals which
are such that there is some Bu{ <) -isomorphism between them
are such that there is some Su{ <} -isomorphism as well. For
any set of properties and relations, A, the relation of
being Au{ <} -isomorphic partitions the set of all possible
individuals. For each cell in the partition there is some
property which is instantiated by all and only the members
of the cell. Such properties are instantiated by an
individual in virtue of the individual's internal A-
226
nature. 9 Internal A-natures are not usually members of A.
They are constructed out of members of A, the part/whole
relation and logical operations. This suggest the
following definition of internal A-1 ndiscernibi 1 i i-y . x and
y are internally A-indiscernible x and y have the same
internal A-nature (i.e., there is an Au{ <}
-isomorphism
between the parts of x and the parts of y) . it is clear,
then, that (Lwm) is equivalent to the thesis that
internally B-indiscernible objects are internally s-
indiscernible. But this means that the (Lwm)
-supervenience
of S on B is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
a function from internal B-natures to internal S-natures:
(LwmD) S (Lwm)
-supervenes on B iff there is a
function, f, from internal B-natures onto
internal S-natures such that for any possible
individual, x, and any internal B-nature, B^
,
necessarily if B.x then f(B.)x.
It is a short step to the following correlation
relation between S-properties and properties constructed
out of the members of the base set:
’l use the label "internal A-nature" in order to
distinguish these properties from complete A-natures. I
hope to indicate that an individual's internal A-nature
depends solely on the distribution of A-properties (and
relations) over the individual and its parts. I refrained
from calling these properties intrinsic A-natures because A
might include some extrinsic properties.
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(LwmC) If s (Lwm)
-supervenes on B then for any
property, P, in S, there is a set of internal B-
natures, I, such that n(Px x instantiates some
member of I)
.
In other words, if S (Lwm)
-supervenes on B then for any
,
P, in S, there is a (perhaps infinitary)
disjunction of internal B—natures which is necessarily
coextensive with P. To prove (LwmC) we begin by supposing
that S ( Lwm) —supervenes on B. Now consider any property,
P, in S. The set of all possible individuals instantiating
P will "follow the borders" of the partition induced by
internal B-indiscernibility : for any cell in the partition
induced by internal B-indiscernibility, and any member of
that cell, X, x instantiates P iff all of x's cell-mates
instantiate P. For proof, suppose there is some y such
that Py yet one of y's cellmates, x, fails to instantiate
P. Since x and y are cell-mates in the partition induced
by internal B-indiscernibility, they are internally B-
indiscernible : they have the same internal B-natures. But
since P (Lwm) -supervenes on B, they had better be
internally P-indiscernible as well. Thus either each
instantiates P or neither does, contrary to our
supposition: contradiction.
We have established that for any property P in S, any
cell in the partition induced by internal B-
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indiscernibility
,
and any member of that cell, x, x
instantiates P iff all of x's cell-mates instantiate P.
This means that any individuals with the same internal B-
nature must be such that both or neither instantiate P.
Thus, there must be a set of internal B-natures, l, such
that an individual instantiates P iff it instantiates some
member of I. (LwmC) is established.
^—CGwm) , Correlation, and Functional Dependence
In chapter V (p. 163), I said that two worlds are
globally A— indiscernible iff there is an A-isomorphism
between their parts. Now, in light of the general
importance of the part/whole relation and its central place
in our new supervenience relations, I need to introduce a
new notion of global A-indiscernibility : w and z are
globally A— indiscernible iff there is an Au{ <} —isomorphism
between the parts of w and the parts of z. This is best
thought of as a second, stricter kind of global A-
indiscernibility
. They are interdef inable : two worlds are
A-indiscernible in the new sense iff they are Au{<}-
indiscernible on the old definition.
We begin by noting that the strict relation of global
A-indiscernibility (being Au{ <} -isomorphic)
,
like the old
one, partitions the set of all possible worlds. For each
cell in the partition induced by global A-indiscernibility,
there is a maximal A-proposition true at all and only the
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worlds in that cell. We can think of it as a complete
description of a way a world could be with respect to the
properties and relations in Au{<). An A-proposition is any
proposition which is such that either it or its negation is
entailed by every maximal A—proposition.
Quite clearly, if s (Gwm)
-supervenes on B then there
will be a function from maximal B-propositions onto maximal
S-propositions
:
(GwmD) S (Gwm)
-supervenes on B iff there is a
function, f, from maximal B-propositions
(complete ways a world can be with respect to the
properties and relations in Bu{<}) onto maximal
S-propositions such that for any possible world,
w, and any maximal B-proposition
,
P, necessarily
if P is true at w then f(P) is true at w.
Otherwise, there would be two worlds at which the same
maximal B-proposition is true but different maximal S-
propositions are true. Such worlds would be Bu{<}-
1
0
•Essentially, I am now treating < as a logical
relation (or concept) which can be "contained" in any sort
of proposition without affecting its non-logical subject
matter. Previously, < was not afforded this lofty status.
I am, in effect, introducing different notions of an A-
proposition and a maximal A-proposition. It is important
to note that the soundness of my earlier arguments in
chapter V.C., regarding the equivalence of the two standard
ways of interpreting (G)
,
is not compromised when they are
interpreted in terms of these new definitions of "global A-
indiscernibility" and "A-proposition" (or "A-truth")
.
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isomorphic but not Su{ <}
-isomorphic and would be
counterexamples to the (Gwm)
-supervenience of s on B.
Now I aim to establish the following:
(GwmC) If s (Gwm)
-supervenes on B then any s-
proposition, P, is equivalent to a disjunction of
maximal B-propositions
.
To prove (GwmC), suppose that S (Gwm)
-supervenes on B. So
any two worlds which are Bu{ <}
-isomorphic are Su{<)-
isomorphic as well. Now consider any S-proposition, P. l
claim that if p is true at w, then every other world, z,
which is Bu{<)
-isomorphic to w must also be such that P is
true at z. In other words, for any cell in the partition
of the class of all possible worlds induced by the relation
of being Bu{ <}
-isomorphic, and any S-proposition, P, P is
true at one world in the cell iff it is true at all of
them. For reductio, suppose some cell contains a world, w,
at which P is true and another world, z, at which P is
false. Since w and z are in the same cell of the partition
induced by global B-indiscernibility
,
there is a Bu{<}-
isomorphism between them. Thus, according to (Gwm)
,
there
must be an Su{ <} -isomorphism between them. It follows that
the same maximal S-proposition is true at w and at z, so
the S-proposition, P, must have the same truth value at
both worlds. This establishes that any S-proposition, P,
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has the same truth value at all worlds in any cell in the
partition induced by being globally B-indiscernible
.
Likewise, P is false at a world in a cell iff it is false
at all of them. Thus, any S-proposition, P, is necessarily
equivalent with the disjunction of all the maximal B-
propositions associated with the cells in the partition at
which P is true. This is sufficient to establish (GwmC)
.
F. Nonreductive Dependence Again
1. Reduction
In chapter III. A., I defended the nonreductive status
of strong supervenience
. Kim's challenge to its
nonreductive status seemed to be strongest when we
interpreted his remarks concerning strong connectibility as
the claim that the existence of necessary biconditionals
linking all theoretical terms of the secondary discipline
with terms of the primary (or reducing) discipline is all
that is required for the secondary discipline to be
reducible to the primary discipline. I argued that even if
we accept this undemanding notion of intertheoretic
reducibility and we restrict our attention to cases where
both the supervenient and base sets of properties could be
identified with a respective discipline (e.g. one with
economics, one with physics) the strong supervenience of S
on B does not imply the (in principle) reducibility of the
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S discipline to the B-discipline
. The main reason for this
was that even though the strong supervenience of S on B
implies that every property in S is necessarily coextensive
with some member of the Boolean closure of B (see (SE)
p.37), there is reason to think that even if all members of
B are expressed by theoretical terms of some scientific
discipline (the B-discipline)
,
in many cases the
complicated predicates expressing members of the Boolean
closure of B would fail to qualify as terms of that
discipline
.
We have seen that like (S)
,
(Lwm)
,
(Lsm) and (Gsm) all
guarantee that every property in the supervenient set is
necessarily coextensive with some logical construction of
members of the base set. But we also saw that the
constructions are more complicated in the case of (Lwm)
,
(Lsm)
,
and (Gsm) : they include quantifiers and relational
predicates while those provided by (S) do not. For
example, even predicates expressing locally supervenient
properties are necessarily coextensive with open sentences
consisting of quantifiers, the logical operators of
disjunction, conjunction and negation, and predicates
expressing base properties, base relations, and the
part/whole relation. It seems, then, that my reasons in
defense of the nonreductive character of (S) are, if
anything, more compelling in the cases of (Lwm)
,
(Lsm)
,
and
(Gsm) . Finally, the nonreductive status of (Gwm) is really
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beyond dispute because it does not even imply the existence
of any necessary coextensions between supervenient
properties (or relations) and constructions out of base
properties and relations. Thus, I think we can conclude
that when one is concerned with a kind of reduction that
has (even minimal) epistemological (and sociological)
requirements, as is surely the case with Nagel-style
intertheoret ic reduction, then all these supervenience
relations are capable of formulating nonreductive
relations
.
On the other hand, it is worth recalling that locally
supervenient properties and relations, especially, may be
necessarily coextensive with finite, manageable
constructions out of the base set which would satisfy the
strong connectibility requirement of theoretical
reductions. So while these new relations are compatible
with the irreducibility of S-theories to B-theories, like
(S)
,
they certainly do not ensure that the relevant S-
theory (or discipline) will fail to reduce to the relevant
B-theory (or discipline) . David Lewis sums up the
relationship between supervenience and reducibility thus:
A Supervenience thesis is, in a broad sense,
reductionist. But it is a stripped down
form of reductionism unencumbered by dubious
denials of existence, claims of ontological
priority, or claims of translatability . . .
.
Even if reductionists ought to be less
cautious and aim for translation, still it
is a good idea to attend to the question of
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supervenience. For if supervenience failsthen no scheme of translation can be correitand we needn't go on Chisholming away in
search of one. if supervenience succeeds
on the other hand, then some correct scheme
^^^^t exist; the remaining guestion is
whether there exists a correct scheme thatis less than infinitely complex.
The basic claim is perfectly correct: without the
functional correlation implied by supervenience, there is
no hope of finding a necessarily coextensive predicate of
the reducing theory for each predicate in the theory to be
reduced.
This raises an interesting guestion. Precisely which
supervenience relation is the strongest one whose
correlation must be satisfied if some sort of
intertheoretic reduction is possible? Although it is a
necessary condition for this sort of reducibility
,
(Gwm) is
too weak because it neither entails the infinite
definability of predicates expressing supervenient
attributes in terms of predicates expressing base
attributes, nor does it guarantee that any such translation
scheme of the sort Lewis mentions exists. (Gsm) and our
local relations, on the other hand, do imply that some such
scheme exists for any predicate expressing any member of
the supervenient set. However, if, as seems likely, some
reductions will involve extrinsic properties which fail to
^^Lewis (1983) p. 358.
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be locally supervenient on the reducing properties, then
(Lsm) and (Lwm) are too strong. This leaves (Gsm) as the
likely candidate to be the strongest of our generalized
supervenience relations which is necessary for
intertheoretic reducibility
.
2 . Dependence
In chapter III.B.2,, I distinguished ontic (or
ontological) dependence/determination from both functional
dependence/determination and ontic priority. I suggested
that the ontic dependence relation which Kim, Charles, and
others criticize supervenience for failing to provide could
be analyzed as a functional dependence relation between
sets of properties where, roughly, the members of the base
^^One might wonder whether this is correct. After
all, we know that (Lwm) does not entail (Gsm), and didn't I
just say that (Lwm) is too strong to be a necessary
condition on intertheoretic reducibility? This seems to
imply that (Gsm) is not necessary for intertheoretic
reducibility because intertheoretic reducibility may hold
in some cases where (Lwm) is true and (Gsm) is false. But
appearances are deceiving. To straighten things out we
need to recall that (Lwm) does entail (Gsm) when the
supervenient set is restricted to properties, as I have
been assuming throughout this section. Thus, when the
supervenience of properties is in question, (Gsm) is the
strongest supervenience relation necessary for
intertheoretic reducibility for the reasons given in the
text. On the other hand, when relations are included in
the supervenient set, (Lwm) fails to entail (Lsm)
,
and it
will probably fail (as (Gwm) fails) to be sufficient for
the sort of infinite definability required for
intertheoretic reducibility. Thus, although it hasn't been
definitively proven, I think it is reasonable to claim that
(Gsm) is the strongest of our four supervenience relations
necessary for intertheoretic reducibility.
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set are ontically prior to, or more natural than, the
members of the supervenient set.^^
We saw that while strong supervenience
,
(S)
,
is a
functional dependence or determination relation, even
strong asymmetric supervenience is not a sufficient
condition for the ontic priority of the base properties.
Given that strong supervenience is as strong as any
supervenience relation, I agreed with Kim and Grimes that
no supervenience relation is a sufficient condition for the
ontic dependence of the supervenient properties on the base
properties. I also suggested that, nevertheless, some
supervenience relation may yet be a necessary condition for
ontic dependence/determination between sets of properties
in virtue of being equivalent to the sort of functional
dependence which is one part of the two-part analysis of
ontic dependence. Such a relation would clearly be
metaphysically significant as part of an analysis of ontic
dependence between sets of properties (and relations)
. I
have since shown that the functional dependence relation
provided by (S) is too strong to be part of an analysis of
ontic dependence among properties: witness the inability of
(S) to capture the local supervenience of pliability on
microphysical properties and relations and many other
examples involving mereological dependence, holistic
^^For the required qualification see (SAS3) in chapter
III.B.5.
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dependence, and dependence on relations. These were among
the reasons for the appeal of global supervenience and for
the subsequent development of multiple domain supervenience
into the four relations considered in this chapter. My
next task is to determine which of the functional
determination relations provided by these four relations is
most suited to be part of an analysis of ontic
dependence/determination between properties.
(Lwm) and (Lsm) appear to be too strong: many
important properties are extrinsic, and if Lewis's Humean
supervenience thesis is true then such properties are
ontologically dependent (but not locally supervenient) on
the set of perfectly natural microphysical properties and
relations. It seems, then, that either (Gsm) or (Gwm)
would be the supervenience relation which provides one part
of the two part analysis of ontic dependence or
determination. I think (Gsm) is the most likely candidate.
Reflection on the original proofs of the non-equivalence of
(Gs) and (Gw)
,
and my arguments for the need for some
version of (Gs) (see V.D.2) suggests that the functional
determination relation provided by (Gwm) is too weak to
capture the holistic determination relations which global
supervenience was designed to capture. On the other hand,
if the issue is which relation provides the appropriate
functional dependence relation for an analysis of ontic
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dependence among propositions (or facts)
,
then the nod
would have to go to (Gwm)
.
G. Conclusion
In this chapter we saw some advantages of our new
formulations of local supervenience
. For instance, (Lsm)
,
in virtue of entailing (Gsm)
,
is also strong enough to
satisfy the necessary condition for reducibility and to
ensure that a relation of ontic dependence holds as long as
the base properties are ontically prior to the supervenient
ones. More generally, before the introduction of (Lwm) and
(Lsm) the only way to capture local multiple-domain
dependence relations was to formulate them in terms of
global supervenience. I think this contributed
icially to the popularity of global supervenience.
Certainly we want a local supervenience relation which can
capture such determination relations directly. Our new
local supervenience relations, (Lsm) and (Lwm)
,
can do so.
This is especially valuable because the local supervenience
of the properties of wholes on the properties of, and
relations between, their parts seems to be the paradigm
case of a metaphysically significant supervenience
relation.
In conclusion, while all four of our new supervenience
relations appear to be nonreductive dependence relations.
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of some sort, there is reason to think that (Gsm)-
supervenience is the most philosophically significant of
them. It appears to be both a necessary condition for
intertheoretic reducibility and both a necessary condition,
and part of an analysis, of ontic dependence among families
of properties and relations. Another advantage of (Gsm) is
that it is a precise formulation of the leading idea of
holistic determination t the idea that the base properties
and relations of an individual, its worldmates and their
base relations (and the part/whole relation) to one another
(functionally) determine the individual's supervenient
properties
.
But there is still the question of the overall
significance of supervenience
,
especially as a dependence
relation. So far, my argument that (Gsm) -supervenience is
strong enough to be one part of a two-part analysis of
ontic dependence has been very abstract. I could put some
flesh on the bones of this argument if I could show in
detail why a specific supervenience thesis (such as global
psychophysical supervenience) is indeed a significant
necessary condition on some specific metaphysical
dependency thesis (such as materialism) . This will be
accomplished in the next (and final) chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUPERVENIENCE
——
—
Significance of Functional Dependence
1. The Objection
It is time to reconsider standard criticisms of the
metaphysical significance of supervenience
. The critics
(e.g.
,
Grimes, Kim, and Charles) have usually focussed on
its reputed shortcomings as a formulation of physicalism
(see chapter III.B.)
. These philosophers argue that
psychophysical supervenience is not equivalent to
materialism because the supervenience thesis is too weak to
capture the kind of asymmetric dependence relation that
must hold between mental and physical properties and
relations if materialism (or physicalism) is true. Their
essential point seems to be that supervenience is not
sufficient for the ontological priority, or greater
naturalness, of the members of the base set. Although the
critics are right that even asymmetric supervenience is not
sufficient for such a relation, they seem to have
underestimated the importance of the functional dependence
relations implied by various supervenience theses:
particularly (Lsm) and (Gsm)
.
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2... A Combinatorial Defense of Superveni
The importance of the functional dependence relations
provided by supervenience relations such as (Lsm) and (Gsm)
can be seen by reflecting on a metaphysical scheme that
takes plenitude principles such as Isolation (see chapter
IV) seriously. i have in mind a combinatorial metaphysics
such as the "Tractarian Nominalism" presented by Skyrms
(1981) . I will present only the briefest outline of this
view as it is developed by Armstrong (1989).^
The central claim of combinatorialism is that
possibility (and necessity) are to be analyzed (or at least
understood) in terms of all combinations of certain
fundamental (or basic) entities. According to Armstrong,
the basic entities come in three kinds; basic individuals
(Armstrong suggests point-instants^)
,
and a few basic
P^op^^ties and relations (which play the role of Lewis's
perfectly natural properties and relations^)
. The details
•jOther combinatorial schemes have been developed by
Cresswell (1972), and considered in some depth by Quine
(1969)
,
and Lycan (1979)
.
^Armstrong (1989) p. 38.
^Unlike Lewis, Armstrong ascribes to a theory according
to which properties and relations are sparse. He holds
that, strictly speaking, the only properties or relations
are perfectly natural properties and relations. Unlike
Lewis, who is agnostic on the matter, Armstrong claims that
these natural properties and relations are universals
(entities that are "wholly present" in each of their
potentially multiple instances). Nevertheless, Armstrong
accepts Lewis's view that the natural properties and
relations (Armstrong would say the only real properties and
(continued . .
.
)
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of the view are not important to us. The central idea is
that any basic individual can instantiate any combination
of basic properties and stand in any basic relations to
other basic individuals. The instantiation of a basic
property by a basic individual or the holding of an n-place
basic relation between n basic individuals is an "atomic
state of affairs"^ Possibilities, then, are understood
as conjunctions of atomic states of affairs; roughly any
conjunction of atomic states of affairs is possible, and
possible worlds are special maximal conjunctions of atomic
states of affairs.^
Given that Armstrong individuates worlds in terms of
atomic states of affairs, and atomic states of affairs
coritain basic individuals, it simplifies our discussion to
work with global supervenience roughly as Kim originally
understood it. Specifically, I will work with (G) on the
understanding that worlds are globally A-indiscernible iff
they have the same distribution of A-properties over basic
individuals.*^
^ ( . . . continued)
relations) constitute a minimal supervenience base for all
other respects of qualitative difference.
^Armstrong (1989) p. 41.
^Armstrong (1989) Chapter 3.
*^This is equivalent to working with (Gwm) or (Gsm) on
the assumption that basic individuals are never parts of one
another and that the haecceities of basic individuals are
included in both the base and supervenient sets.
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On these assumptions it is rather easy to see why the
global supervenience of the mental on the physical is a
necessary condition on physicalism. On this framework,
physicalism would plausibly be formulated as the hypothesis
that the only basic properties and relations are
physical.^ In other words, physicalism is the thesis that
the only basic properties and relations that can be
independently combined and recombined in any old way with
basic individuals are physical properties: the physical
P^op^i^ties and relations are the building blocks out of
which all other (qualitative) properties and relations are
"constructed". So understood, the mental will have to
supervene globally (but perhaps not locally) on the set of
physical properties and relations. To see that this is so,
suppose, for reductio, that some mental property or
relation, M, fails to supervene globally on the set of all
physical properties and relations, P. Then there are
possible worlds with the same distribution of physical
properties and relations in P (over the basic individuals)
,
but different distributions of M. But this means that
^Those who think physicalism is a contingent thesis
should interpret all my references to "all basic (or
natural) properties and relations" in this section as
tacitly restricted to only those basic properties and
relations that are actually instantiated. For arguments
that this is the proper way to restrict the modality
involved in physicalism and materialism see Lewis (1983) and
Chapter IV. D. 2.. The logic of the subsequent argument is
sound on both the restricted and the unrestricted
interpretation
.
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these worlds cannot be identified as conjunctions of atomic
states of affairs after all. Here's why: because the
worlds have the same distributions of physical properties
and relations and, by hypothesis, all basic properties and
relations are physical, it follows that they have the same
distribution of basic properties and relations over the
basic individuals. This means that the same atomic states
hold at both of them. Thus, according to
Armstrong's combinatorialism, the worlds are identical.
But they are not identical worlds because they differ with
respect to the distribution of the mental property, M.
Thus, we reject the reductio assumption, and conclude that
if physicalism is true, then the mental must globally
supervene on the physical.
We can represent the basic structure of the argument
thus
:
To Prove: If physicalism is true then every mental
property globally supervenes on the set of all
physical properties (and relations)
.
(1) Physicalism is true. (Conditional Assumption)
(2) Physicalism is the doctrine that all basic
properties, relations (and individuals) are
physical. (DFN)
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(3) Worlds are conjunctions of atomic states of
(Armstrong)
(4) W and z, have the same distributions of basic
properties and relations over basic individuals
iff the same atomic states of affairs hold at w
and at z. (Ass)®
(5) Some mental property, M, fails to globally
supervene on the set of all physical properties
and relations. (Reductio)
(6) There are two worlds, w and z such that (a) w and
z have the same distributions of physical
properties and relations (over individuals) and
(b) w and z have different distributions of M. (5
Dfn of global)
(V) W = z (1, 2,
(8) VI * z (6b)
(9) P & -P (7, 8)
On Armstrong's combinatorial metaphysics, we can see why
the thesis that the mental (the moral, the biological, or
whatever) is globally supervenient on the physical is
significant. The falsehood of the thesis is tantamount to
the denial of physicalism. It implies that one of the
®This assumption is justified, I believe, in light of
Armstrong's notion of an atomic state of affairs, and in
light of Kim's original understanding of a distribution of
properties and relations over basic individuals (which we
are working with in this argument)
.
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ontologically basic properties or relations is not a
physical property or relation. This is why it is useful to
include a supervenience thesis as part of a formulation of
physicalism (or materialism)
.
If we make use of the notion of a natural property,
the point can be seen more quickly. Essentially, in the
combinatorial framework, physicalism amounts to the thesis
that all perfectly natural properties and relations are
physical properties and relations.^ But, as we have
already seen, according to Lewis and Armstrong, being a
perfectly natural property involves being a member of a
supervenience base for all other properties. And in light
of our investigation into the different versions of
supervenience, I believe we can conclude that natural
properties (and relations) must make up a (Gsm)-
supervenience base. So the claim that all natural
properties and relations are physical implies that the set
of mental properties and relations (as well as all other
qualities) (Gsm) -supervenes on the set of all physical
properties and relations (in virtue of supervening on the
subset of the base set that is the set of all natural
properties and relations) . This is why the thesis that the
mental, for example, is (Gsm) -supervenient on the physical
^If physicalism is taken to be a contingent truth (as
it often is) then it is best formulated as the claim that
all the actual perfectly natural properties and relations
(i.e., those that are actually instantiated) are physical
properties or relations. See note 7 above for more details.
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has metaphysical significance. The falsehood of the thesis
is tantamount to the denial of physicalism. it implies
that some perfectly natural (i.e., most ontologically
basic) property or relation is not a physical property or
relation. This is why many have said that the basic issue
dividing physicalists and non-physical ists of all stripes
is the supervenience of all gualitative properties and
relations on the physical. Physicalists are committed to
it, dualists are not (although they need not embrace its
denial either^°)
. The capacity of supervenience to
formulate theses that play such a central role in basic
philosophical disputes is the primary significance of
supervenience. And it is especially important to realize
that this capacity derives from its status as a functional
dependence or determination relation.
3 . A Second Look at the Literature
What Grimes, Kim and the other critics have shown is
that no supervenience relation, alone, is sufficient for
physicalism. A serious physicalist therefore must
supplement her supervenience thesis with some other claim,
^*^An example of a kind of property (and event) dualism
that is compatible with psychophysical supervenience is
presented by Stephen Yablo (1992). Yablo argues that in
some cases mental events (on the fine-grained conception of
events) have a kind of causal priority over their physical
realizations. And the supervenience of the mental on the
physical is actually a central premise in his argument for
the causal priority of (some) mental events.
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or some of the positive aspects of her position will be
left out. For example, the physicalist might formulate
physicalism as the claim that all natural properties and
relations are physical. This not only entails the
supervenience of mental (moral, biological, etc) properties
on physical properties, but it also implies the ontic
priority of (at least some) physical properties and
relations relative to all other properties and relations.
Alternatively, the physicalist could choose to formulate
physicalism in two steps. First she would assert that all
qualitative properties supervene on the set of all physical
properties and relations. Then she would supplement this
claim with an extra thesis designed to indicate that the
physical is somehow prior to the non-physical.
With this in mind it is interesting to note that in
their original work on supervenience (or "determination")
,
Heilman and Thompson emphasize that if physicalism is to be
formulated as a supervenience thesis it must be
supplemented by an additional principle that somehow
expresses the primacy of the physical. H&T supplement
their principles of physical determination with a principle
of physical exhaustion according to which every entity is
either a basic physical entity of the sort directly studied
by physicists (e.g., a quark, neutrino, electron, photon,
etc)
,
a mereological sum of such entities, or a set
theoretic construction of such entities and their sums.
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[TJhese determination principles ... are
separately and jointly independent of
Ontological Physicalism [i.e., the principle
of physical exhaustion] and reductionism.
Physical Determination does not require that
all attributes
- properties, relations,
functions, etc. - be, modulo reduction,
physical attributes. The principles of
Ontological Physicalism and of Physical
Determination together make up Physical ist
Materialism.
In fact, materialism is often expressed as the
conjunction of a supervenience thesis and some version of
the token identity theory according to which, for instance,
all individuals (and all events) are physical, but not all
individuals or events are mental. This is the position of
Davidson (1970). More recently, LePore and Loewer have
characterized materialism as the conjunction of three
theses: (i) a principle of physical exhaustion according to
which every event is a physical event (although some may be
mental events as well), (ii) a global psychophysical
supervenience thesis, and (iii) a principle asserting the
causal priority of the physical. These authors find
supervenience useful precisely because it is a powerful
necessary condition on physicalism. They didn't represent
psychophysical supervenience as sufficient for materialism.
^^Hellman and Thompson (1977) p. 511.
^^LePore and Lower (1989) pp. 177-178.
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B. A Response to Grimoc;
With these points established, it is time to
reconsider Grimes' criticism of the metaphysical
significance of supervenience
.
^ristead of being a savior of contemporary
philosophy, the concept of supervenience
turns out to be rather uninteresting, or atleast ill-suited for the sorts of
applications it is supposed to have. For
even in its strongest form, this concept
fails to serve as a general form of
dependence.... Thus, supervenience is not
an all-purpose device for explaining how the
moral, the mental, or the macrophysical
depends in some special way upon a more
basic reality. It's just not the right sort
of concept in this regard.”'^
Now we can see that Grimes has overstated things with his
claim that supervenience is inadequate for the sorts of
applications it is supposed by many to have. In general.
Grimes is simply wrong that supervenience fails to be a
general form of dependency: it is a kind of functional
dependency, and different types of supervenience are
different sort of functional dependence relations.
More specifically, supervenience is supposed by many
to be a necessary (but insufficient) condition of
intertheoretic reducibility
,
and it is perfectly adequate
to the task. Also, specific supervenience theses (such as
’^Grimes (1988) p. 159.
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the global supervenience of the mental on the physical) are
explicitly and correctly treated as important necessary but
insufficient, conditions on physicalism and other important
philosophical positions by three of the most influential
supervenience theorists (e.g., Davidson (1970), and Heilman
and Thompson (1975), (1977)), and by some more recent
writers (e.g., Lepore and Lower (1989); Oddie (1991)).
This helps dispel the incorrect impression that the
proponents of supervenience have universally expected more
of supervenience than it is capable of providing.
Finally, while Grimes is correct that "supervenience
is not an all-purpose device for explaining how the moral,
the mental, or the macrophysical depends in some special
way upon a more basic reality",''^ in the sense that it
doesn't capture everything that is important about such
relationships (e.g. ontic priority)
,
supervenience is
ideally suited for "explaining how the moral, the mental,
or the macrophysical depends in some special way upon a
more basic reality".''^ For example, the macrophysical
might be locally supervenient while the mental is only
globally supervenient on the physical. Moreover, certain
mental properties might be locally supervenient on
intrinsic physical properties while others are not. Were
these claims true, they would, in fact, convey pertinent
^"^Grimes (1988) p. 159.
’^Grimes (1988) p. 159.
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between the
information concerning the dependence relations
respective properties. in a perfectly legitimate sense,
such claims would provide information regarding how (as
opposed to why) these "realms" depend on the physical.
C. Conclusion
In chapters III, IV, VI, and VII, I defended
supervenience as both a nonreductive relation and as a
metaphysically significant dependence relation with
applications in disparate fields of philosophy. Chapter IV
deserves special mention for in that chapter I defend the
significance of functional dependence relations by
focussing on the comparatively weak functional dependence
relation provided by global supervenience (really (Gw)-
supervenience) and showing its strength against the
backdrop of a modal ontology which respects the plenitude
of possibilities. This discussion provided the foundation
for my defense in this chapter of the significance of
global psychophysical supervenience in general, and (Gsm)-
psychophysical supervenience in particular, as a necessary
condition on physicalism.
In chapters II, IV, V, and VI, I examined the logical
and metaphysical relations between both the standard
versions and my new versions of supervenience. All the
standard variants of supervenience extant in the literature
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have been found wanting in certain respects; the local
supervenience relations are either too limited (as (S) is
in virtue of being a single domain relation which does not
allow relations in the base set) or too weak and too
limited (as (W) is) to be substantive necessary conditions
on the most ontologically significant dependence relations,
while the standard formulations of global supervenience are
either imprecise or insufficiently general. I believe I
corrected these deficiencies with my new formulations of
local and global supervenience developed in chapters V and
VI
.
Although there certainly is more work to be done on
supervenience, especially the supervenience of relations, I
believe that this dissertation advances the discussion in a
number of ways. First, I think my attention to the
distinction between formal and metaphysical entailment
helps to clarify disputes concerning the entailment
relations between different versions of supervenience.
Second, I think that the new supervenience relations are
substantial improvements on the standard relations (S)
,
(G)
,
and (W) . Third, I believe I have illustrated the
close relationship between supervenience, especially global
supervenience, and metaphysical issues concerning the
plenitude of possibilities. Most importantly, I hope that
my defense of the significance of supervenience theses as
non-trivial necessary conditions on central philosophical
254
theses such as physicalism will allow us to accept the
critics' claim that supervenience is insufficient for the
ontic priority or greater naturalness of the base
properties (or relations) without drawing the mistaken
conclusion that supervenience is a philosophically
insignificant dependence relation.
255
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Armstrong, David (1983) . What is a Law of
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
(1989a) . A Combinatorial Theory nf Pngc ; y^-; i
^
4-,,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
.
(1989b). Universals: an Opinionated Introductinn
(Boulder: Westview Press)
.
Bacon, John (1986). "Supervenience, Necessary Coextension
and Reducibility"
,
Philosophical Studies 49: 163-176!
(1990). "Van Cleve Versus Closure", Philosophical
Studies 58: 239-242.
Bigelow, John, and Robert Pargetter (1990) . Science and
Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Bonevac, Daniel (1991). "Semantics and Supervenience",
Svnthese 87: 331-361.
Boolos, George S., and Jeffrey, Richard S. (1989)
Computability and Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press)
.
Bricker, Phillip (1991). "Plenitude of Possible
Structures", The Journal of Philosophy 87: 607-619.
Brink, David (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
.
Butterfield, Jeremy (1989). "The Hole Truth", British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40: 1-28.
Charles, David (1992). "Supervenience, Composition, and
Physical ism"
,
in David Charles and Kathleen Lennon
(ed.). Reduction. Explanation, and Realism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press), 265-296.
Crane, Tim (1991). "All God Has To Do", Analysis 51: 235-
244 .
Cresswell, M. J. (1979). "The World is Everything That is
the Case", in Michael J. Loux (ed.). The Possible and
the Actual (Ithica: Cornell University Press)
,
pp.
129-145.
Currie, Gregory (1984). "Global Supervenience and
Reduction", British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 35: 345-358.
256
(1990) . "Supervenience, Essentialism and Aesthetic
,
Philosophical Studies 58: 243—257,
Davidson, Donald ( 1970) . "Mental Events" in Ned Block
Readings in Philosophy of Psychology
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 107-119
DePaul, Michael R. (1987). "Supervenience and Moral
Dependence", Philosophical Studies 51: 425 -439 .
Grimes, Thomas R. (1988). "The Myth of Supervenience",
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69: 152-160.
(1991). "Supervenience, Determination, and
Dependency", Philosophical StudiP<^ 62: 81-92.
Hare, R. M. (1952). The Language of Morals (New York:
Oxford University Press)
.
Haugeland, John (1982). "Weak Supervenience", American
Philosophical Quarterly 19: 93-103.
Heilman, Geoffrey (1985). "Determination and Logical
Truth", Journal of Philosophy 82: 607-616.
Heilman, Geoffrey, and Frank Thompson (1975) . "Physicalism
Ontology, Determination, and Reduction", Journal of
Philosophy 72: 551-564.
(1977) "Physicalist Materialism", Nous
. 11: 309-345.
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type
Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
.
Horgan, Terrence (1982). "Supervenience and Microphysics",
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63: 29-43.
(1984). "Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics",
Southern Journal of Philosophy
. 22, Supplement: 19-38
(1987). "Supervenient Qualia", The Philosophical
Review
.
96: 491-520.
Kim, Jaegwon Kim (1978). "Supervenience and Nomological
Incommensurables"
,
Americal Philosophical Quarterly
.
15: 149-158.
(1982). "Psychophysical Supervenience", Philosophical
Studies 41: 51-70.
(1984a). "Concepts of Supervenience", Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 65: 153-176.
257
- (1984b). "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation"Midwest Studies 9: 257-270. '
(1987) . " Strong and ' Global' Supervenience
Revisited", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
48: 315-326.
(1988). "Supervenience for Multiple Domains",
Philosophical Topics 16; 129-150.
(1989). "The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism" APA
Proceedings 63; 31-47. '
(1990). "Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept"
Metaphilosophv 21; 1-27. '
(1991). "Comments on Cranston Pauli's 'A Defense of
Strong Supervenience'", Presented at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst May of 1991.
Kincaid, Harold (1987). "Supervenience Doesn't Entail
Reducibility"
,
The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25;
343-354
.
Kitcher, Philip (1984). "1953 and All That; A Tale of Two
Sciences", The Philosophical Review 93: 335-373.
Lepore, Ernest and Barry Loewer (1989) . "More on Making
Mind Matter", Philosophical Topics 17: 175-191.
Lewis, David (1983). "New Work for a Theory of Universals",
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343-377.
(1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford:
Blackwell)
.
(1986b). "Against Structural Universals", Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 64: 25-46.
(1986c). Philosophical Papers vol. II (Oxford:
Blackwell)
.
(1988). "What Experience Teaches", reprinted in
William Lycan (ed.). Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell
,
1990)
,
pp. 499-519
.
Lombard, Lawrence (1986). Events: A Metaphysical Study
(London: Routledge, Kegan Paul.
258
Lycan, William (1979). "The Trouble with Possible Worlds"in Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1979)
, pp. 274-316.
Macdonald, Cynthia (1989). Mind-Body Identity ThenriPg (NewYork: Routledge)
.
Moore, G. E. (1922) Philosophical Studies (London:
Routledge)
.
Nagel, Ernest (1961) The Structure of Science
(Indianapolis: Hackett)
.
Oddie, Graham (1991) . "Supervenience, Goodness, and Higher-
Oirder Universals"
,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
69: 20-47. '
Oddie, Graham and Pavel Tichy (1990) . "Resplicing
Properties in the Supervenience Base", Philosophical
Studies 58: 259-269.
Pauli, Cranston, and Theodore Sider (1992). "In Defense of
Global Supervenience", Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 52: 833-854.
Petrie, Bradford (1987). "Global Supervenience and
Reduction", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
48: 119-130.
Post, John F. (1984). "Comment on Teller", Southern
Journal of Philosophy 22, Supplement: 163-167.
(1987). The Faces of Existence: An Essay in
Nonreductive Metaphysics (Ithica: Cornell).
Quine, W. V. (1960). Word And Object (MIT).
(1969). "Propositional Objects", in Ontological
Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia) 139-
160.
Rosenberg, Alexander (1978). "The Supervenience of
Biological Concepts", Philosophy of Science 45: 368-
386.
Sarkar, Sahotra (1992). "Models of Reduction and Categories
of Reductionism"
,
Svnthese 91, 167-194.
Shoenfeild, John (1967). Mathematical Logic (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley)
.
259
Sider Theodore (1991) . "intermediate Supervenience andthe Hierarchy of Ontological Pacification"
Manuscript. '
Simmons, Peter (1987) Parts; A stndv in Ontoloov
Clarendon Press ) .
^
Sklar, Lawrence (1967). "Types of Inter-Theoretic
Reduction", British Journal for the Philosonhv ofScience 18, 109-124 . '
Skyrms, Brian (1981). "Tractarian Nominalism",
Philosophical Studies 40: 199-206.
Teller, Paul (1984a). "A Poor Man's Guide to Supervenience
and Determination", Southern Journal of Philosophy 22Supplement: 137-162.
(1984b). "Comments on Kim's Paper", Southern Journal
of Philosophy 22, Supplement: 57-61.
Tennant, Neil (1985) . "Beth's Theorem and Reductionism"
,
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 342-354.
Tye, Michael (1983) . "On the Possibility of Desembodied
Existence"
,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61
•
275-282.
Van Cleve, James (1990). "Supervenience and Closure",
Philosophical Studies 58: 225-238.
Yablo, Stephen (1992) . "Mental
Philosophical Review 101:
Causation"
,
245-280.
The
260

